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Americans are being inundated with warnings in the labeling of consumer
products. Congress, at least half a dozen federal agencies, state lawmakers, and
the courts all demand that warnings accompany consumer goods. In this
Article, Mr. Noah argues that there are too many decisionmakers pursuing too
many different purposes, and paying too little attention to the serious
information costs that may result from the overuse of warnings. In particular,
he notes that indiscriminate and cumulative warnings about trivial risks may
be counterproductive. Consumers either will begin to ignore product labels
altogether, thereby missing other important information, or they will become
alarmed by risks that were judged insufficient to warrant any more direct
attempts to curtail use. Such inappropriate responses to risk labeling may
outweigh the anticipated benefits of warning requirements, especially when the
primary purpose of such efforts is nothing more than fulfilling an amorphous
"right to know." Thus, Mr. Noah concludes that there is a pressing need for
a more coherent risk communication strategy. Without one, he argues,
manufacturers of consumer products will continue to face increasing and
sometimes inconsistent demands to include warnings in labeling, even if the net
effect of those warnings is public apathy and confusion.
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Introduction
American consumers are being inundated with warnings. Hazard statements
on product labels have become so commonplace that many consumers no longer
notice their presence. For purposes of this Article, the term "warning"
encompasses any explicit statement concerning the risks that a person may
encounter when using a product. Risk information may be presented as a
"Warning" or introduced by some other signal word such as "Danger" or
"Caution," and it usually describes potential health hazards to the immediate
consumer. The majority of warning statements appear in product labeling but
there are a number of other methods available for communicating risk
information to consumers. Indeed, a fundamental question for legislators,
regulators, and the courts is whether the traditional warning label requirement
represents the most appropriate mechanism for conveying information about
hazards posed by consumer products.
Almost no category of products has escaped the imperative to warn.
Warning labels are required for cigarettes, alcoholic beverages, cosmetics, food
products, pharmaceuticals, medical devices, household cleaners, and pesticides.
Frequently, several different warning statements must appear in the labeling that
accompanies such products; these statements may range from concrete
directions for avoiding acute hazards to vague disclaimers concerning possible
chronic risks. As labels become increasingly crowded, risk information is often
presented in exaggerated terms in an effort to attract the attention of distracted
consumers, even though the overuse of warnings may dilute the impact of truly
important cautionary information or cause consumers to overreact to
information about inconsequential risks.
Several factors account for the proliferation of warnings. First, legislators
at both the federal and state level have demanded that the public be alerted to
hazards associated with consumer products. In some cases, legislators have
required warnings on specific products, often because their popularity makes
more stringent agency proposals, such as outright prohibitions, politically
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difficult. In most instances, however, Congress has enacted broadly worded
statutes that delegate this responsibility to administrative agencies.
Agencies entrusted with the task of identifying consumer product risks and
drafting appropriate precautionary language face problems other than political
expediency. The identification of hazards associated with consumer products
is often complicated, particularly when the hazards are chronic health risks such
as cancer. In addition, it is difficult for agencies to maintain consistency in the
content and format of label warnings for the products that they regulate. Even
when an agency is internally consistent, it often fails to coordinate its actions
with other agencies.
For their part, state lawmakers have imposed a variety of warning
requirements in instances where they believe that federal regulators have not
been sufficiently aggressive. Thus, states have mandated warnings on myriad
products viewed as posing important health risks. In addition, some states have
considered or enacted sweeping right-to-know initiatives applicable to a broad
range of products. The State of California, for instance, requires that any
products containing a chemical suspected of causing cancer or birth defects bear
an alarming warning statement to that effect. Instead of serving as a mechanism
for improving consumers' decisionmaking, such rules simply stigmatize
products, perhaps in a veiled attempt to pressure companies into reformulating
these products.
Finally, in products liability cases, courts have created incentives to warn
for all sorts of risks, some of them trivial. When viewed with the benefit of
hindsight, and without the need to consider all of the other equally trivial risks
that also might be highlighted, the labeling of almost any product can be
faulted. Several commentators have described the significant and often
misguided influence of courts in this respect, but they generally have failed to
place the judiciary's indirect role in context with the more direct and often
competing warning requirements imposed by Congress, federal agencies, and
state lawmakers. Indeed, it is the confluence of these four forces, rather than
any one in particular, that accounts for the many problems encountered with
the overuse of warning statements on product labels.
Whatever the cause, warnings have become a preferred strategy for dealing
with product risks. In many instances, reliance on risk labeling may represent
a perfectly sensible strategy. Increasingly, however, recourse to warning labels
represents an inappropriate response to the potential hazards of consumer
products. Labeling requirements frequently are justified as inexpensive
alternatives to more burdensome design requirements or outright prohibitions.
This premise fails to appreciate the substantial costs associated with the overuse
of warnings, particularly the twin dangers of diluting the impact of more serious
warnings and prompting counterproductive consumer behavior in response to
overly alarming warnings about relatively insignificant risks.
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In this context, dilution refers to the risk that additional warnings about
relatively inconsequential hazards may cause consumers to become less attentive
to labels as a whole, including some important aspects of labeling such as
directions for proper use. Overreaction is a complementary problem, meaning
that consumers may become preoccupied with information about trivial hazards.
For instance, consumers may forego use of net beneficial products in response
to warning statements, or may shift to equally beneficial substitutes that actually
pose greater (though perhaps less alarming) risks. These and other
considerations counsel in favor of the judicious use of warnings in the labeling
of consumer products.
Ideally, warning statements should be reserved for those risks that can best
be minimized by conveying information through labeling, namely by providing
instructions for avoiding acute hazards. Information about other types of
hazards can be disseminated through mechanisms other than explicit warning
statements in labeling. Simple ingredient disclosures, for instance, may alert
persons who are allergic to particular substances. Public education campaigns
can describe poorly understood chronic hazards that may be associated with
certain products. If a risk is in fact trivial, no information need be provided.
On the other hand, if a risk becomes sufficiently serious relative to the benefits
provided by a product, an outright prohibition or other design requirement
might be preferable to the disclosure of information. At present, however,
warning statements often are mandated in situations where either more or less
stringent regulatory alternatives would seem more appropriate.
Even if decisionmakers recognize the need for greater selectivity in
choosing those hazards that merit attention in product labeling, they will have
to exercise more care in designing effective risk statements. It is essential, for
instance, that warning statements (1) be introduced with signal words
commensurate with the degree of risk posed by a product, (2) accurately specify
the nature of the hazard, (3) be comprehensible to users of the product, (4)
describe the degree of uncertainty underlying the risk estimate, and (5) explain
how to avoid the risk. Signal words should be consistent with the degree of risk
reflected in the text of the precautionary statement, which in turn should
accurately convey the nature of the hazard posed by a product. Although
difficulties with comprehension will necessarily limit the amount of detail that
can be provided, risk statements that are exaggerated, oversimplified, or vague
will not improve consumer decisionmaking. Warning statements in the labeling
of consumer products should convey only concrete and actionable information
about significant risks to users. Unfortunately, in addition to their lack of
selectivity in identifying hazards for which warnings are appropriate,
decisionmakers appear to give insufficient attention to these important
considerations. Unless used in a consistent and thoughtful manner, warning
statements will fail to fulfill their intended purposes.
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Finally, decisionmakers must stop competing with one another for control
over product labeling. The United States Congress, a number of federal
agencies, state lawmakers, and the courts often work at cross-purposes in this
area, accentuating the difficulties in both the identification of hazards for which
warnings are appropriate and the design of effective warning statements
concerning those hazards. This Article concludes that primary authority over
risk labeling for consumer products should reside with federal regulators. In
general, Congress should leave agencies to make the difficult judgments about
appropriate responses to newly discovered hazards; it also should ensure that
these decisions preempt inconsistent state and judicial requirements. For their
part, federal regulators should strive for greater intra- and interagency consis-
tency than exists today. Under this system, states would retain the power to
impose warning requirements for consumer products not subject to federal
regulation, and courts could entertain products liability claims in cases where
manufacturers fail to comply with federal or state requirements, but neither the
states nor the courts would be allowed to undermine agency labeling decisions.
The first three Parts of this Article examine the rich and varied array of
warning requirements imposed or encouraged by Congress, federal
administrative agencies, state governments, and the courts. Although federal
agencies traditionally have been given primary responsibility in this area,
Congress has intervened in several politically sensitive situations, states
increasingly are imposing their own sometimes more stringent requirements,
and the courts have routinely ignored the relevance of requirements imposed
by the other decisionmakers. In Part IV, the Article evaluates issues that are
common to these diverse warning efforts, including problems encountered in
constructing appropriate messages to convey risk information to consumers.
Lastly, in Part V the Article highlights the pitfalls of overreliance on warnings
and suggests possible alternatives.
There is a pressing need for a more coherent risk communication strategy.
If none is developed, manufacturers of consumer products will continue to face
increasing and sometimes inconsistent demands to include warnings in labeling,
even if the net effect is public apathy and confusion.
I. Warning Requirements Imposed by Congress
A. General Misbranding Prohibitions
Many consumer goods are subject to general statutory commands that may
require the inclusion of appropriate precautionary information in labeling. The
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FD&C Act), for instance, prohibits the
adulteration and misbranding of food, drugs, medical devices, and cosmetics
Vol. 11:293, 1994
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before or during delivery in interstate commerce.' The Act enumerates a series
of conditions that define when each of these types of products is deemed to be
misbranded.2 For example, a drug or medical device would be misbranded
unless its labeling bears "such adequate warnings against use in those
pathological conditions or by children where its use may be dangerous to
health, or against unsafe dosage or methods or duration of administration or
application, in such manner and form, as are necessary for the protection of
users."
3
More generally, in determining whether the labeling of a food, drug,
device, or cosmetic is misleading, the FD&C Act specifies that consideration
must be given to any "fail[ure] to reveal facts material . . . with respect to,
consequences which may result from the use of the article . . . ," Under these
provisions, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) enjoys broad authority
to require that warning statements appear on products subject to its jurisdiction.5
Examples of FDA labeling regulations will be discussed more fully in Part II
of the Article.6
The FD&C Act, enacted in 1938, was not the first federal legislation to
require warning statements in the labeling of consumer products. Its
predecessor, the Federal Food and Drugs Act of 1906, prohibited interstate
commerce in adulterated or misbranded food and drugs.7 Other than requiring
that the presence of certain narcotic drugs be disclosed,' however, the 1906 Act
did not specifically mandate that warnings of product risks appear in labeling.
Approximately twenty years later, Congress passed the Federal Caustic Poison
Act, legislation requiring that the word "POISON" and directions for treatment
of accidental ingestion appear on the labels of a dozen enumerated chemicals. 9
The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), enacted in
1947, mandated similar labeling disclosures for highly toxic chemi-
1. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, ch. 675, § 301,52 Stat. 1042 (1938) (codified as amended
at 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(a)-(c) (1988)) [hereinafter FD&C Act].
2. 21 U.S.C. §§ 343 (food), 352 (drugs and devices), 362 (cosmetics) (1988).
3. Id. § 352(0(2).
4. Id. § 321(n).
5. The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) has primary jurisdiction over meat and poultry
products. See Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA), 21 U.S.C. §§ 601-680 (1988); Poultry Products
Inspection Act (PPIA), 21 U.S.C. §§ 451-470(1988). Both statutes contain general misbranding provisions.
See id. §§ 453(h)(12), 457(c), 601(n)(12), 607(d).
6. Indeed, much of the Article focuses on warning efforts for products subject to FDA's jurisdiction,
both because FDA has authority over the vast majority of all potentially hazardous consumer products and
because the Agency has a long and rich history of requiring different types of hazard statements for such
products. Parallels to other agenciesand other products are noted where appropriate, and many of the lessons
from FDA's experiences should be generalizable.
7. Food and Drugs Act, ch. 3915, § 2, 34 Stat. 768 (1906) (supereeded by the FD&C Act, supra note
1).
8. Id. § 8, 34 Stat. 770.
9. Federal Caustic Poison Act, ch. 489, § 2, 44 Stat. 1406-07 (1927). Although largely superseded by
subsequent legislation, see infra notes 10- l1, FDA regulations implementing this statute are still in force.
See 21 C.F.R. §§ 1230.10-.16(1993).
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cals--"POISON" in red letters, accompanied by a skull-and-crossbones
symbol-as well as warnings or cautions to reduce unreasonable risks associated
with the use of pesticides. ° These requirements currently are enforced by the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).
Apart from the FD&C Act, one of the most broadly applicable statutes
governing warning labels on consumer products is the Federal Hazardous
Substances Labeling Act of 1960. " Although it excludes food, drugs, cosmetics,
tobacco, pesticides, and fuel, the Act governs all substances that are toxic,
corrosive, irritating, or flammable. 2 Precautionary information must be
preceded by specified signal words: "DANGER" if a substance is extremely
flammable, corrosive, or highly toxic ("POISON" must also be used in the
latter case), and "WARNING" or "CAUTION" for all other substances subject
to the Act. The warning statement must identify the hazard ("Flammable," or
"Vapor Harmful," for example), include a description of appropriate
precautionary and first-aid measures, and provide instructions for handling the
product. A substance may be classified as a banned hazardous substance if the
cautionary labeling required under the Act is found to be inadequate to protect
public health and safety. 13 The Act has been amended several times to address
specific hazards to children, who generally cannot be safeguarded by recourse
to warning labels. 4
In 1972, Congress enacted the Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA). 5
The provisions of the Act apply to consumer products other than food, drugs,
medical devices, cosmetics, tobacco, pesticides, and vehicles. 6 The Act gave
10. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), ch. 125, § 2(u), 61 Stat. 165 (1947)
(codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 136(q)(2)(D) (1988)). The predecessor Insecticides Act of 1910 had
only included general prohibitions against adulteration and misbranding. See Insecticides Act, ch. 191,
§§ 1, 8, 36 Stat. 331, 333 (1910). FIFRA was substantially amended in 1972 by the Federal Environmental
Pesticide Control Act, Pub. L. No. 92-516, 86 Stat. 973 (1972).
11. Federal Hazardous Substances Labeling Act, Pub. L. No. 86-613, 74 Stat. 372 (1960) (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261-1273 (1988)). This statute now is designated as the Federal Hazardous
Substances Act (FHSA).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 1261(0 (1988).
13. Id. § 1261(q)(1). The implementing agency cannot, however, classify an article as a banned
hazardous substance unless it finds "that the regulation imposes the least burdensome requirement which
prevents or adequately reduces the risk of injury for which the regulation is being promulgated."1d. § 1262-
(i)(2)(C).
14. See Child Protection Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-756, 80 Stat. 1303 (1966); Child Protection and
Toy Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-113, 83 Stat. 187 (1969); Poison Prevention Packaging Act of 1970,
Pub. L. No. 91-601, 84 Stat. 1670 (1970). At a minimum, the phrase "Keep out of reach of children" must
be included on the label unless a product is intended for use around children and bears adequate directions
for protecting children from harm. 15 U.S.C. § 1261(p)(-I) (1988). An earlier law also relied on design
requirements to protect children, in this case from the risk of suffocating in empty refrigerators, because
a labeling requirement would have been futile. See Refrigerator Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 84-930, 70 Stat.
953 (1956) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1211-1214(1988)).
15. Consumer Product Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 92-573, 86 Stat. 1207 (1972) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2081 (1988)). The Act transferred the authority to implement the Federal Hazardous
Substances Act and the Poison Prevention Packaging Act from FDA to the Consumer Product Safety
Commission. 15 U.S.C. § 2079(a) (1988).
16. Id. § 2052(a)(1).
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the newly created Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) the power
to promulgate regulations establishing consumer product safety standards
relating to performance and warning requirements. 7 CPSC may ban a product
if it determines that there is no feasible safety standard adequate to protect the
public from unreasonable risks of either acute or chronic injury."5
In short, Congress has delegated significant authority to administrative
agencies to require that warning statements accompany consumer products.
Pursuant to the FD&C Act's broad prohibitions against misbranding, FDA may
mandate warnings for food, drugs, medical devices, and cosmetics. In FIFRA,
Congress provided somewhat more detailed guidance concerning the content
of warning labels for pesticides. Nonetheless, EPA enjoys significant discretion
in implementing these labeling requirements, and the Agency's jurisdiction
includes pesticides and similar toxic substances intended for lay use. Finally,
under the CPSA and FHSA, CPSC has been charged with the responsibility for
regulating the labeling of most other potentially hazardous consumer products.
B. Specific Products
In addition to delegating broad authority to agencies, Congress sometimes
mandates particular warning statements for certain products, especially when
industry pressure and the popularity of an otherwise troublesome product makes
stricter regulation politically impossible. Saccharin and tobacco are two of the
best-known examples. Others include warnings for coal tar hair dyes, mandated
more than half a century ago, and recent labeling requirements for alcoholic
beverages and products manufactured with ozone depleting substances.
1. Coal Tar Hair Dyes
The earliest example of a specific warning requirement imposed by
Congress involved coal tar hair dyes. When it enacted the FD&C Act in 1938,
Congress exempted these products from the cosmetic adulteration prohibitions,
17. Id. § 2056(a) (A standard could include "[r]equirements that a consumer product be marked with
or accompanied by clear and adequate warnings or instructions, or requirements respecting the form of
warnings or instructions."). CPSC's power is somewhat constrained, however, because the statute provides
that any such requirements "shall be reasonably necessary to prevent or reduce an unreasonable risk of injury
associated with such product." Id. Courts have interpreted this provision as requiring that the identifiable
benefits of a warning requirement must outweigh the costs to the manufacturer, including costs associated
with lost sales. See, e.g., Aqua Slide 'N' Dive Corp. v. CPSC, 569 F.2d 831, 842 (5th Cir. 1978).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 2057 (1988). CPSC must appoint Chronic Hazard Advisory Panels to advise it on the
risks of cancer, birth defects, or gene mutations associated with consumer products, id. § 2077(a), and the
Commission must request a review by a such an advisory panel before it may undertake a rulemaking related
to chronic risks of a product. Id. § 2080(b)(1) & (2)(A). Under the FHSA, CPSC must establish a
Toxicological Advisory Board "to advise the Commission on precautionary labeling for hazardous
substances," id. § I 275(a)(I), but the Act does not require that the Board review hazards before CPSC may
promulgate regulations.
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provided that they conspicuously display a cautionary statement on the label.' 9
This exemption was included after intensive lobbying by persons in the beauty
salon industry who feared that the cosmetic adulteration provision in the
proposed law would force FDA to ban coal tar dyes altogether.2" More recently,
however, new questions have arisen about the safety of coal tar hair dyes.2
Unable to ban these products in light of the statutory exemption, FDA issued
a regulation requiring a cancer warning on products containing one particular
coal tar hair dye ingredient.22 Given the exemption for coal tar hair dyes,
Congress will have to amend the statute if a risk serious enough to justify an
outright prohibition comes to light in the future.
2. Saccharin
In 1977, Congress mandated the disclosure of information concerning
animal carcinogenicity in the labels of food products containing saccharin.
Earlier that year, FDA had proposed banning saccharin as an ingredient in food
and other products after concluding that the available animal studies
demonstrated an association between this artificial sweetener and bladder
cancer.23 Indeed, when the Agency proposed prohibiting most uses of saccharin,
the lifetime human cancer risk extrapolated from the animal data was one-in-
2500.24 FDA's proposal would have allowed for the marketing of saccharin as
19. 21 U.S.C. § 361(a) (1988) ("Caution-This product contains ingredients which may cause skin
irritation on certain individuals and a preliminary test according to accompanying directions should first
be made. This product must not be used for dyeing the eyelashes or eyebrows; to do so may cause blind-
ness."). FDA eventually issued a regulation clarifying the scope of the coal tar hair dye exemption. See 28
Fed. Reg. 6439 (1963) (later codified as 21 C.F.R. § 70.3(u) (1993)); see also Toilet Goods Ass'n v. Finch,
419 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1969) (rejecting challenge to this regulation).
20. See, e.g., Foods, Drugs, and Cosmetics, Hearing Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 489-90 (1935) (statement of Clarence Goodwin,
Allied Manufacturers of the Beauty and Barber Industry).
21. In the late 1970s, Congressional hearings were held to assess claims that coal tar hair dyes may
be carcinogenic. See, e.g., Safety of Hair Dyes and Cosmetic Products, Hearing before the Subcomm. on
Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong., I st
Sess. (1979). But see Graham A. Colditz, Hair Dye and Cancer, 86 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 164 (1994).
22. 21 C.F.R. § 740.18(a) (1993) ("WARNING--Contains an ingredient that can penetrate your skin
and has been determined to cause cancer in laboratory animals."); 44 Fed. Reg. 59,509, 59,510 (1979) (ex-
plaining that "FDA does not have the statutory authority to prohibit the interstate distribution of hair dyes
containing 4-MMPD"). As explained below, the regulation was voluntarily stayed by the Agency after its
decision was challenged in court, but the stay was associated with the insignificance of the risk rather than
a claim that the Agency lacked authority to add to the statement mandated by statute. See infra note 68.
Although the actual carcinogenic risk was insignificant by FDA's own assessments, see R. Wilson, Risks
PosedBy VariousComponentsofHairDyes,278 ARCHIVES DERMATOLOGICAL RES. 165 (1985), the Agency's
response to much stronger data would have been equally limited.
23. 42 Fed. Reg. 19,996, 20,002 (1977).
24. Curtis C. Travis et al., Cancer Risk Management: A Review of 132 Federal Regulatory Decisions,
21 ENVTL. SCt. TECH. 415, 417 (1987); see also Richard M. Cooper, Saccharin-OfRisk and Democracy,
40 FOOD DRUG COsM. L.J. 34, 34 (1985); Richard A. Merrill & Michael R. Taylor, Saccharin:A Case Study
of Government Regulation ofEnvironmentalCarcinogens,5 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES LAW 1, 63-69 (1985).
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a nonprescription drug product so long as an appropriate cancer warning was
included on the label.
25
Congress intervened by placing a moratorium on FDA's proposed action,26
mandating instead that the following statement appear on food product labels:
USE OF THIS PRODUCT MAY BE HAZARDOUS TO YOUR
HEALTH. THIS PRODUCT CONTAINS SACCHARIN WHICH
HAS BEEN DETERMINED TO CAUSE CANCER IN
LABORATORY ANIMALS.
27
This requirement applies only to food products. 28 The statute authorized the
Agency to revise or remove by regulation these food labeling requirements if
justified by new scientific information.29 Notwithstanding recent studies finding
that there is no significant human cancer risk associated with the use of
saccharin," FDA has not proposed any changes to the mandatory label
statement. Congress has extended the moratorium against more stringent agency
action several times.
31
25. 42 Fed. Reg. 19,996, 20,004 (1977) (proposing that the labeling of such products include the
following "Warning: Saccharin causes bladder cancer in animals. Use of saccharin may increase your risk
of cancer.").
26. Saccharin Study and Labeling Act, Pub. L. No. 95-203, 91 Stat. 1451 (1977). The Act prohibits
the Agency from (1) revoking or amending any interim food additive regulations applicable to saccharin,
or (2) taking any other action to prohibit or restrict the sale or distribution of saccharin or any food, drugs,
or cosmetics which lawfully contain saccharin, solely on the basis of any carcinogenic or toxic effects
revealed by studies available before the date of enactment. Id. § 3.
27. Id. (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 343(o)(1) (1988)). In addition, retail establishments other than
restaurants that sell foods made with saccharin were required to post notices containing this statement. 21
U.S.C. § 343(p) (1988); 21 C.F.R. § 101.11 (1993). Interestingly, the use of saccharin had been restricted
for much of the preceding seventy years not due to safety concerns but apparently because it posed an
economicthreat to the sugar industry. See LindaC. Cummings, The Political Reality ofArtificial Sweeteners,
in CONSUMING FEARS: THE POLITICS OF PRODUCT RISKS 116, 131 (Harvey M. Sapolsky ed., 1986).
28. Congress determined that the "potential health hazard posed by ingestion of saccharin from sources
other than foods, for example from saccharin-containingdrugs, does not warrant the imposition of statutory
labeling and advertising restrictions .... S. REP. NO. 353, 95th Cong., I st Sess. 11 (1977). FDA, for its
part, apparently concluded that the risk presented by this use of what it once deemed an unequivocal animal
carcinogen did not warrant any sort of administrative labeling requirements for drugs or cosmetics. Cf 44
Fed. Reg. 59,909, 59,514 (1979) (suggesting that Congress' failure to extend labeling requirement to other
products such as toothpastes may reflect recognition of health benefits that result from encouraging use by
improving palatability).
29. 21 U.S.C. § 343(o)(2) (1988).
30. See Clifford 1. Chappel,A Review and Biological Risk Assessment of Sodium Saccharin, 15 REG.
ToxICOL. & PHARMACOL. 253 (1992); R.W. Morgan & 0. Wong, A Review of EpidemiologicalStudies on
Artificial Sweeteners and Bladder Cancer, 23 FOOD CHEM. TOXICOL. 529 (1985); Council on Scientific
Affairs, Saccharin: Review of Safety Issues, 254 JAMA 2622 (1985).
31. See Pub. L. No. 96-273,94 Stat. 536 (1980); Pub. L. No. 97-42,95 Stat. 946 (1981); Pub. L. No.
98-22, 97 Stat. 173 (1983); Pub. L. No. 99-46, 99 Stat. 81 (1985); Pub. L. No. 100-71, 101 Stat. 431
(1987); Pub. L. No. 102-142, 105 Stat. 910 (1991) (extending moratorium until May 1, 1997). In addition,
a few states have passed laws specifically authorizing the manufacture, distribution, and sale of saccharin
in intrastate commerce. See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1059(West 1990); OR. REV. STAT. § 689.535
(1991).
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3. Tobacco Products
In 1965, Congress enacted the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising
Act.32  The legislation responded to several new developments: a
recommendation of the Surgeon General,33 a regulation promulgated by the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC),34 and actions taken by several states to
regulate cigarette labeling and advertising. 35 The 1965 Act required that all
cigarette packages bear the following statement: "Caution: Cigarette Smoking
May Be Hazardous to Your Health."36 Within five years the law was amended
to require a sterner precaution: "Warning: The Surgeon General Has
Determined That Cigarette Smoking Is Dangerous to Your Health."37 Although
it sounded more ominous, the 1969 warning was not appreciably clearer than
the 1965 version. Neither warning made any attempt to disclose the nature or
possible severity of the threat to smokers' health, much less the probability of
encountering the unnamed risk.
In 1984, the law was again substantially amended. Congress replaced the
warning that had been used for over a decade with four specific and more
forceful warnings:
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Smoking Causes Lung
Cancer, Heart Disease, Emphysema, And May Complicate Pregnancy.
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Quitting Smoking Now
Greatly Reduces Serious Risks to Your Health.
32. Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (1965).
33. REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITrEE TO THE SURGEON GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, SMOKING AND HEALTH 33 (1964) ("Cigarette smoking is a
health hazard of sufficient importance in the United States to warrant appropriate remedial action.").
34. 29 Fed. Reg. 8324, 8325 (1964) (requiring that cigarette labeling and advertising disclose "that
cigarette smoking is dangerous to health and may cause death from cancer and other diseases").
35. See Ill CONG. REC. 13,900, 13,901 (1965) (statement of Senator Moss).
36. Pub. L. No. 89-92, § 4. Congress sought to ensure that the public "be adequately informed that
cigarette smoking may be hazardous to health," as well as protect commerce from "diverse, nonuniform,
and confusing" labeling and advertising regulations. Id. § 2. The Act therefore included an express federal
preemption provision. Id. § 5 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1334 (1988)). These preemption
provisions recently were interpreted in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992), which is
discussed more fully infra at notes 306-09 and accompanying text.
37. Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, § 2, 84 Stat. 87 (1970) (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1333, 1335 (1988)) (also prohibiting any broadcast advertising of cigarettes).
This legislation responded to a new FTC proposal that would have required a detailed warning that "cigarette
smoking is dangerous to health and may cause death from cancer, coronary heart disease, chronic bronchitis,
pulmonary emphysema, and other diseases." 34 Fed. Reg. 7917 (1969).
38. Comprehensive Smoking Education Act, Pub. L. No. 98-474, 98 Stat. 2200 (1984) (codified at




SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Smoking By Pregnant
Women May Result in Fetal Injury, Premature Birth, And Low Birth
Weight.
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Cigarette Smoke Contains
Carbon Monoxide.39
These warnings are to be used on a rotating basis, alternating every three
months.40 The 1984 amendments also directed the Secretary of Health and
Human Services (HHS) to establish a public education program.4"
Federal legislation regulating warning statements on cigarette packages
represents an intriguing evolution from an uncertain "Caution," to a more
forceful but still vague "Warning," to a series of quite detailed warning
statements. One of the warnings added in 1984 even presented the information
in positive terms by explaining that quitting can greatly reduce serious health
risks. The source of the warning became more prominent over time (via
references to the Surgeon General), as did the particular consequences that
could be linked to smoking.42
Cigarettes are not the only tobacco products to receive close legislative
attention. In 1986, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco
Health Education Act.43 Responding to concerns that the use of chewing tobacco
may cause gum disease and mouth cancer,44 Congress adopted warning require-
ments similar to those required for cigarettes.45 The FTC was given the
39. 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(1988) (also requiring that these warnings appear in cigarette advertisements).
Many other countries require warnings on cigarettes and other tobacco products. The European Community,
for example, has directed that all such products include the general statement that "Tobacco seriously
damages health," followed (on a rotating basis) by a number of specific warnings selected by member states
from a list of more than 20 statements. Council Directive 92/41/EEC, 1992 O.J. (L 158) 30 (amending
Directive 89/622/EEC).
40. 15 U.S.C. § 1333(c)(1) (1988). A similar rotation ofwamings was proposed for alcoholic beverages,
but one witness criticized this approach as "dribbl[ing] out the warnings piecemeal," and cast doubt on the
effectiveness of this policy with respect to cigarettes. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Consumer of
the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 89 (1988) [hereinafter
Hearings] (statement of Professor W. Kip Viscusi, George G. Allen Professor of Economics, Dept. of
Economics, Duke University).
41. 15 U.S.C. § 1341(a) (1988).
42. The 1984 Act even specifies what type of lettering to use. Id. § 1333(b) (e.g., the introductory
phrase "Surgeon General's Warning" must appear in all capital letters). By contrast, the 1965 legislation
simply mandated that the warning "shall appear in conspicuousand legible type in contrast by typography,
layout, or color with other printed matter on the packaged." Pub. L. No. 89-92, § 4.
43. Pub. L. No. 99-252, 100 Stat. 30 (1986) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4401-4408 (1988)).
44. See S. REP. No. 209, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 4 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9, 10
(expressing concern that young people were using smokeless tobacco products with the misimpression that
these were safe alternatives to cigarettes).
45. Packages of smokeless tobacco must include one of the following statements on a rotating basis:
WARNING: THIS PRODUCT MAY CAUSE MOUTH CANCER.
WARNING: THIS PRODUCT MAY CAUSE GUM DISEASE AND TOOTH LOSS.
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responsibility for implementing and enforcing these requirements, 46 and the Act
directed HHS to establish a public education program, 47 but Congress has not
yet provided funding for these efforts to inform consumers about the health
hazards associated with smokeless tobacco products.48
4. Alcoholic Beverages
The labeling of alcoholic beverages became subject to statutory warning
requirements in 1988. Unlike previous legislative efforts by which Congress
had intervened at least in part to forestall more stringent administrative
regulation, the Alcoholic Beverage Labeling Act of 1988"' was apparently a
response to growing demands for action in the absence of any administrative
efforts to address the issue." A decade earlier, the Department of Treasury's
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (BATF) had proposed to require
warning labels concerning the risks of fetal alcohol syndrome,5 but this
proposal was abandoned the next year in favor of a public awareness
campaign."
The 1988 legislation included the finding "that the American public should
be informed about the health hazards that may result from the consumption or
WARNING: THIS PRODUCT IS NOT A SAFE ALTERNATIVE TO CIGARETTES.
15 U.S.C. § 4402(a)(1), (c)(I) (1988). In contrast to the cigarette warnings, these are not characterized as
having been issued by the Surgeon General. These same warnings must appear in any advertising for
smokeless tobacco products, enclosed in a special circle-and-arrow graphic design. Id. § 4402(a)(2),
(b)(2)(B).
46. Id. §§ 4402(b)-(d), 4404-4405.FTC's implementingregulationsappearin 16 C.F.R. pt. 307 (1993).
In promulgating these regulations, the Commission rejected comments suggesting that the circle-and-arrow
format required in advertisements also apply to warning statements on product labels. 51 Fed. Reg. 40,005,
40,009-10 (1986). One aspect of the FTC's original regulations, exempting advertisements appearing on
utilitarian items (such as tote bags) from the warning requirements, subsequentlywas invalidated.See Public
Citizen v. FTC, 869 F.2d 1541, 1554-57 (D.C. Cir. 1989); 56 Fed. Reg. 11,653 (1991).
47. 15 U.S.C. § 4401 (1988). A similar provision was added by the 1984 cigarette legislation. See id.
§ 1341(a). Increasingly, Congress is recognizing that public education campaigns provide an important
supplementto labeling requirements. In 1988, for instance, Congress amended the FHSA by inserting a new
section governing the labeling of art materials. Pub. L. No. 100-695, 102 Stat. 4568 (1988) (codified at 15
U.S.C.A. § 1277 (West Supp. 1993)). This provision adopts by reference a hazard labeling standard
developed by the American Society for Testing and Materials, and it also directs CPSC to review that
standard periodically and disseminate educational materials. See 59 Fed. Reg. 10,761 (1994) (to be codified
at 16 C.F.R. pt. 1500) (proposed Mar. 8, 1994).
48. Jeffrey Denny, Snuffs Tough Stuff, WASH. POST, May 16, 1993, at C5.
49. Alcoholic Beverage Labeling Act, Pub. L. No. 100-690, tit. VIII, § 8001(a)(3), 102 Stat. 4518
(1988) (codified at 27 U.S.C.A. §§ 213-219 (West Supp. 1993)).
50 See SEMErARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, SINT SPrAWL REfWr TO THE U.S QNESS ON ALCOHOL
AND HEALTH (1987); A.M.A. Board ofTrustees Report,Alcohol:Advertising, CounteradvertisingandDepic-
tion in the Public Media, 256 JAMA 1485, 1487 (1986) (recommending that "health education labels be
used on all alcoholic beverage containers and in all alcoholic beverage advertising"). See generally Michael
S. Jacobs, The Alcoholic Beverage Labeling Act of 1988: A CriticalAnalysis, 40 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1223
(1989).
51. 43 Fed. Reg. 2186 (1978).
52. 44 Fed. Reg. 8288 (1979).
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abuse of alcoholic beverages," as well as Congress' "determin[ation] that it
would be beneficial to provide a clear, nonconfusing reminder of such hazards
.... "" The Act requires that the containers of all alcoholic beverages bear,
in a "conspicuous and prominent place on the container," the following
statement:
GOVERNMENT WARNING: (1) According to the Surgeon General,
women should not drink alcoholic beverages during pregnancy be-
cause of the risk of birth defects. (2) Consumption of alcoholic
beverages impairs your ability to drive a car or operate machinery,
and may cause health problems.54
Like the earlier cigarette warnings, the trailing reference to unspecified "health
problems" is not particularly illuminating. The Act also created a mechanism
for revisions to the warning if new scientific evidence justified such a change."
To date, BATF has not recommended to Congress any changes in the content
of the warning.
5. Ozone Depleting Substances
Most recently, as part of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Congress
required that products containing ozone depleting chemicals include the
following label statement:
Warning: Contains [insert name of substance], a substance which
harms public health and environment by destroying ozone in the
upper atmosphere. 6
53. 27 U.S.C.A. § 213 (West Supp. 1993).
54. Id. § 215(a). Shortly after the Act was signed, BATF issued a temporary rule applying the
placement and legibility requirements it had used for the saccharin statement on alcoholic beverages. 54
Fed. Reg. 7160, 7160-61 (1989). The final rule was published a year later. 55 Fed. Reg. 5414, 5421 (1990)
(codified at 27 C.F.R. pt. 16 (1993)). In the preamble to its final rule, BATF discussed a report provided
by the Surgeon General which had concluded that: "the most effective labels are those which (1) are
prominent with regard to other information presented on the product label, (2) are printed in large letters
and contrasting colors, and (3) do not present too much information for the consumer to assimilate."' Id.
at 5415 (quoting Review of the Research Literature on the Effects of Health Warning Labels, at 4 (June
1987)). The Bureau also collected samples of labels from other products bearing warning statements, such
as foods, over-the-counter drugs, and cigarettes. Id. at 5416. In testifying against the proposed warnings
for alcoholic beverages, Professor Viscusi argued that warnings "intended to browbeat individuals into
changing behavior rather than trying to convey new information ... will not serve a constructive purpose."
Hearings, supra note 40, at 88.
55. 27 U.S.C.A. § 217 (West Supp. 1993) (directing the Secretary of Treasury, after consultationwith
the Surgeon General, to report such new information to Congress together with specific recommendations
for amendments to the warning). A bill recently was introduced to require the use of seven rotating warning
messages in any alcoholic beverage advertising. H.R. 1823, 103d Cong., I st Sess. (1993).
56. 42 U.S.C.A. § 767 lj(b)(West Supp. 1993). A similar requirementappliesto productsmanufactured
with such substances. Id. § 7671j(d)(I).
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This labeling requirement parallels those imposed by FDA and CPSC in 1977
for chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) propellants in consumer products subject to the
agencies' respective jurisdictions.57 As was true with these agencies'
requirements, Congress sought to influence consumer purchase decisions,
thereby creating an incentive for manufacturers to shift to safer alternatives
more quickly than mandated under other parts of the legislation.5" EPA recently
issued final regulations implementing these requirements.59
C. Summary
Thus, Congress has mandated specific warning statements for a variety of
particular consumer items, in some instances to forestall more stringent agency-
imposed restrictions on popular products, but also (on occasion) in the face of
agency inaction or as an adjunct to a mandatory phase-out. Although
administrative agencies still must exercise some judgment in implementing these
requirements, the choice, content, and sometimes even format of the warning
statements have been dictated by Congress. For the vast majority of consumer
products, however, federal agencies retain considerable discretion in deciding
whether and how to convey risk information.
II. Warning Requirements Imposed by Federal Agencies
In implementing the general statutory misbranding prohibitions, federal
agencies have mandated that cautionary statements appear in the labeling of
various types of consumer products. This Part reviews the different
requirements applicable to cosmetics, food and food additives, nonprescription
drug products, prescription drugs, pesticides, and other household products.
Although illustrative rather than exhaustive, the discussion provides the detail
necessary to understand and fully appreciate the diverse strategies used for
57. See 42 Fed. Reg. 22,018 (1977); 42 Fed. Reg. 42,780 (1977). These are discussed more fully in
the next Part. See infra notes 76-84 and accompanying text.
58. See S. REP. No. 228, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 398-99 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3781.
Although the Senate Report also mentioned that the warnings would alert consumers "that they must take
care in handling and disposing of such product[s] to avoid emitting such substances to the environment,"
the primary goal was to dissuade consumers from selecting these products in the first place. Id.; see also
57 Fed. Reg. 19,166, 19,169 (1992) ("The increased ability of consumers to express a preference for
products not using controlled substances would create a market-based incentive for manufacturers to find
and utilize substitutes for ozone-depleting substances that reduce the overall risk to human health and the
environment."); Orval E. Nangle, Stratospheric Ozone: United States Regulation of Chlorofluorocarbons,
16 ENVnL. AFF. 53 I, 575-76 (1989) ("[L]abeling products containingor manufactured with CFCs and halons
is inexpensive and is the least burdensome form of regulation.... The public has a right to know that a
product contains ozone-depletingsubstances and a right to express a choicefor or against such substances.").
59. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 82.100-82.124 (1993). This regulation is discussed more fully in the next Part.




different consumer products as well as to convey a sense of the sheer immensity
of federal regulations applicable to labeling.
Each product category provides important lessons about agency decisions
to require warning statements in labeling. For example, in the labeling of some
products, all risk information is presented as a "Warning," while the labeling
of other products uses more carefully differentiated categories for the
presentation of information about potential health hazards. In some situations,
agencies have addressed each new safety question by requiring an additional
warning, but in other cases every effort is made to avoid the use of alarming
hazard statements. For instance, ingredient labeling rather than warning
requirements for food products are used to alert persons with allergies. Some
warnings serve as general disclaimers of a product's safety (especially when
concerns about possible chronic hazards have arisen) while others primarily
seek to convey or emphasize instructions for avoiding acute risks. Taken
together, the many different examples reveal an inconsistent and sometimes
incoherent patchwork of labeling requirements.
A. Cosmetic Products
Cosmetics were the first consumer products for which Congress drafted
a specific warning statement, and they are now subject to a series of separately
issued warning regulations that present a microcosm of the different mistakes
that agencies sometimes make when requiring warning labels. FDA's numerous
warning requirements for cosmetics run the gamut from generalized disclaimers
that the safety of a product has not been verified to concrete instructions for
avoiding immediate risks, and from statements about the possible environmental
consequences attending use of a product to alarming warnings about risks of
cancer extrapolated from animal studies. Despite their diverse content and
purposes, these and other precautionary statements for cosmetics are all
designated as "Warnings."
FDA's cosmetic labeling regulations set forth several required warning
statements. First, cosmetic products whose safety has not been adequately
substantiated must bear the following disclaimer:
The Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 11:293, 1994
Warning-The safety of this product has not been determined.6
Second, cosmetic products in self-pressurized containers must bear the
following statement on their labels:
Warning-Avoid spraying in eyes. Contents under, pressure. Do not
puncture or incinerate. Do not store at temperature above 1200, F.
Keep out of reach of children.6
Third, in addition to this general warning for self-pressurized containers,
cosmetic products using a halocarbon or hydrocarbon propellant must state:
Warning-Use only as directed. Intentional misuse by deliberately
concentrating and inhaling the contents can be harmful or fatal."
Fourth, a cosmetic product containing a CFC propellant must bear the following
information:
Warning-Contains a chlorofluorocarbon that may harm the public
health and environment by reducing ozone in the upper atmosphere.63
Finally, FDA generally requires that the label of a cosmetic product bear a
warning statement "whenever necessary or appropriate to prevent a health
hazard that may be associated with the product."'  Thus, manufacturers must
determine what other warning statements may be necessary to ensure the safe
use of their products.
60. 21 C.F.R. § 740.10(a) (1993). A different disclaimer recently was proposed for certain cosmetic
suntanning products: "Warning-This product does not contain a sunscreen and does not protect against
sunburn." 58 Fed. Reg. 28,194, 28,302 (1993) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 740.19) (proposed May 12,
1993). FDA explained that, because consumers expect that tanning products will protect against sunburn,
and in light of the serious consequences of overexposure to the sun, "such products could be potentially
dangerous" if not accompanied by an informative labeling statement. Id. at 28,207. The Agency did not,
however, explain why a "Warning" was necessary. The proposed requirement also would apply to cosmetic
dyes marketed as "sunless" tanning products. Id. at 28,293-94. This is a context in which one would not
expect the failure to reveal the absence of a sunscreen ingredient to be misleading.
61. 21 C.F.R. § 740.1 l(a)(l) (1993). CPSC requires a similar warning statement for products in self-
pressurized containers, though the signal word "Caution" may be substituted for the word "Warning." 16
C.F.R. § 1500.130(b)(1993).
62. 21 C.F.R. § 740.1 l(b)(l) (1993). A judicial challenge to these regulations proved unsuccessful.
See Cosmetic, Toiletry & Fragrance Ass'n v. Schmidt, 409 F. Supp. 57 (D.D.C. 1976).
63. 21 C.F.R. § 740.11(c)(1)(1993). Many of these requirements apply to food products, nonprescrip-
tion drugs, and medical devices as well. See id. §§ 101.17, 369.21, 801.425(a).
64. Id. § 740.1 (a). Similarly, under a regulationoriginally promulgated by FDA under the FHSA before
responsibility for implementing that legislation was transferred to CPSC, a cosmetic product will be
considered misbranded if its label fails to bear information alerting a household to any "substantial risk of
injury or illness" associated with customary or usual use of the product. 16 C.F.R. § 1500.81(a) (1993).
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FDA also has mandated detailed precautionary statements for a few
specific products that it regulates as cosmetics, namely feminine deodorant
sprays and foaming detergent products.6" FDA adopted these requirements
because it had received numerous complaints of nonserious adverse reactions
from customers and physicians. Although conceding that it knew of no
medicinal benefits derived from these products, the Agency conceived of the
labeling requirements as appropriate interim measures pending the receipt of
further information.66 The last warning statement for cosmetic products
appearing in the regulations advised of the possible carcinogenicity of a coal
tar hair dye ingredient.67 FDA agreed to an ongoing stay after this rule was
challenged for not considering the extremely small human risk demonstrated
by the available animal data.68 FDA had found no epidemiological data
suggesting a risk to humans using 4-NMPD,69 but it deliberately selected the
signal word "Warning" for the 4-MvIPD statement so as "to parallel other
warnings for cosmetics that pose risks of possible grave injury, and to alert
consumers to the nature of the information conveyed."'"
65. For example, the labels of feminine deodorant sprays must bear the following information:
Caution-For external use only. Spray at least 8 inches from skin. Do not apply to broken,
irritated, or itching skin. Persistent, unusual odor or discharge may indicate conditions for
which a physician should be consulted. Discontinue use immediately if rash, irritation, or dis-
comfort develops.
21 C.F.R. § 740.12(b) (1993). A similar "Caution" concerning irritation of skin and the urinary tract from
prolonged use is required for foaming detergent (bubble bath) products unless clearly labeled for use
exclusively by adults. Id. § 740.17(b). An earlier version of the regulation, which applied to all products
irrespective of user population, was stayed by FDA. 48 Fed. Reg. 7169 (1983). Data over a 10 year period
revealed less than two adverse reactions per million units distributed. 51 Fed. Reg. 20,471,20,472 (1986).
66. See, e.g., 38 Fed. Reg. 16,236 (1973) ("Although the reported reactions are not sufficiently great
to justify removal of these products from the market, they are sufficient to justify required warnings....
Until further information can be developedconcerningthe safety of these sprays, appropriate label warnings
to minimize consumer risk should be required."). In the preamble to its final regulation, FDA reiterated this
point. 40 Fed. Reg. 8926 (1975). The regulation requiring warnings on products in self-pressurized con-
tainers was based on a similar rationale. See 40 Fed. Reg. 8912, 8913 (1975) ("[A]t this time there is not
sufficient scientific data demonstrating a degree of health hazard to justify a total ban on all aerosol
products.").
67. 21 C.F.R. § 740.18(a) (1993) ("WARNING: Contains an ingredient that can penetrate your skin
and has been determined to cause cancer in laboratory animals."). The 1978 proposal was based on the
results ofa bioassay showing significant increases in various animal cancers. 43 Fed. Reg. 1101, 1102 (1978)
("The NCI study firmly establishes that [4-MMPD] is carcinogenic in two rodent species.").
68. Carson Products Co. v. Department of Health& Human Services, Food Drug Cosm. L. Rep. (CCH)
38,071 (S.D. Ga. 1980). FDA thereupon stayed the regulation, 47 Fed. Reg. 7829 (1982), and it has not
reopened the matter since that time. FDA is not alone in having experienced difficulties in assessing the
human health risks of potential carcinogens. See Gulf South Insulation v. CPSC, 701 F.2d 1137, 1147 n.20
(5th Cir. 1983) (describing interagency inconsistencies with regard to formaldehyde); 50 Fed. Reg. 10,372
(1985) (interagency report on risk assessment).
69. In explainingthe basis for the final regulation requiring a warning on products containing4-MMPD,
FDA took the position that "[t]he demonstration that a compound causes cancer in animals must be taken
as evidence that it has a potential for causing cancer in humans, unless there is strong evidence to the
contrary." 44 Fed. Reg. 59,509, 59,516 (1979).
70. Id. at 59,516. FDA explained, however, that it would have banned 4-MMPD rather than require
a warning statement were it not for the statutory provision governing coal tar hair dyes. Id. at 59,511.
The Yale Journal on Regulation
Set out in less than three pages of the Code of Federal Regulations, FDA's
labeling requirements for cosmetics illustrate several mistakes often encountered
with warning strategies. First, the regulations mandate numerous and arguably
too many warning statements. Theoretically, a single product could be required
to carry half a dozen separate warnings. The consequences of overwarning are
described at length in Part V(B) of this Article. Second, notwithstanding the
differing types and seriousness of the risks disclosed in these label statements,
most are designated as "Warnings." The problems with such an undifferentiated
approach will be discussed more fully in Part IV(A). Third, the Agency adopted
a warning strategy in some cases to disclose risk information and to provide
instructions for minimizing those risks, but in other cases FDA chose this
approach precisely because it felt that there was inadequate risk information
on which to base either more or less stringent regulatory requirements. Indeed,
the disclaimer that the safety of a product had not been determined may have
been mandated by the Agency to pressure cosmetic manufacturers to undertake
safety testing of all ingredients used in their products, rather than provide
consumers with any risk information.
The most notable failing of the cosmetic warning regulations is the
Agency's pursuit of different and sometimes inconsistent goals. As more fully
explained in subsequent sections of this Article, "Warning" statements in the
labeling of consumer products ideally should convey concrete and actionable
information about significant risks to consumers. From this perspective, the
general cosmetic labeling requirement, mandating a warning statement
"whenever necessary or appropriate to prevent a health hazard that may be
associated with the product,"'" makes the most sense but provides the least clear
guidance to regulated entities. The warning required for cosmetics containing
halocarbon or hydrocarbon propellants, advising that intentional misuse can be
harmful, more closely approaches the ideal and represents a reasonable means
of deterring hazardous behavior.72 The warning for cosmetics in self-pressurized
containers provides a series of instructions without specifying the consequences
of inappropriate use. This warning more closely resembles the "Caution"
statements mandated for feminine deodorant sprays and foaming detergent bath
products, but the specificity of FDA's precautionary directions is laudable
whatever signal word is used. By contrast, the disclaimer for untested products
does not provide consumers with any guidance for how to respond to such
information, much less specify the risks that may be encountered in choosing
71. 21 C.F.R. § 740.1(a) (1993) (emphasis added).
72. In the preamble to the final rule, FDA explained that it selected the warning because "it is precise
in its description of the conditions of misuse." 40 Fed. Reg. 8912, 8914 (1975) (rejecting alternative warning
"Do not inhale directly, deliberate inhalation of contents can cause death."). It should be noted, however,
that misuse warnings may encourage rather than deter risk-taking behavior, an argument FDA consistently
has rejected. See infra notes 476-478 and accompanying text.
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to use the product, and the stayed 4-MMPD warning presents an accurate but
incomplete statement that fails to quantify the approximate human cancer risk.
The CFC warning, although it does indicate the consequences of use, is
wholly unrelated to protecting the immediate user from any hazards. Instead,
the warning for products containing CFC propellants sought to foster environ-
mentally desirable consumer choices.73 The National Academy of Sciences
(NAS) issued a report in 1976 that included a recommendation for "informative
labeling" of products containing CFCs.74 EPA was the first agency to issue a
labeling requirement, demanding that all pesticides prominently display the
following statement on the front panel of the label: "This Product Contains
Chlorofluorocarbon-11 (or -12, as appropriate)."" FDA followed with a
"Warning" statement ("Contains a chlorofluorocarbon that may harm the public
health and environment by reducing ozone in the upper atmosphere.")
applicable to cosmetics and all other products that it regulates.76 In issuing its
final rule, the Agency rejected a comment objecting to the inconsistency
between EPA's simple disclosure statement and FDA's warning requirement.77
Shortly thereafter, CPSC required a warning statement in the labeling of
products subject to its jurisdiction, using language that was identical to the
warning mandated by FDA.78
All three agencies viewed their respective requirements as short-term
measures that could be implemented with relative ease pending the planned
phase-out of CFC propellants. FDA explained that "[a]n appropriate warning
statement will encourage self-restraint by consumers and encourage them to find
alternative products ... during the interim period."79  These warning
requirements also were tailored to avoid unnecessarily alarming consumers in
cases where the use of products containing CFC propellants may be beneficial.
FDA took care to phrase its warning so as to "minimize[ ] any possibility that
the consumer will believe that the warning refers to risks of harm from direct
inhalation of the products," and it also exempted prescription drugs and other
products that require CFCs, such as medical devices used for treating asthma,
because "[t]he presence of the warning label might confuse consumers and
dissuade them from purchasing a product that provides a health benefit."8 FDA
73. See 41 Fed. Reg. 52,071, 52,074-75 (1976).
74. NAS, Halocarbons: Environmental Effects of Chlorofluoromethane Release (1976), reprinted in
F-D-C REPORTS, Sept. 20, 1976, at 12, 15.
75. 42 Fed. Reg. 9205 (1977).
76. 21 C.F.R. §§ 101.17(c), 369.21, 740.1 l(c)(l), 801.425(a) (1993).
77. 42 Fed. Reg. 22,019,22,020 (1977) ("All three agencies have recognized the suitability of imposing
some type of labeling requirement, but they have differed in their approach to the text and the applicability
of the requirement, in part because of reasons of policy, and in part because of differences in the type of
products they regulate.").
78. 16 C.F.R. § 1401.5(a) (1993).
79. 41 Fed. Reg. 52,071, 52,075 (1976); see also 42 Fed. Reg. 22,019, 22,026 (1977).
80. 41 Fed. Reg. 52,071, 52,075 (1976).
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soon thereafter prohibited all non-essential uses of CFC propellants in
prescription drugs as well as in other products.8' Especially now that EPA is
poised to phase out most other uses of any ozone depleting substances, the CFC
regulations are primarily of historical relevance.
The FDA and CPSC decisions to frame their labeling statements as
"Warnings" are questionable given the admitted absence of any direct risk to
the user of a product containing CFC propellants. FDA took the position that
"consumer[s] should be alerted to all the serious hazards posed by a product."82
In pursuit of such a broad goal, however, agencies might require warnings for
numerous products that may contribute to environmental degradation and
thereby threaten public health in the future (e.g., products in nonrecyclable
packaging). By comparison, in the same year that it mandated the CFC warning,
FDA decided that the possible adverse environmental effects of its decision to
approve the use of plastic beverage containers were not of sufficient magnitude
to justify any limitations on their use.83 Perhaps public education campaigns
should be used in instances where consumers need to understand the
environmental consequences of their choices, but statements on product labels
designated as "Warnings" and given the same prominence as directions against
the more serious and immediate health hazards such as those posed by
inhalation are not appropriate in such circumstances.
8 4
The apparent shortcomings of FDA's cosmetic labeling regulations may
have arisen because of a gradual accretion of separately promulgated rules
rather than a single decision to impose these varied and numerous requirements.
But in any case the Agency clearly believed that warnings could properly serve
a number of different purposes. Notwithstanding the Agency's reassurances that
it had considered the problem of requiring too many different and dissimilar
81. 21 C.F.R. § 2.125(c) (1993); 43 Fed. Reg. 11,301 (1978). Although this prohibition made the
warning requirement obsolete in most cases, certain essential uses are still permitted, 21 C.F.R. § 2.125(e)
(1993), but are not exempt from the warning requirement which remains in effect. Id. §§ 369.21,801.425;
see also 58 Fed. Reg. 34,812, 34,812-13 (1993) (explaining that warning requirement remains in effect for
limited class of products); 43 Fed. Reg. 11,301, 11,311-15 (1978) (expanding list of essential uses exempt
from prohibition without also revising uses exempt from warning requirement); M-D-D-I REPORTS ("The
Gray Sheet"), Oct. 4, 1993, at 18 (reporting FDA may further expand list of essential uses).
82. 42 Fed. Reg. 22,019, 22,026-27 (1977).
83. 42 Fed. Reg. 9227, 9229-30 (1977). Two years earlier FDA had revised its NEPA regulations to
clarify that the Agency could not take adverse environmental effects into account when regulating products,
explaining, for instance, that it cannot refuse to approve or withdraw approval of a safe food additive or
drug "if the product would only contribute to litter or deplete the nation's energy resources or detract from
scenic beauty."40 Fed. Reg. 16,662 (1975). After the regulation was challengedsuccessfully, Environmental
Defense Fund, Inc. v. Mathews, 410 F. Supp. 336, 338 (D.D.C. 1976), FDA decided to acquiesce in the
court's decision and revoke this rule. 41 Fed. Reg. 21,768 (1976).
84. To its credit, FDA did not mandate that the CFC warning appear in large type because it concluded
that this "would distract attention from other equally important warnings and information." 42 Fed. Reg.
22,019, 22,027 (1977). More recently, the Agency drafted alternative language for prescription and
nonprescription drugs and devices containing or manufactured with ozone depleting substances so that





warnings," FDA simply tacked on one labeling requirement after another as
the need arose without fully considering the cumulative impact of the
regulations. The net effect is a somewhat incoherent patchwork of cautionary
labeling requirements. As explained in the sections that follow, some of these
same problems arise with respect to other consumer products, but FDA and the
other agencies responsible for the regulation of labeling have responded to these
difficulties differently in each case.
B. Foods and Food Additives
FDA has mandated relatively few warnings for food products.86 Other than
the various warning statements prescribed for food products packaged in self-
pressurized containers, statements which are identical to those required for
cosmetic products," FDA has required explicit warnings for only one food
product category.88 Although food product warnings are uncommon, FDA
sometimes designs food labeling regulations to provide indirect warnings of
85. See, e.g., 42 Fed. Reg. 22,019, 22,027 (1977) ("While the impact of warnings might be reduced
if numerous statements were included, the Commissioner concludes that the warnings on self-pressurized
containers are not so numerous as to make the dilution effect an overriding concern at this time."). CPSC
similarly concludedthat "the warnings on self-pressurized containers are not so numerous that the additional
warning would substantially dilute the effectiveness of other warnings that may be required on products
to alert consumers to even greater hazards." 42 Fed. Reg. 42,780, 42,782 (1977).
86. As explained above, USDA shares jurisdiction with FDA over food products containing meat and
poultry. See supra note 5. USDA generally has not required that any cautionary statements appear in the
labeling of such products. See 9 C.F.R. pt. 317 (1993) (general labeling requirements for meat products);
id. pt. 381 (N) (labeling requirements for poultry products). In response to recent food poisonings traced
to contaminated hamburgers, and as part of a settlement reached with consumer groups that had sued the
Agency, USDA mandated that safe handling instructions appear in labeling. See 58 Fed. Reg. 52,856 (1993)
(to be codified at 9 C.F.R. pts. 317, 38 1). Although the Agency declined to require explicit "warnings" as
some had suggested, id. at 52,868, the new labeling rules mandate inclusion of the following "rationale"
statement: "Some food products may contain bacteria that could cause illness if the product is mishandled
or cooked improperly." Id. at 52,872. After it was invalidated on procedural grounds, USDA repromulgated
the same regulation. 59 Fed. Reg. 14,528, 14,530 (1994) (to be codified at 9 C.F.R. pts. 317, 381).
87. 21 C.F.R. § 101.17(a)-(c) (1993). In a related requirement, decorativeceramicware must be labeled
as "not for food use" because of the risk of lead poisoning. 59 Fed. Reg. 1638, 1641 (1994) (to be codified
at 21 C.F.R. § 109.16(b)(1)).
88. Low-calorie protein products for rapid weight loss must bear the following statement:
WARNING: Very low calorie protein diets (below 400 Calories per day) may cause serious illness
or death. Do Not Use for Weight Reduction in Such Diets Without Medical Supervision. Not
for use by infants, children, or pregnant or nursing women.
21 C.F.R. § 101.1 7(d)(1 ) (1993). Protein products advertised for use in nutritionally balanceddiets providing
400 or more calories per day must bear a milder "Notice." Id. § 101.17(d)(2). FDA's original regulation
had used 800 calories as the threshold and mandated a "Warning" even above that threshold. See 45 Fed.
Reg. 22,904,22,914 (1980). After a pair ofjudicial challenges, FDA amended the regulation. 49 Fed. Reg.
13,679, 13,690 (1984). The new regulation was upheld against subsequent challenges. See National
Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Novitch, 589 F. Supp. 798,800-01 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); National Nutritional Foods
Ass'n v. Young, 598 F. Supp. 1107, 1108 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
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potential health hazards. For instance, mandatory ingredient labeling alerts
consumers to the presence of substances to which they might be allergic. 9
General ingredient labeling requirements may not, however, describe
particular components in sufficient detail for allergic consumers, so FDA has
imposed special disclosure requirements in certain cases. "The agency's primary
tool for handling a situation where population subgroups may be at increased
risk from a food ingredient that is safe for most people is to use [ingredient]
labeling to inform those persons who need or want to avoid the ingredient."90
Thus, food product labeling must disclose the presence of substances such as
the color additive FD&C Yellow No. 59' and sulfiting agents used as preserva-
tives.92 In addition, FDA regulations governing the use of certain food additives
sometimes mandate the disclosure of possible side effects from consumption93
or cautionary information applicable to particularly vulnerable groups.94
Products that may trigger allergic reactions provide one of the best
justifications for product labeling. In the case of Yellow No. 5, FDA found
evidence of a causal link between the color additive and serious allergic
reactions in susceptible individuals.95 The Agency rejected comments urging
it to ban Yellow No. 5, explaining that "the requirement for a label declaration
as opposed to a possible prohibition against the use of the color has been
selected because it minimizes the societal impact while providing an adequate
89. 56 Fed. Reg. 28,592, 28,615 (1991) ("[Tlhe information present in the ingredient list is adequate
to enable the consumer to avoid ingredients of concern."). Allergic responses to common foods can be quite
serious, especially for children. See Hugh A. Sampson et al., Fatal and Near-FatalAnaphylacticReactions
to Food in Children and Adolescents, 327 NEw ENG. J. MED. 380 (1992). In addition to its programs to
monitor for microbial contaminationof food, FDA has created an adverse reaction reporting system similar
to that used for drugs. See Linda Tollefson, Monitoring Adverse Reactions to Food Additives in the US.
Food and Drug Administration, 8 REG. TOXICOL. & PHARMACOL. 438,441 (1988) (noting that majority of
initial reports concerned sulfiting agents and aspartame).
90. 58 Fed. Reg. 24,314 (1993).
91. 21 C.F.R. § 74.705(d)(2) (1993). A comparable requirement applies to drugs containing Yellow
No. 5. Id. §§ 74.1705(c)(3), 201.20(a). BATF has imposed similar requirements for alcoholic beverages.
See 27 C.F.R. §§ 4.32(c), 5.32(b)(5), 7.22(b)(4) (1993).
92. 21 C.F.R. §§ 101.100(a)(4), 130.9 (1993). By comparison, prescription drugs must include a
"warning" statement about sulfiting agents in labeling. 21 C.F.R. § 201.22(b) (1993).
93. See 21 C.F.R. § 184.1835(e) (1993) ("The label and labeling of food whose reasonably foreseeable
consumption may result in a daily ingestion of 50 grams of sorbitol shall bear the statement: 'Excess
consumption may have a laxative effect."'); id. § 180.25(e) (same requirement for mannitol).
94. See id. § 172.804(e)(2) (food containing aspartame must bear following statement:
"PHENYLKETONURICS: CONTAINS PHENYLALANINE."). This same statement is required in the
labeling of drug products containing aspartame. Id. § 201.21. BATF recently imposed this requirement on
malt beverages. 58 Fed. Reg. 44,131, 44,132 (1993) (to be codified at 27 C.F.R. pt. 7).
95. 42 Fed. Reg. 6835, 6836 (1977). FDA sought comments on the possibility of banning the use of
Yellow No. 5 in certain classes of ingested drugs, id. at 6837-38, but evidently it never seriously considered
prohibiting the use of this color additive in food. Although there was little evidence of allergic reactions
in humans, FDA also promulgated regulations requiring labeling disclosures of Yellow No. 6 because of
its structural similarity to YellowNo. 5 as well as suggestive animal evidence. 51 Fed. Reg. 41,765,41,779
(1986); 52 Fed. Reg. 21,505, 21,506-07 (1987). After a judicial challenge was filed, FDA withdrew the
requirement. 53 Fed. Reg. 49,138 (1988).
Warning Labels
measure of protection for those sensitive to the color."96 In the case of sulfiting
agents, FDA did prohibit uses of these additives where labeling would be
impractical (e.g., raw produce).97 For packaged foods, however, the Agency
opted for a simple ingredient declaration on the label, rejecting comments
urging that a "Warning" be required.9' FDA's recent and wide-ranging revisions
of its food labeling regulations will provide even more detailed ingredient
information of possible relevance for persons with allergies, 99 but the Agency
again rejected suggestions that explicit allergy "Warnings" appear on product
labels.'0°
FDA has taken the position that warnings on food products are appropriate
only when based on sound scientific data with clear application to. human
health, stating that it "is unwilling to require a warning statement in the absence
of clear evidence of a hazard."' O' The Agency recently reiterated its position,
explaining that it "does not intend to require warning statements [on food
labels] except in specific instances where there is scientifically based evidence
96. 44 Fed. Reg. 37,212, 37,214 (1979) (adding, however, that it would reconsider proposals for a ban
if labeling requirements prove inadequate). FDA retreated from its proposal to mandate that a warning
statement appear in the labeling of over-the-counter (OTC) and prescription drugs in view of the fact that
it was only requiring an ingredient declaration on food labels. Id. at 37,217. The package insert for
prescription drugs must, however, include the following statement in the "Precautions" section:
This product contains FD&C YellowNo. 5 (tartrazine) which may cause allergic-type reactions
(including bronchial asthma) in certain susceptible persons. Although the overall incidence of
FD&C Yellow No. 5 (tartrazine) sensitivity in the general population is low, it is frequently
seen in patients who also have aspirin hypersensitivity.
21 C.F.R. § 201.20(b) (1993); see also 45 Fed. Reg. 60,419, 60,421 (1980) (rejecting comment arguing
statement was redundant with ingredient declaration).
97. 51 Fed. Reg. 25,012, 25,012-13 (1986) ("labeling alone will not always provide adequate protection
for sulfite-sensitive individuals"); see also Allen v. Delchamps, Inc., 624 So. 2d 1065, 1066-67 (Ala. 1993)
(grocer could be held liable for customer's anaphylacticreaction to sulfite used on fresh produce in violation
of FDA regulation).
98. 51 Fed. Reg. 25,012, 25,013 (1986); see also 50 Fed. Reg. 13,306, 13,306 (1985) (in proposing
regulation, FDA explained that "a label declaration of sulfites will enable persons intolerant to sulfites to
minimize their exposure to these ingredients"). In extending this ingredient declaration requirement to
standardized foods, the Agency repeated its earlier conclusion that, notwithstanding the fact that sulfites
"are one of the few food ingredients known to cause anaphylactic shock and death," it is not "necessary
to require a warning statement on food labels or to ban all uses of sulfites." 58 Fed. Reg. 2850, 2855-56
(1993).
99. See, e.g., 58 Fed. Reg. 2876 (1993) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 101.4(d)) (when used in food
products represented as "nondairy," caseinate will have to be described as "(a milk derivative)"). This
requirement seeks to address the sort of problems identified by James E. Gem et al., Allergic Reactions to
Milk-Contaminated "Nondairy" Products, 324 NEw ENG. J. MED. 976 (1991).
100. 58 Fed. Reg. 2850, 2872 (1993) (declining "to require warnings for ingredients that only cause
mild idiosyncratic responses"). FDA has rejected suggestions that all bioengineered foods disclose their
origin, but it would require disclosure if a risk of allergenicity has been introduced by the insertion of
genetic material from another source. See 58 Fed. Reg. 25,837, 25,840 (1993); 57 Fed. Reg. 22,984,22,991
(1992) ("For example, if a tomato has had a peanut protein introduced into it and there is insufficient
information to demonstrate that the introduced protein could not cause an allergic reaction .... a label
declaration would be required to alert consumers who are allergic to peanuts so they could avoid that toma-
to .... ").
101. 56 Fed. Reg. 28,592, 28,615 (1991).
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of a potential health hazard."' 2 Some food products and additives have been
associated with chronic hazards, and it is well recognized that potential
carcinogens are ubiquitous in the human diet.03 Some occur naturally, and
others are introduced during processing, but FDA has never suggested that
every food product containing a suspected carcinogen should bear a warning
statement.
[A] requirement for warnings on all foods that may contain an
inherent carcinogenic ingredient or a carcinogenic contami-
nant.., would apply to many, perhaps most foods in a supermarket.
Such warnings would be so numerous they would confuse the public,
would not promote informed consumer decisionmaking, and would
not advance the public health.
04
If a chronic risk appears to be serious, FDA will prohibit use of the food or
food additive (as it had proposed to do with saccharin) rather than require a
label warning."" Some commentators have objected, however, that such a policy
unduly limits consumer freedom of choice. 6
Oftentimes, animal bioassays provide only equivocal results of doubtful
application to humans. Even studies suggestive of significant carcinogenic
activity generally are not relied upon without a close assessment of the weight
of the evidence.' 7 Extrapolating the results of high dose animal studies to
humans creates reason for caution; it. is possible that observed tumors arise only
102. 58 Fed. Reg. 2850, 2872 (1993).
103. 52 Fed. Reg. 5081, 5083 (1987) ("[E]ven some human nutrients-such as selenium, chromium,
and nickel-when isolated and administered to laboratory animals in the enormous quantities represented
by the maximum tolerated dose, have been found to be carcinogenic.");see also 58 Fed. Reg. 33,690,33,694
(1993) (same); Bruce N. Ames et al., RankingPossible CarcinogenicHazards,236 SCIENCE 271,277 (1987).
104. 44 Fed. Reg. 59,509, 59,513 (1979).
105. See 42 Fed. Reg. 52,814, 52,814 (1977) (rejecting suggestion that labels of contaminated food
products bear warning because "[i]f any food is found to be hazardous to health, FDA will not permit it
to be distributed"); see also Richard M. Cooper, FreedomofChoice in the Real World, 34 FOOD DRUG COSM.
L.J. 612, 622-23 (1979) (defending FDA policy of regulating hazards in food through prohibitions rather
than warnings).
106. See Peter Barton Hutt, Public Policy Issues in Regulating Carcinogens in Food, 33 FOOD DRUG
COSM. L.J. 541, 556 (1978); Peter Barton Hutt, The Basis and Purpose of Government Regulation of
Adulteration and Misbranding of Food, 33 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 505, 537-39 (1978) (arguing that risk
labelingmay be appropriate wheneveroutright prohibition would restrict consumerfreedom ofchoice); Note,
Health Regulation ofNaturalyHazardousFoods: The FDA Ban onSwordfish,85 HARV. L. REV. 1025,1041,
1044-46 (1972) (arguing that labeling requirement would have been more appropriate than FDA's strict
limits on mercury contamination of fish).
107. See 52 Fed. Reg. 49,572, 49,577 (1987) Even when risk assessments have been performed, the
use of conservative assumptions at each step in the calculation tends to dramatically overstate risks. See
OMB, Regulatory Program of the United States Government xxv (1987) ("The final risk estimate derived
from these compounded conservative assumptions may be more than a million times greater than the best
estimate and may, thus, have a probability of being accurate that is virtually zero."); Albert L. Nichols &
Richard J. Zeckhauser, The Perils of Prudence: How Conservative Risk Assessments Distort Regulation,
8 REG. TOXICOL. & PHARMACOL. 61, 67 (1988).
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Warning Labels
because of tissue damage caused by the near lethal quantities of a substance
used in test animals. Thus, FDA has allowed the use of numerous substances
that appear to cause tumors only in high dose animals, and in no case has the
Agency demanded chronic risk disclosures in labe"ling.0 8
Although exaggerated intakes of several common products may cause
tumors through a secondary mechanism, FDA concluded that "these foods and
drugs are not, by reason of their capacity to induce liver damage when abused
by being consumed at high levels, properly classified as carcinogenic because
of their potential association with a higher rate of liver cancer."1"9 In accordance
with its practice of carefully evaluating the weight of the evidence suggesting
a carcinogenic risk, FDA recently approved acesulfame potassium as a sugar
substitute notwithstanding the development of tumors in animals tested at the
highest doses."' In addition, although many traditional color additives contain
known or suspected animal carcinogens, they have been sanctioned for use in
food and other products without any label statements advising consumers of
the animal test results.t" '
If a chronic health risk is not serious enough to justify a prohibition, FDA
also will not mandate that a warning statement appear on the labels of food
products. The Agency's hesitancy to demand precautionary labeling for either
108. For example, when FDA approved a petition to allow selenium supplementationof livestock feed,
it had to grapple with three animal studies that had found neoplastic lesions in the livers of rodents fed high
doses of the substance. The Agency ultimately concluded that there was no cancer risk to humans from
residues in animal tissue, discounting the observed tumors as linked to hepatotoxicity only at high doses.
See 39 Fed. Reg. 1355 (1974); 38 Fed. Reg. 10,458 (1973).
109. 38 Fed. Reg. 10,458,10,460(1973); see also Richard A. Merrill et al., The FDA's Authority Under
the Delaney Clause to Consider Mechanisms ofAction in Determining WhetherAdditives "Induce Cancer,"
47 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 77 (1992). With improvements in scientific methods for detecting substances and
evaluating their potential for causing cancer, such issues will arise even more frequently in the future. See
47 Fed. Reg. 14,464,14,466 (1982) ("As the number of chemicals that are found to cause cancer in animals
has grown, and as scientists' ability to detect the components of a substance has become more acute, the
chancesthat a food additive or color additive will be found to be a carcinogenicchemical entity increases.");
44 Fed. Reg. 17,070, 17,075 (1979) (noting that detection limits have improved by several orders of
magnitude).
110. See 21 C.F.R. § 172.800 (1993); 57 Fed. Reg. 6667, 6672-73 n.12 (1992). Aspartame, another
sugar substitute, must only bear a cautionary statement alerting phenylketonurics,21 C.F.R. § 172.804(e)(2)
(1993), even though one of its metabolites is formaldehyde, an animal carcinogen. See 49 Fed. Reg. 6672,
6679-80 (1984); Council on Scientific Affairs, Formaldehyde, 261 JAMA 1183 (1989). FDA's decision
not to require additional warnings for aspartame was upheld in Community Nutrition Institute v. Young,
773 F.2d 1356, 1366 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
11I. For example, products containing FD&C Blue No. 2 need not provide any label warning despite
evidencethat prolonged exposure to this color additive resulted in a statistically significant increase in animal
tumors. FDA explained that the available biological evidence discounting the risk of carcinogenicity out-
weighed the statistical evidence from the bioassays. 48 Fed. Reg. 5252, 5257-58 (1983), aft'd, 52 Fed. Reg.
8113 (1987), afftd, Simpson v. Young, 854 F.2d 1429 (D.C. Cir. 1988). FDA also does not require
cautionary labeling for products using any of many other color additives that contain known carcinogenic
constituents or impurities because of the extremely low level of human risk they represent. See, e.g., 47
Fed. Reg. 49,628, 49,630 (1982) (D&C Green No. 5); 47 Fed. Reg. 14,138 (1982) (D&C Green No. 6);
48 Fed. Reg. 34,463, 34,464 (1983) (D&C Red No. 6 and D&C Red No. 7); 50 Fed. Reg. 35,774 (1985)
(FD&C Yellow No. 5); 51 Fed. Reg. 41,765 (1986) (FD&C Yellow No. 6); 52 Fed. Reg. 19,719 (1987)
(D&C Violet No. 2).
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acute or chronic hazards associated with food, partly to avoid overwhelming
consumers with inconsequential information, stands in marked contrast to its
apparent readiness to demand warnings of all sorts of risks or related safety
information in the labeling of cosmetics. As a whole, therefore, FDA's warning
requirements applicable to food products are quite modest.
C. Nonprescription Drug Products
As is the case with food products, FDA generally has not demanded the
disclosure of chronic risk information in nonprescription drug labeling. With
regard to acute risks, however, the Agency has demanded very detailed warning
statements, with an emphasis on providing directions for safe use or
highlighting the consequences of misuse. This emphasis contrasts with the
vagueness of many of the Agency's cosmetic product warnings.
Label warnings on nonprescription drug products (often referred to as over-
the-counter (OTC) drugs) generally are appropriate only for serious and
substantiated human health risks. FDA has taken the position that "warning
statements for OTC drug products should be limited to those that are scientifi-
cally documented, clinically significant, and important for the safe and effective
use of the products by consumers."" 2 The whole premise of making drugs
available to consumers without a prescription is that self-diagnosis of certain
conditions and self-treatment with these medications does not create safety
concerns. Because few drugs are entirely risk free, OTC drug products can be
marketed only if consumers are given information adequate to minimize the
danger of any side effects.
Manufacturers of OTC drugs must abide by the terms of "monographs"
issued as FDA regulations." 3 Monographs specify for particular categories of
products, such as antacids or internal analgesics, the active ingredients and
dosages that FDA has determined to be safe and effective. OTC drug
monographs also specify acceptable labeling for these products. The Agency
had originally mandated that manufacturers of OTC drug products use only the
precise language relating to indications and directions for use set forth in the
112. 53 Fed. Reg. 46,204,46,213 (1988); see also 57 Fed. Reg. 58,356,58,368 (1992) (stating warnings
for OTC drug labeling should "include[] only essential information that is necessary to assure proper and
safe use"); id. at 58,371 (Because"cardiovascularsymptoms rarely occurwith the use of OTC antihistamines
.... the agency concludes that there is not an adequate basis for OTC antihistamine drug products to bear
label warnings regarding possible adverse cardiovascular effects."); 40 Fed. Reg. 28,582, 28,583 (1975)
(explaining that warning is justified only if "reasonable evidence exists indicating an association between
a drug and a serious hazard"); 40 Fed. Reg. 8912 (1975) (stating warnings against misuse of aerosolized
productsonly are necessary where misuse is "sufficiently frequent to constitutea hazard of widespread public
concern").
113. 21 C.F.R. pt. 330 (1993). Deviations from the monographs would require premarket FDA
approval. Id. § 330.11. (In some cases, such as the internal analgesic ibuprofen, monographs do not cover




monographs." 4 Even when it revised its policy to allow for greater flexibility
in labeling, FDA continued to demand verbatim adherence to any warnings
prescribed in the regulations. 5 Manufacturers may include other cautionary
information not mandated by FDA, but it must appear in some portion of the
label other than the section containing the required warnings." 6 Some of the
monographs also set forth "professional labeling" intended for physicians that
often includes much more detailed precautionary information than is directed
to consumers.
1 7
Many of the OTC drug monographs require detailed warning statements
in product labeling.' These specific warnings are in addition to the general
warnings mandated for all nonprescription drug products, namely: "Keep this
114. 38 Fed. Reg. 31,260, 31,264 (1973). This rule, which became known as the "exclusivity" policy,
was widely criticized. See, e.g., Stephen McNamara, FDA Regulation of Labeling and the Developing Law
of Commercial Free Speech, 37 FOOD DRUG COSM. Li. 394, 400 (1982).
115. 21 C.F.R. § 330.1(c)(2)(vi) (1993); 51 Fed. Reg. 16,258, 16,260 (1986) ("The agency believes
that concisely and consistently worded warnings are essential to the safe use of an OTC drug product and
that permitting flexibility in this section of labeling could put consumers at risk."). FDA recently gave
manufacturers some limited flexibility in formulating OTC warning statements, authorizing the interchange
of words such as "consult" and "ask," and "physician" and "doctor." 59 Fed. Reg. 3998, 4000 (1994) (to
be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 330.1(i)).
116. See 56 Fed. Reg. 63,554, 63,566 (1991) (discussing warning that cautioned against using OTC
dandruff products with children younger than two years, a warning recommended by expert panel but
rejected as unnecessary by FDA); 50 Fed. Reg. 2124, 2128 (1985) (even truthful and nonmisleading
information "may not appear in any portion of the labeling required by the monograph and may not detract
from such required information").
117. See, e.g., 53 Fed. Reg. 46,204,46,258-59(1988) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 343.80) (proposed
Nov. 16,1988)(setting forth professional labeling for internal analgesics,with sections entitled "Precautions"
and "Adverse Reactions," and including all of the monograph warnings under latter heading along with
information about other side effects of aspirin use including gastrointestinal bleeding). FDA also has
proposed mandating a cautionary statement directed to consumers regarding certain professional uses. 58
Fed. Reg. 54,224, 54,226 (1993) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 201.314(i)(1)) (proposed Oct. 20, 1993)
("IMPORTANT: See your doctor before taking this product for your heart or for other new uses of aspirin
because serious side effects could occur with self treatment.").
118. For example, OTC nighttime sleep-aid drug products must include the following statements in
the "Warnings" section of the label:
(1) "Do not give to children under 12 years of age."
(2) "If sleeplessness persists continuously for more than 2 weeks, consult your doctor.
Insomnia may be a symptom of serious underlying medical illness."
(3) "Do not take this product if you have asthma, glaucoma, emphysema, chronic pulmonary
disease, shortness of breath, difficulty in breathing, or difficulty in urination due to enlargement
of the prostate gland unless directed by a doctor."
(4) "Avoid alcoholic beverages while taking this product. Do not take this product if you are
taking sedatives or tranquilizers, without first consulting your doctor."
21 C.F.R. § 338.50(c) (1993). Standardized warnings also have been established in final monographs for
several other products including: antacids, id., § 331.30(c); first aid antibiotic products, id., § 333.150(c);
antiemetic drugs, id., § 336.50(c); stimulants, id., § 340.50(c); antihistamines, id., § 341.72(c); antitussives,
id., § 341.74(c); bronchodilators, id., § 341.76(c); expectorants, id., § 341.78(c); topical otic drugs, id.,
§ 344.50(c); and hemorrhoidal products, id., § 346.50(c). FDA regulations also contain a variety of other
recommended warnings for various OTC drugs not governed by monographs. See id. pt. 369.
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and all drugs out of the reach of children," and "In case of accidental overdose
[or "ingestion"], seek professional assistance or contact a poison control center
immediately."' 9 These "Warnings" are action-oriented directives intended to
ensure safe product use rather than mere disclosures of risk information. 
120
Another general warning required for OTC drug products intended for
systemic absorption cautions pregnant and nursing women to "seek the advice
of a health professional before using this product. '1 .. In addition to the written
warning, a symbol that conveys the intent of the warning may be used "to
attract the attention of women who do not read English."' 2  FDA rejected
requests for flexibility in phrasing the required statement, however, explaining
that a standardized warning "would insure that the intended message is
conveyed uniformly to all women and would prevent consumer confusion."'
123
(The Agency also discounted a concern that the general warning for OTC
products, coupled with BATF's contemporaneous decision not to require a
119. Id. § 330.1(g). One court has held that the adequacy of a warning on an OTC topical analgesic
product was for a jury to decide in light of expert testimony that the FDA warning to keep medications out
of children's reach "was very general and that its effect is 'watered down' by the fact that the same warning
appears on numerous products that are not harmful (i.e., Flintstone Vitamins and Hydrocortisone Cream)."
Hahn v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 805 F.2d 1480, 1482 (11 th Cir. 1986). The direction to "keep out of the reach
of children" must appear in the labeling of a number of hazardous products not regulated by FDA. See 15
U.S.C. § 1261 (p)(I)(i) (1988) (FHSA); 16 C.F.R. § 1500.3(a)(14)(i)(J)(l) (1993) (CPSC rule for hazardous
substances); 40 C.F.R. § 156.10(h)(1)(ii) (1993) (EPA requirement for pesticides).
120. Indeed, FDA sometimes struggles when deciding whether information should appear in the
"Warnings" or "Directions for Use" section of labeling. See, e.g., 58 Fed. Reg. 54,224, 54,226 (1993) (to
be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 201.314(i)(1)) (proposed Oct. 20, 1993) (statement on professional uses of
aspirin); 58 Fed. Reg. 45,194, 45,198 (1993) ("[C]ritical information alerting the consumer about the
possible consequences of not taking these products correctly should be appropriately placed in both the
'Warnings' and the 'Directions' sections of the products' labeling."); 58 Fed. Reg. 28,194, 28,241 (1993)
(to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 352) (proposed May 12, 1993) (in tentative final monograph for sunscreen
products, FDA decided to move age limitation information from "Warnings" to "Directions" section); cf.
id. at 28,236 (proposing to require a "SUN ALERT" statement which "combines the attributes of an
indication and a warning" and, therefore, "should stand on its own and be distinctive in labeling").
121. 21 C.F.R. § 201.63(a) (1993).
122. 47 Fed. Reg. 54,750, 54,753 (1982); see also 59 Fed. Reg. 1638, 1639 (1994) (to be codified at
21 C.F.R. § 109.16(b)(1)(i)) (permitting use of symbol to indicate lead ceramicware is not intended for food
use). Infant formulas must use pictograms to accompany directions for use. 21 C.F.R. § 107.20(b) (1993).
This is mandatory because of the importancethat directions for such products be "understandableto all users,
includingthose who have difficulty reading English or perhaps any language."48 Fed. Reg. 31,880,31,883
(1983); see also 50 Fed. Reg. 1833, 1836-37 (1985). FDA has not required bilingual labeling on OTC or
other products, but, subject to certain limitations, manufacturers are permitted to provide label information
in another language.See 21 C.F.R. §§ 101.15(c) (food), 201.15(c) (drugs), 701.2(b) (cosmetics), 801.15(c)
(medical devices) (1993); see also 58 Fed. Reg. 44,081 (1993) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 101.9(d)(14))
(permitting dual language labeling in nutrition information panel required for food products); 53 Fed. Reg.
21,633, 21,636 (1988) ("FDA encourages the preparation of labeling to meet the needs of non-English
speaking or special user populations so long as such labeling fully complies with agency regulations."); 48
Fed. Reg. 31,880,31,883 (1983) (recognizing difficulties likely to arise with multilingual labeling, including
"illiteracy in other label languages and space limitations").
123. 47 Fed. Reg. 54,750, 54,753 (1982). In pursuit of assuring such uniformity, FDA explained that
its regulation would preempt state requirements. "A single national warning will help ensure that consumers
receive clear, unambiguous, and consistent information on the labeling of OTC drugs concerning use by
pregnant or nursing women. Differing State requirements could conflict with the Federal warning, cause
confusion to consumers, and otherwise weaken the Federal warning." Id. at 54,756.
Warning Labels
similar warning on the labels of alcoholic beverages, might create the
impression that pregnant and nursing women could safely use alcohol.' 24 ) More
recently, FDA required that OTC drug products containing aspirin include the
following statement immediately after the general pregnancy warning:
"IT IS ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT NOT TO USE" (select
"ASPIRIN" or "CARBASPIRIN CALCIUM," as appropriate)
"DURING THE LAST 3 MONTHS OF PREGNANCY UNLESS
SPECIFICALLY DIRECTED TO DO SO BY A DOCTOR
BECAUSE IT MAY CAUSE PROBLEMS IN THE UNBORN
CHILD OR COMPLICATIONS DURING DELIVERY."
125
FDA rejected comments asserting that this warning was unnecessary in light
of the general warning against using any OTC drug product during pregnancy
without a physician's guidance." 6
Nonprescription drug products containing aspirin also must include a
warning statement concerning a serious risk to children.
WARNING: Children and teenagers should not use this medicine for
chicken pox or flu symptoms before a doctor is consulted about Reye
syndrome, a rare but serious illness reported to be associated with
aspirin.
27
When the risk of Reye syndrome first came to light in the early 1980s, FDA
responded with a public education campaign that included newspaper columns,
radio public service announcements, and print advertisements. 2 ' Shortly
thereafter, although it lauded the industry's "unprecedented voluntary program"
of cautionary labeling and advertising, FDA proposed a mandatory label
124. Id. at 54,754 (noting its lack of jurisdiction over alcoholic beverages and disputing suggestion
that inconsistent labeling for these dissimilar products might imply alcohol is safe). By comparison, FDA
justified an additional third-trimester pregnancy warning for aspirin products in part becauseOTC analgesics
containing ibuprofen already carry such a warning and an inconsistency might lead consumers mistakenly
to believe that aspirin is safer in this respect. 55 Fed. Reg. 27,776, 27,782 (1990) ("[Hlaving different
warnings on OTC drug products containing these ingredients could cause consumers to perceive that there
is a difference in the safety of using these ingredients during the third trimester of pregnancy when, in fact,
there is no established significant safety difference.").
125. 21 C.F.R. § 201.63(e) (1993). The Agency's choice of placement (immediately after the general
pregnancy warning) and type style sought to ensure maximum prominence for the new warning. 55 Fed.
Reg. 27,776, 27,782-83 (1990).
126. Id. at 27,778, 27,782-83.
127. 21 C.F.R. § 201.314(h)(l) (1993). To ensure prominence, this statement must appear before any
other warning on the label. Id. § 201.314(h)(2). FDA rejected a suggestion, however, that a boxed warning
was necessary to highlight the statement. 51 Fed. Reg. 8180, 8181 (1986). The tentative final monograph
for internal analgesic products also includes a number of other warnings applicable to aspirin. See 53 Fed.
Reg. 46,204, 46,256 (1988) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 343.50(c)) (proposed Nov. 16, 1988).
128. 50 Fed. Reg. 51,400, 51,401 (1985). The campaign continued even after the warning became
mandatory. 53 Fed. Reg. 21,633 (1988).
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warning because of its concerns that the "multiplicity of warning statements
... may cause consumer confusion. '"'29 Reiterating its "well-established policy
of promoting uniformity in the area of labeling,' 30 the Agency imposed a
mandatory warning requirement which would expire after two years. 3 ' A
slightly revised warning was made a permanent requirement in 1988, after FDA
rejected suggestions urging "more drastic measures [such as] banning use of
aspirin in products for individuals under 21 years of age or limiting such
products to prescription use.t32
As illustrated above, FDA has required numerous and detailed
precautionary statements about acute nonprescription drug risks. 33 By contrast,
chronic risk statements are rare. Indeed, one recent proposal to require a
warning of chronic hazards in the labeling of OTC drug products has
engendered substantial controversy. In 1991, the Agency suggested that it may
be appropriate for nonprescription drugs containing doxylamine succinate, at
that time an antihistamine ingredient tentatively approved by FDA, 3  to carry
a carcinogenicity warning in their labeling. An FDA official offered the
following idea:
129. 50 Fed. Reg. 51,400, 51,402 (1985).
130. Id. at 51,403.
131. 51 Fed. Reg. 8180,8182 (1986). For a more detailed account of the history behind the early Reye
syndrome warning efforts, see American Home Products Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 672 F. Supp. 135,
137-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
132. 53 Fed. Reg. 21,633, 21,635 (1988); see also 58 Fed. Reg. 54,228 (1993) (proposing revision
in language of warning and also extending it to non-aspirin salicylates); 58 Fed. Reg. 26,886, 26,886-87
(1993) (proposing same Reye syndrome warning for OTC products containing bismuth subsalicylate).
133. In addition, a few nonprescription medical devices are subject to detailed FDA warning
requirements. For example, every tampon package must at a minimum include the following statement:
"ATTENTION: Tampons are associated with Toxic Shock Syndrome (TSS). TSS is a rare but serious
disease that may cause death. Read and save the enclosed information." 21 C.F.R. § 801.430(c) (1993). The
accompanying package insert must include a number of detailed statements describing the precise risks of
TSS and instructions for minimizing the risk. Id. § 801.430(d). Because the epidemiologicaldata indicated
a risk of approximately one case of TSS for every 10,000 tampon users annually, 47 Fed. Reg. 26,982
(1982), one manufacturer argued that the proposed labeling requirements were unjustified in light of the
Agency's failure to require warnings for other products allegedly posing higher lifetime cancer risks. Id.
at 26,985. FDA responded by explaining that the epidemiological studies linking TSS to tampon use
provided a much firmer risk estimate than extrapolations from animal bioassays of the other substances,
and that the risk of TSS would be significantly greater if expressed as a lifetime rather than annual risk.
Id.; cf 44 Fed. Reg. 59,509, 59,512 (1979) (in responding to similar arguments against the 4-MMPD
warning, FDA stated that "a government agency is not estopped from taking warranted action against a
particular hazard because of the existence of other hazards on which it has not taken action"). Specific
warning requirements also have been established for denture repair kits, 21 C.F.R. § 801.405(b)(3) (1993),
hearing aids, id. § 801.420(c)(2), and intrauterine contraceptive devices (IUDs), id. § 801.427(b).
134. 52 Fed. Reg. 31,892, 31,913 (1987) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 341.12(g)) (proposed Aug.
24, 1987). When FDA originally published its final monograph on OTC antihistamine products, it deferred
making a final decision on doxylamine. 57 Fed. Reg. 58,356, 58,357 (1992).
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WARNING: Use of this product may be hazardous to your health.
This product contains doxylamine succinate which has been deter-
mined to produce tumors in laboratory animals.135
Noting that the language was "similar to the required warning for products
containing saccharin," the official asserted that "the format should already be
familiar to many consumers."
' 36
The Agency's suggested warning for doxylamine would have been
unprecedented. Indeed, FDA previously had noted the incongruity of providing
such warnings on products intended for lay use:
Suitable labeling of an OTC drug may provide sufficient safeguards
for a drug that presents such indirect risks [as drowsiness]. When a
drug presents serious direct risks (e.g., of cancer or other serious
disease), adequate labeling for any lay use without medical
supervision generally cannot be written.
137
The Agency has not required that other OTC drug products carry warnings of
unsubstantiated chronic risks. 31 In conjunction with its proposal to prohibit the
use of saccharin in foods, FDA had proposed a similar warning for the artificial
sweetener if sold as an OTC drug; the idea was dropped, however, after
Congress established its moratorium and disclosure statement (but not a
"Warning") for food products containing saccharin.139Although FDA eventually
135. Letter from William E. Gilbertson, Director of FDA's Division of OTC Drug Evaluation, to R.
William Soller, Senior Vice President and Director of Science and Technology, Nonprescription Drug
Manufacturers Association (July 18, 1991) (on file with the author).
136. Id. An FDA advisory committee had reviewed the results of rodent bioassays which found some
increase in benign liver and thyroid tumors after high-dose, lifetime exposures, but it concludedthat a human
cancer risk was not likely and made no recommendation to restrict the use of doxylamine. Transcript of
meeting of FDA's Pulmonary-Allergy Drugs Advisory Committee, at 172-74 (June 14, 1991) (on file with
the author). At the same time, however, the committee suggested that the animal data not be withheld from
the public. Id. at 175-82. FDA interpreted this suggestion as a recommendation to include a warning
statement in the labeling of the product.
137. 44 Fed. Reg. 51,512, 51,525 (1979). The very attempt to formulate an accurate label statement
for doxylanine underscores the primary point that there was nothing to disclose. For example, it would make
no sense to advise consumers that "doxylaminesuccinate has been associated with the developmentof benign
tumors in certain rodents, but an FDA advisory committee has concluded that this ingredient is not likely
to pose any human health risk whatsoever." Cf. Cooper, supra note 105, at 620-21 (listing examples of
nonsensical warnings).
138. For instance, FDA allows the use of coal tar as an active ingredient for the treatment of psoriasis
and other less serious scalp conditions, 21 C.F.R. § 358.710 (1993), even though the Agency conceded that
"it is well-established that coal tar contains substances that possess carcinogenic properties." 51 Fed. Reg.
27,346, 27,348 (1986). Coal tar products need not carry any mention of animal toxicity data on their labels.
Id. at 27,349 (after discussing reassuring clinical experiencewith coal tar drugs, FDA decidedsome guidance
against prolonged use would be justified but did not deem it necessary to warn consumers of "relatively
small" cancer risk); see also 56 Fed. Reg. 63,554, 63,565 (1991). Required warnings appear in 21 C.F.R.
§ 358.750(c) (1993).
139. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanyingtext.
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relented and dropped the proposed warning for doxylamine, 40 the Agency still
is actively considering chronic risk labeling for benzoyl peroxide, a widely used
topical acne ingredient.'
41
Consistent with its treatment of food and most cosmetic products, FDA
generally has not required that OTC labeling discuss low-level, chronic health
hazards. 142 In contrast to its treatment of food products, however, the Agency's
practice with respect to OTC drugs involves the imposition of detailed and quite
rigid warning requirements for acute hazards. For the most part, FDA has
required instructional warnings that more closely resemble directions for use
than descriptions of the risks posed by use or misuse. When specific health
hazards are identified in a required cautionary statement, as in the case of the
third-trimester pregnancy warning for products containing aspirin, it is done
primarily to underscore the importance of abiding by the directives contained
in the warning. Because OTC products are intended for self-treatment, the
emphasis on instructional warnings rather than risk disclosures seems entirely
appropriate.
D. Prescription Drugs
Medications that cannot be used safely by consumers without the diagnosis
and supervision of a physician are designated as prescription drugs and can be
dispensed only on the order of a licensed medical practitioner, making such
medications unlike most other consumer products. As one would expect,
physician labeling contains far more detailed risk information than is generally
possible to provide in the labeling of most consumer products, and physician
labeling includes information about both acute and chronic risks. Nonetheless,
FDA's elaborate labeling requirements for prescription drugs provide instructive
140. 59 Fed. Reg. 4216,4217 (1994) (decidinginstead to publish informative article in FDA CONSUMER
magazine).
141. FDA deferred final action on benzoyl peroxide when it issued the monograph for topical acne
products. 56 Fed. Reg. 41,008, 41,009 (1991) (animal studies suggested that ingredient may promote
tumors). Benzoyl peroxide may continue to be marketed while careinogenicity studies are underway, but,
as with doxylamine, FDA is considering a labeling disclaimer requirement in the meantime. See F-D-C
REPORTS ("The Tan Sheet"), Nov. 29, 1993, at 8, 9; F-D-C REPORTS ("The Rose Sheet"), Jan. 17, 1994, at
8. By contrast, FDA has not suggested any need for cautionary labeling pending its decision on fears that
the weight control ingredient phenylpropanolaminemay cause hemorrhagic stroke. See F-D-C REPORTS ("The
Pink Sheet"), Feb. 15, 1993, at T&G-l.
142. Like foods, the labeling of nonprescription drugs must disclose the presence of Yellow No. 5,
21 C.F.R. § 201.20(a) (1993), and alert phenylketonuricsif the product contains aspartame. Id. § 201.21(b).
FDA has proposed to require a declaration of the sodium content of OTC drugs. 56 Fed. Reg. 19,222 (1991)
(to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 201, 331) (proposed April 25, 1991). Unlike rule applicable to food
products, however, the warning would be required above a certain threshold. Id. at 19,226 (to be codified
at 21 C.F.R. § 201.64(c)) (if maximum daily dose of OTC drug contains more than 140 mg of sodium, its





contrasts, particularly when compared with OTC drug warnings directed to lay
consumers.
Prescription drugs are potent medications that unavoidably are associated
with adverse effects,'43 but the benefits of using such drugs outweigh the
accompanying risks so long as the expert judgment of a trained professional
is first applied in the decision to use a drug for a particular patient. The best
mechanism for achieving these ends is detailed labeling that includes all
pertinent risk information. The labeling for prescription drugs provides
comprehensive information to help physicians in making therapeutic risk-benefit
decisions in individual cases. Consequently, when FDA reviews new drug
applications, it carefully considers all aspects of proposed labeling.'" In
promulgating its regulation governing the content and format of "package
inserts," FDA emphasized that "the decision as to whether a warning is legally
required for the labeling of a drug must rest with the agency."'45
In the labeling for any prescription drug, FDA demands that cautionary
information be categorized according to the relative severity of the hazard and
the degree to which the risk has been substantiated. Package inserts contain
many detailed paragraphs of information about indications for use and side
effects to assist physicians in making prescribing decisions. Topic headings in
prescription drug labeling should include: Clinical Pharmacology, Indications
and Usage, Contraindications, Warnings, Precautions, and Adverse Reactions.146
The placement of risk information into one of the latter several categories
depends on the relative severity of the hazard, ranging from situations where
risks "clearly outweigh any possible benefit" (to be noted as contraindica-
tions) 147 to non-serious side effects that occur with a frequency of less than one
143. It is well known, for instance, that certain patients are allergic to penicillin, and approximately
300 persons (representing 0.001% of all treated patients) die each year from anaphylactic reactions. ALFRED
G. GILMAN et al., GOODMAN AND GILMAN'S THE PHARMACOLOoICAL BASIS OF THFRAPEutrcs 1083 (8th ed. 1990).
All told, adverse drug reactions may account for many thousands of fatalities in the United States each year.
See John A. Anderson, Allergic Reactions to Drugs and BiologicalAgents, 268 JAMA 2845 (1992); Strom,
Pharmacoepidemiology:CurrentStatus, Prospects, andProblems, 113 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 179 (1990).
144. See Richard A. Merrill, CompensationforPrescriptionDruglnjuries,59 VA. L. REV. 1, 11 (1973)
("The agency approves, and for practical purposes prescribes, the labeling that the drug must bear.").
Proposed labeling must be included in the application, and the agency may condition final approval on
revisions. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(F) (1988);21 C.F.R. §§ 314.50(c)(2)(i), 314.110(1993).Althoughdecisions
are made for each new drug independently at the time of their approval, the agency does attempt to achieve
consistency in the labeling required for similar prescription drugs. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 310.500(e) (1993)
(specifying appropriate labeling for digoxin); 22 FDA MEDICAL BULL. 2 (1992) (describing class-wide labeling
changes, including a boxed warning against use during pregnancy, for one type of antihypertensive drug);
49 Fed. Reg. 14,303 (1984) (announcing class labeling guideline for oral hypoglycemic drugs and issuing
a mandatory warning requirement); 45 Fed. Reg. 76,356 (1980) (announcing class labeling guideline for
single-entity barbiturates).
145. 44 Fed. Reg. 37,434, 37,453 (1979).
146. 21 C.F.R. § 201.56 (1993).
147. Id. § 201.57(d); see also McFadden v. Haritatos, 448 N.Y.S.2d 79, 81 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982)
("[T]he caveats against use beginning with 'CONTRAINDICATIONS' were and are set forth in the
regulations in a descending order of importance. Thus, as known adverse side effects increase in intensity
and severity, the manufacturer's warning in respect to the drug's potential for harm should accordingly
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in a thousand (to be noted as "rare" adverse reactions).' This hierarchy stands
in marked contrast to the Agency's largely undifferentiated approach for OTC
drug labeling.4 9
The Warnings section of the package insert is reserved for risks that are
more serious than adverse reactions but are not so serious as to clearly outweigh
possible benefits of a drug. Particularly serious risks may have to be highlighted
as a "boxed warning."'"5 For example, the package insert for the antiepileptic
drug Depakene (valproic acid) carries a boxed warning which provides in part
that:
HEPATIC FAILURE RESULTING IN FATALITIES HAS
OCCURRED IN PATIENTS RECEIVING VALPROIC ACID....
SERIOUS OR FATAL HEPATOTOXICITY MAY BE PRECEDED
BY NON-SPECIFIC SYMPTOMS SUCH AS LOSS OF SEIZURE
CONTROL, MALAISE, WEAKNESS, LETHARGY, FACIAL
EDEMA, ANOREXIA, AND VOMITING. PATIENTS SHOULD BE
MONITORED CLOSELY FOR APPEARANCE OF THESE
SYMPTOMS.'
The Agency has emphasized that, "to ensure the significance of boxed warnings
in drug labeling, they are permitted in labeling only when specifically required
by FDA.' 52
In certain cases, information concerning uncommon but potentially serious
allergic reactions may have to appear in the Warnings section. For example,
ascend to a higher category.").
148. 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(g)(2) (1993).
149. See 57 Fed. Reg. 58,356, 58,368 (1992) ("[T]he agency does not believe that the importance of
the 'Warnings' section will be undermined if all of the information about unsafe use, side effects, and
adverse reactions is presented under a single heading."). By contrast, when professional labeling is set forth
in the monograph, most of the "Warnings" appearing in consumer labeling generally are listed as "Adverse
Reactions." See supra note 117.
150. 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(e)(1993). For example, FDA has mandatedthe use of boxed warnings against
the use of thyroid and digitalis preparations in the treatment of obesity. Id. §§ 201.316, 201.317.
151. 47 PHYSICIANS DESK REFERENCE 512 (1993). The PHYSICIANS DESK REFERENCE (PDR) is an annual
compilation of prescription drug package inserts provided to practicing physicians at no charge. Because
physicians normally do not dispense drugs directly to patients, they do not see the labeling included with
the product and must instead rely on copies received from sales representatives or compilations such as the
PDR. Such additional labeling must contain the same information as the approved package insert, 21 C.F.R.
§§ 201.100(d)(2), 202.1(/)(2) (1993), and manufacturers have been held liable for failure to warn when the
PDR does not contain the same warnings. E.g., Baker v. St. Agnes Hospital, 421 N.Y.S.2d 81, 86 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1979).
152. 44 Fed. Reg. 37,434, 37,448 (1979). Thus, becauseit was unpersuadedby the data, FDA rejected
a petition requesting that the labeling of oral contraceptives include a boxed warning concerning the risk
of breast cancer. F-D-C REPORTS ("The Pink Sheet"), May 31, 1993, at T&G- 18; cf. F-D-C REPORTS ("The
Pink Sheet"), May 24, 1993, at T&G-3 (describing FDA request that all manufacturers of contrast agents
include boxed warning against intrathecal use). FDA prohibits certain types of advertising for prescription




prescription drugs made with sulfiting agents must include a lengthy warning.'53
A similar statement concerning possible allergic reactions to Yellow No. 5 is
required, but only in the Precautions section of prescription drug labeling.'54
Such detailed precautionary information contrasts with the simple ingredient
declarations FDA requires when these additives are present in food and nonpre-
scription drug products.'
Whichever category is appropriate for the disclosure of hazard information
in the package insert, FDA demands that the risk be substantiated. The regula-
tions provide, for instance, that only "[k]nown hazards and not theoretical
possibilities shall be listed" as contraindications.'56 The Agency explained in
the preamble to this rule that "including theoretical hazards as contraindications
in drug labeling would cause that very important section of the labeling to lose
its significance.""' A statement in the Warnings section is only appropriate after
"reasonable evidence of an association of a serious hazard with a drug" is
found, though "a causal relationship need not have been proved."'58 Evidence
from long-term animal studies normally should be included in the Precautions
section, together with an explanation of species and bioassay results, 59 though
in some cases "serious animal toxicity data may require warnings in drug label-
ing." 6 FDA even requires that the Adverse Reactions section, which contains
some of the least serious risk information in the package insert, only include
the side effects that are "reasonably associated" with use of the drug. 6 '
Although all "adverse experiences" with a new drug must be reported to the
153. The Warnings section would have to include the following statement:
Contains (insert the name of the sufite, e.g., sodium metabisulfite), a sulfite that may cause
allergic-type reactions including anaphylactic symptoms and life-threatening or less severe
asthmatic episodes in certain susceptible people. The overall prevalence of sulfite sensitivity
in the general population is unknown and probably low. Sulfite sensitivity is seen more
frequently in asthmatic than in nonasthmatic people.
21 C.F.R. § 201.22(b) (1993).
154. Id. § 201.20(b), discussed in supra note 96. In addition, the statement alerting phenylketonurics
that products sweetened with aspartame contain phenylalanine must appear in the "Precautions" section of
the package insert. Id. § 201.21 (c).
155. See supra notes 91-92.
156. 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(d) (1993).
157. 44 Fed. Reg. 37,434, 37,447 (1979).
158. 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(e) (1993); see also 40 Fed. Reg. 28,582, 28,583 (1975).
159. 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(l)(5) (1993). FDA explainedthat: "This information maybe ofvalueto physi-
cians in deciding whether to prescribe a particular drug for an indication, when animal data demonstrate
a relationship between the use of the drug and carcinogenesis, mutagenesis, or impairment of fertility and
no comparable human data exist, and when equally effective alternative drugs that do not present a risk are
available." 44 Fed. Reg. 37,434, 37,450 (1979).
160. Id. at 37,448; see 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(e) (1993).
161. 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(g) (1993). FDA recently asked manufacturers of fertility drugs to revise the
Adverse Reaction section of labeling to disclose recent information about the possible risk of ovarian cancer.
See FDA Talk Paper No. T93-3 (Jan. 13, 1993) (six cases had been reported to FDA, and one published
study suggested causal association, but Agency explained that "this labeling change is being made only in
one section of the label without a conclusion about causality").
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Agency, whether or not reasonably associated with use of the drug,' for
purposes of labeling an adverse reaction "would not include unsubstantiated
reactions."' 113 When substantiated health hazards are discovered, however,
manufacturers have a duty to alert the Agency and to add new risk information
to labeling.
6 4
FDA's rules governing the disclosure of potential risks of use by pregnant
women illustrate the interplay between categorization and substantiation. A
"Pregnancy category" designation, accompanied by a specified explanation and
any additional information concerning the risk of birth defects, must appear in
the Precautions section of most package inserts. The particular designation
depends on the available evidence of a drug's potential teratogenicity. If
adequate and well-controlled clinical studies have failed to demonstrate any risk
to the fetus, the drug is to be designated as Pregnancy category A. 65 Pregnancy
category B is appropriate in cases where clinical studies have not been
performed in pregnant women, but the data from animal testing fail to
demonstrate a risk to the fetus. Pregnancy category C should be used if the
animal test results were unfavorable but the benefits of use outweigh the
possible risk of birth defects. 66 In the event that there is positive human evi-
dence of a risk to the fetus, but the potential benefits from use of the drug by
pregnant women may be acceptable, Pregnancy category D should appear in
the Precautions section of the package insert along with a cross-reference to
the Warnings section which must include a specified hazard statement.'67
Finally, if evidence from use in humans or animals discloses a risk of birth
defects that clearly outweighs any possible benefit of using the drug during
pregnancy, Pregnancy category X is appropriate, along with a cross-reference
to the Contraindications section.'68 Although the use of different letters for each
category is unique, the scheme used for teratogenic risk information reflects
162. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 310.305(b), 314.80(a) (1993); 50 Fed. Reg. 7452, 7471 (1985).
163. 44 Fed. Reg. 37,434, 37,453 (1979) ("adverse experiences are not synonymous with adverse
reactions and should not be included in prescription drug labeling"); see also Thomas Scarlett, The Relation-
ship Among Adverse Drug Reaction Reporting, Drug Labeling, Product Liability, and Federal Preemption,
46 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 31, 36 (1991) ("[A]lthough the FDA prefers that companies err on the side of
caution and report more rather than less, the agency does not want to process a lot of pointless ADR
information or have labeling cluttered up with speculative warnings."). FDA's distinction between adverse
experiences for purposes of spontaneous reporting and adverse reactions for purposes of labeling differs
from the systems used in European and other countries. Garth K. Graham, Can Safety Labeling Be Harmo-
nized?, 27 DRUG INFO. J. 447, 448 (1993).
164. 44 Fed. Reg. 37,434, 37,447 (1979) ("[T]he act and FDA regulations require a warning in drug
labeling as soon as a hazard is associated with the use of a drug."). The extent of manufacturers' ability
to revise approved labeling to incorporate new risk information has been an issue ofconsiderablecontroversy
in products liability litigation involving prescription drugs. See infra notes 333-341 and accompanyingtext.
165. 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(f)(6)(i)(a) (1993).
166. Id. § 201.57(f)(6)(i)(b)&(c).
167. Id. § 201.57(f)(6)(i)(d).
168. Id. § 201.57(f)(6)(i)(e). The Agency explained that the use of these pregnancy categories is




FDA's general categorization and substantiation requirements applicable to
other prescription drug hazards.
Prescription drug warning requirements have not been confined to product
labels for physicians. On several occasions over the last two decades, FDA has
proposed requiring that drug information be given directly to patients. In 1970,
for example, the Agency issued a requirement for a "patient package insert"
(PPI) for oral contraceptives. 6 9 The insert included the following cautionary
information:
Do Not Take This Drug Without Your Doctor's Continued
Supervision. The oral contraceptives are powerful and effective drugs
which can cause side effects in some users and should not be used
at all by some women. The most serious known side effect is
abnormal blood clotting which can be fatal. 7
In imposing this requirement, FDA explained that oral contraceptives, which
pose low-probability but potentially serious risks, were taken by healthy women
as a matter of choice over a long period of time, and that "many patients [were]
not receiving the needed information in an organized, comprehensive,
understandable and handy-for-future reference form."'' Several years later, the
Agency promulgated a regulation requiring a similar PPI for drug products
containing estrogens,' though in this case the primary goal was to dissuade
inappropriate use.'73
In 1979, based on studies indicating the usefulness of supplying written
information directly to patients, FDA proposed regulations that would have
169. 35 Fed. Reg. 5962 (1970); 35 Fed. Reg. 9001 (1970).
170. 21 C.F.R. § 130.45(d)(1) (1970). The requirement has been revised several times since then, and
includes far more detailed warnings and information about side effects. 21 C.F.R. § 310.501 (1993); FDA,
Patient Package Insert Text for Estrogen-Progestogen Oral Contraceptives, Docket No. 86D-0335 (Feb.
1987) (on file with the author). This PPI was held to provide an adequate warning in a recent products
liability case, MacPherson v. Searle & Co., 775 F. Supp. 417, 425 (D.D.C. 1991), and FDA is now
considering further revisions to improve clarity of the PPI, such as adding a single cover page that highlights
the information found in the full insert. See F-D-C REPORTS ("The Pink Sheet"), Nov. 1, 1993, at T&G-1.
A similar PPI requirement exists for IUDs. 21 C.F.R. §§ 310.502, 801.427(b)(2) (1993).
171. 35 Fed. Reg. 9001, 9002 (1970). As explained by a former Chief Counsel of FDA: "Labeling
is usually the appropriate regulatory strategy for those relatively few circumstances where a large proportion
of consumers will take the trouble to assess benefits and risks before deciding whether to use a particular
product, and where useful information on risks can in fact be provided. The best example is contraceptive
drugs and devices." Richard M. Cooper, A Time to Warn andA Time to Ban, in PRODUCr LABELING AND HEALTH
RiSKS: BANBURY REPORT 6, at 299 (Louis A. Morris et al. eds., 1980). See generally Marsha W. Gardner,
Increasing Patient Awareness in Drug Therapy: Ramifications of a Patient Package Insert Requirement,
66 GEO. L.J. 837 (1978); Richard A. Guarino, Patient Package Inserts, 34 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 116
(1979).
172. 42 Fed. Reg. 37,636 (1977), 21 C.F.R. § 310.515 (1993); see also Pharmaceutical Mfrs. Ais'n
v. FDA, 484 F. Supp. 1179 (D. Del.) (rejecting challengeto this regulation), aff'd, 634 F.2d 106, 108 (3d
Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
173. See 9 FDA DRUG BULL. 2, 3 (1979).
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required PPIs for most prescription drug products.1 4 Although the Agency
recognized that consumers may have difficulties understanding some of the
concepts and information described in professional labeling,'75 the proposed
PPIs would have differentiated between Contraindications, Warnings, Pre-
cautions, and Adverse Reactions in much the same way as package inserts
directed to physicians do. 76 The proposal was never implemented,'77 but
pharmaceutical companies sometimes voluntarily provide separate information
for patients, and FDA recently expressed renewed interest in requiring the
distribution of prescription drug information directly to patients.'78 For the most
part, however, prescription drug labeling remains geared toward providing
physicians with the information that may be relevant in deciding whether to
prescribe a medication for a particular patient.'79 Although the level of detail
generally could not be replicated in the labeling of other products, FDA require-
ments that risk information be substantiated and categorized should be relevant
no matter what the type of product or the relative sophistication of the
audience.
174. 44 Fed. Reg. 40,016, 40,020-21 (1979).
175. Id. at 40,026.
176. Id. at 40,029. Indeed, information about potential carcinogenicity and mutagenicity based on
animal or laboratory testing would appear in the Precautions section of the PPI along with other items such
as information concerning possible drug interactions. Id.
177. After receiving various complaintsabout the costs of such an undertaking,FDA instead established
a three-year pilot program mandating the distribution of PPIs for 10 classes of drugs. 45 Fed. Reg. 60,754,
60,773 (1980) (anticipating that PPIs for these drugs would "help prevent serious side effects"). Even this
scaled-down program was stayed by the Agency in 1981. 46 Fed. Reg. 23,739, 23,815 (1981). It was
revoked the following year. 47 Fed. Reg. 39,147 (1982); see also Rosalind M. Kendellen, The Food and
Drug Administration Retreatsfrom Patient Package Insertsfor Prescription Drugs, 40 FOOD DRUG COSM.
L.J. 172 (1985).
178. 59 Fed. Reg. 20,356 (1994).
179. The labeling of prescription or otherwise restricted medical devices must bear information con-
cerning "any relevant hazards, contraindications, side effects, and precautions." 21 C.F.R. § 801.109(c)
(1993). Although these elements are not spelled out in the same detail contained in the regulations governing
package inserts for drugs, FDA's guidelinesset forth identical categorizationand substantiationrequirements
for device labeling. See ODE Guidance Memorandum G91-1 (March 8, 1991) (on file with the author).
Through premarket approval of"Class ll" devices (such as pacemakers), FDA establishes detailed require-
ments regarding the design, manufacture, and labeling of a device in advance of sale. (Most Class I devices
(e.g., bandages) and Class II devices (e.g., tampons), as well as some Class Ill devices for which premarket
approval has not yet been required, are subject to premarket notification requirements, and FDA does review
labeling when deciding whether a device is "substantially equivalent" to a previously marketed device. See
21 U.S.C. § 360(k) (1988); 21 C.F.R. §§ 807.81-807.97(1993).) Class labeling requirements for certain
devices such as IUDs contemplate the same level of detail as found in prescription drug package inserts.
See 21 C.F.R. § 801.427(b)(l )(I 993). In the preamble to this regulation, FDA explainedthat the "Warnings"
section "addresses only the most serious of possible adverse effects," and it decided to modify two of the
warning statements it had originally proposed, moving one that was less serious into the "Precautions"
section and deleting another one altogether because it was not supported by the available data. 42 Fed. Reg.




E. Pesticides and Other Household Products
A variety of other consumer products must include specific precautionary
information in their labeling. CPSC has imposed warning requirements for
several different household items that are subject to its jurisdiction, ranging
from lawn mowers 8 ' and charcoal briquettes 8' to baby pacifiers. 8 2 By contrast,
CPSC has designated toys with small parts as banned hazardous substances if
intended for use by children under 3 years of age, a prohibition that
manufacturers have been able to avoid by including a statement on the label
of such toys that they are only recommended for older children. 3 Parents may,
however, interpret the age recommendation as based on a developmental
standard rather than the risk of choking and may, therefore, be more likely to
ignore it. "'
EPA's authority under FIFRA extends to several types of household
products, including general purpose pesticides used by consumers in and around
their homes. As FDA has done with many products subject to its jurisdiction,
EPA has chosen labeling as its primary means for controlling the marketing
and use of pesticides and related products. 5 The Agency has issued detailed
regulations governing the use of warning statements in labeling, creating precise
matrices linking degrees of human toxicity and other acute risks to warning
requirements of different intensity.'86 In many respects, EPA's guidelines
180. 16 C.F.R. § 1205.6(a) (1993).
18 I. Id. § 1500. 14(b)(6)(i) (requiring following boxed warning: "WARNING: Do Not Use for Indoor
Heating or Cooking Unless Ventilation is Provided for Exhausting Fumes to Outside. Toxic Fumes May
Accumulate and Cause Death.").
182. Id. § 1511.7(a) ("[P]acifiers shall be labeled with the statement: 'Warning-Do Not Tie Pacifier
Around Child's Neck as it Presents a Strangulation Danger."').
183. Id. pt. 1501. So long as a toy is not marketed or commonly recognized as being intended for
children under age three, label recommendations will make the small parts regulation inapplicable to that
toy. See United States v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 754 F. Supp. 1050, 1055 (D.N.J. 1991).
184. See Toy Mfrs. of America, Inc. v. Blumenthal,986 F.2d 615,619 (2d Cir. 1992); Jean A. Langlois
et al., The Impact of Specific Toy Warning Labels, 265 JAMA 2848 (1991). A bill recently passed by the
House would address this problem by mandating a warning about the risks of choking on the small parts
of toys even if recommended for use by children ages three to six. H.R. 965, § 2(a), 103d Cong., I st Sess.
(1993); see also S. 680, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R. REP. NO. 29, 103d Cong., I st Sess. 4-6 (1993);
58 Fed. Reg. 8013, 8015 (1993) (CPSC decision to withdraw advance notice of proposed rulemaking to
require such a warning).
185. See 7 U.S.C. § 136(q)(I)(G) (1988) (pesticide labels must include warning and precautionary
statements "adequate to protect health and the environment"); Continental Chemiste Corp. v. Ruckelshaus,
461 F.2d 331, 335-36 (7th Cir. 1972). EPA requires the use of the following statement on all pesticides:
"It is a violation of Federal law to use this product in a manner inconsistent with its labeling." 40 C.F.R.
§ 156.10(i)(2)(ii) (1993).
186. See id. § 156.10(h). These requirements generally apply to newly registered pesticides, so revisions
to the labeling of older pesticides must await reregistration. In an effort to accelerate labeling revisions, EPA
instituted the Label Improvement Program (LIP) in 1980. See 45 Fed. Reg. 37,884 (1980). EPA proposed
to incorporate in its amendments to the pesticide registration regulations LIP procedures for conforming
revisions to labeling in advance of reregistration, 49 Fed. Reg. 37,916, 37,927 (1984), but the proposal was
dropped from the final regulation. 53 Fed. Reg. 15,952, 15,963 (1988) ("EPA believes that LIP serves a
useful function, with goals of consistency, uniformity; and clarification of labeling .... [But] regulations
for its implementation are premature.").
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dictating how and when to convey precautionary information are similar to
FDA's regulations governing prescription drug labeling, though EPA's
application of its guidelines may be somewhat less rigorous in practice.'87 CPSC
regulations governing hazardous substances under the FHSA, though somewhat
less detailed, share many of the same characteristics. 8 '
EPA's pesticide labeling regulations first set out four human toxicity
categories, depending on quantifiable measures of toxicity by different possible
routes of exposure. Toxicity Category I would be assigned to a chemical whose
LDs0 (median lethal dose in animals) by ingestion occurred at a dose of only
50 mg/kg or lower.8 9 Toxicity Categories II and III would be assigned to
substances with median lethal doses occurring at doses higher by up to one or
two orders of magnitude, respectively. A chemical with an LDs0 exceeding 5000
mg/kg would be assigned to Toxicity Category IV.'
A pesticide or similar product assigned to Toxicity Category I must bear
the signal word "Danger" on the front panel of the product, along with the
word "Poison" if the toxicity results from ingestion, inhalation, or dermal
absorption."9 ' In addition, first-aid or other instructions for treatment must
appear on the front panel of a Category I pesticide. 92 Category II pesticides
must bear the signal word "Warning" on their front panel, and all other
187. See W. Kip Viscusi, Toward a Proper Role for Hazard Warnings in Products Liability Cases,
13 J. PROD. LIAB. 139, 157-61 (1991) (praising standardizationof vocabulary, format, and relative promi-
nence of risk information in drug package inserts, yet criticizing EPA pesticide labeling regulations because
of significant variability in approved labeling for similar products); Valle S. Dutcher, The Marlboro Man
Meets the Orkin Man: The Effect of Cipollone v. Ligett Group, Inc. on Federal Preemption by the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act of Failure to Warn Claims Brought under State Tort Law, 15
J. PROD. & Toxics LIAB. 29, 38 (1993) ("[F]ederal regulation of pesticides should not allow manufacturers
to escape liability for inadequate labeling by 'laundering' the label through the EPA registration process.").
188. Seel6C.F.R.§ 1500.3(b)(14)(i) (1993). Canadaappliessimilar labelingrequirementsto hazardous
substances. See Consumer Chemicals and Containers Regulations, C. Gaz. 88-556, pts. Ill & IV (requiring
specified signal words, primary and secondary hazard statements, and first-aid instructions). The Canadian
regulations are unusual, however, in that they also require uniform hazard symbols reflecting the type and
seriousness of acute hazards such as toxicity and corrosiveness. For example, a poisonous substance for
which the signal word "Danger" was required would have to include a skull-and-crossbones inside a bold
octagonal border; a less poisonous substances for which the signal word "Warning" was required would
have to include a skull-and-crossbones inside a bold diamond-shaped border; and a poison for which only
a "Caution" was required would use an inverted triangle as a border. See id. § 16 & Schedule I1; see also
Cosmetic Regulations, C.R.C., P.869, § 26 (1990) (requiring use ofthese symbols for flammability labeling
of cosmetics in pressurized containers).
189. 40 C.F.R. § 156.10(h)(1) (1993). CPSC regulations use median lethal doses to define "highly
toxic" substances. 16 C.F.R. § 1500.3(b)(6) (1993).
190. 40 C.F.R. § 156.10(h)(1) (1993); see also 40 Fed. Reg. 28,242, 28,257 (1975) (describing the
origins of this numerical scale). For effects on the skin and eyes, qualitative measures are used. Thus,
Toxicity Category I would be assigned to a chemical that had corrosive effects on the skin. Toxicity
Categories II, Ill, or IV would be assigned if severe, moderate, or mild to slight skin irritation, respectively,
remained after 72 hours. 40 C.F.R. § 156.10(h)(1) (1993).
191. 40 C.F.R. § 156.10(h)(l)(i)(A) (1993). CPSC reserves use of the signal word "Danger" for
extremely flammable, corrosive, or highly toxic substances, along with the word "Poison" for highly toxic
substances. 16 C.F.R. § 1500.3(b)(14)(i)(C)&(H) (1993). A skull-and-crossbones symbol must accompany
the word "Poison." Id. § 1500.121(b)(5)(i); see also 7 U.S.C. § 136(q)(2)(D)(i) (1988) (under FIFRA,
pesticides labeled as poisonous must include the skull-and-crossbones symbol).
192. 40 C.F.R. § 156.10(h)(l)(iii)(A) (1993).
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Warning Labels
pesticides must use the word "Caution."' 93 First-aid instructions for these other
toxicity categories need not appear on the front panel,'94 but the front panel of
all pesticide products must bear the statement "keep out of reach of children."' 95
EPA's regulations forbid the use of more than one human hazard signal
word on the front panel, and a manufacturer cannot use a more alarming signal
word than that required (e.g., "Danger" for a Category III pesticide) unless the
Agency first determines that such a deviation would be necessary to prevent
unreasonable adverse effects.'96 The hierarchy of signal words also is linked
to a hierarchy of required precautionary statements that must follow the signal
word. Precautionary statements must indicate "the particular hazard, the route(s)
of exposure and the precautions to be taken to avoid accident, injury or dam-
age."' 97 For example, a product assigned to Toxicity Category I by virtue of
an LD 0 based on ingestion would have to include something along the
following lines after the word "Danger":
Fatal (poisonous) if swallowed. Do not breathe vapor. Do not get in
eyes, on skin, or on clothing. In case of accidental ingestion, contact
poison control center immediately. 8
A Category II pesticide would carry a somewhat milder warning ("May be fatal
if swallowed. .. ."), a Category III pesticide would carry a still milder caution
193. Id. § 156.10(h)(1)(i)(B)-(D). Because CPSC does not define intermediate toxicity categories, the
signal words for all hazardous substances not qualifying for "Danger"may be either "Warning" or "Caution."
16 C.F.R. § 1500.3(b)(14)(i)(D) (1993).
194. 40 C.F.R. § 156.10(h)(l)(iii)(B) (1993).
195. Id. § 156.10(h)(1)(ii). CPSC appliesa similar labeling requirement for those hazardous substances
subject to its jurisdiction. 16 C.F.R. § 1500.3(b)(14)(i)(J)(l) (1993).
196. 40 C.F.R. § 156.10(h)(l)(i)(E) (1993). It is also noteworthy that EPA prohibits multilingual
labeling for pesticides unless the Agency specifically requires it for a certain product. Id. § 156.10(a)(3).
If the Agency decides that additional text in another language is necessary to protect the public, it may
require either all information in labeling appear in the second language or use of an appropriate translation
of the phrase "If you cannot read English do not use this product until properly instructed." 40 Fed. Reg.
28,242, 28,251 (1975). This contrasts with the somewhat greater flexibility permitted by FDA. See supra
note 122.
197. 40 C.F.R. § 156. 1 0(h)(2)(i)(A) (1993). CPSC requires that the signal word on a hazardous product
be followed by an affirmative statement of the principal hazard(s), precautionary measures, and first-aid
and special handling instructions. 16 C.F.R. § 1500.3(b)(14)(G)-(1) (1993).
198. See 40 C.F.R. § 156.10(h)(2)(i)(B) (1993) (matrix depicting typical precautionary statements by
toxicity category). CPSC does not provide such detailed guidelines, but it has set forth specific warning
label requirements for especially hazardous substances such as diethylene glycol, various petroleum
distillates, charcoal, and fireworks. See 16 C.F.R. § 1500.14(b) (1993). For instance, the warning for
products containing 10% or more of toluene, benzene, or other petroleum distillates is "Danger: Harmful
or fatal if swallowed. Call physician immediately." Id. § 1500. 14(b)(3)(ii). The warning had included the
statement "If swallowed, do not induce vomiting," but this was deleted because in some cases the risk of
systemic toxicity would be greater than the risk of aspiration from vomiting. 53 Fed. Reg. 3014, 3015
(1988). FDA requires that the labeling for ipecac syrup, an OTC product used to induce vomiting in
poisoning emergencies, include the following warning: "Ordinarily, this drug should not be used if strych-
nine, corrosives such as alkalies (lye) and strong acids, or petroleum distillates such as kerosine, gasoline,
coal oil, fuel oil, paint thinner, or cleaning fluid have been ingested." 21 C.F.R. § 201.308(c)(2) (1993).
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("Harmful if swallowed. Avoid breathing vapors .... "), and a Category IV
pesticide need not carry any precautionary statement. 199
EPA's pesticide labeling regulations also specify appropriate warnings for
other hazards that may be associated with the use of a product. Under a separate
subheading for "Environmental Hazards," for instance, a statement that "This
Pesticide is Toxic to Wildlife" would be required if the active ingredient of a
product intended for outdoor use had an acute mammalian or avian oral LDs0
of 100 mg/kg or lower.200 Under a separate subheading for "Physical or
Chemical Hazards," different warning statements concerning flammability or
explosive characteristics would be required depending on varying flashpoints
and whether the product is in a pressurized container.2"1 Although EPA's
pesticide labeling regulations do not specify appropriate warnings for chronic
hazards such as cancer, private organizations have developed standards that
closely resemble the EPA framework for acute hazards.20 2
EPA's new warning requirements for products containing or manufactured
with ozone depleting substances, implementing a provision of the Clean Air
Act Amendments of 1990,203 are somewhat out of character with the Agency's
cautionary labeling requirements for pesticides. Recall that when FDA and
CPSC established their CFC warning requirements, EPA had mandated only
a simple disclosure statement on pesticide labels.20 4 Tracking the language
mandated by Congress, EPA's new regulation requires that the following
statement accompany affected products:
199. See40 C.F.R. § 156.10(h)(2)(i)(B) (1993). In the preamble to its final regulations, EPA rejected
comments suggesting that the signal word "Caution" not be required for Category IV products even though
no accompanying precautionary statement is required. 40 Fed. Reg. 28,242, 28,252 (1975).
200. 40 C.F.R. § 156.10(h)(2)(ii)(A)&(C) (1993).
201. Id. § 156.10(h)(2)(iii). For instance, pesticide products in non-pressurized containers with
flashpoints at or below 200 F would have to be labeled as "Extremely flammable. Keep away from fire,
sparks, and heated surfaces." Products with flashpoints of 20*-80' F would have to be labeled as "Flamma-
ble. Keep away from heat, sparks, and open flame." Products in non-pressurized containers with flashpoints
of 80°-1 50° F would have to carry the following instruction: "Do not use or store near heat or open flame."
202. See J. E. Betso et al., Hazard Communication: The Case for Category lV "Cancer Information,"
8 REG. TOXICOL. & PHARMACOL. 219,220-22 (1988) (discussing ANSI guideline). By contrast, CPSC has
issued warning requirements applicable to various products posing chronic health risks. For instance, paint
strippers and other adhesive removers should include language along the following lines: "Contains
methylene chloride, which has been shown to cause cancer in certain laboratory animals. Risk to your health
depends on level and duration of exposure." 52 Fed. Reg. 34,698, 34,702 (1987); see also Consumer Fed'n
of America v. CPSC, 883 F.2d 1073, 1078-79 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (upholding the Commission's decision not
to ban methylene chloride); Richard A. Merrill, CPSC Regulation of CancerRisks in Consumer Products:
1972-1981,67 VA. L. REV. 1261,1310-51 (1981) (describing earlier Commission efforts to classify potential
carcinogens as banned hazardous substances).
203. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.




WARNING: Contains [or Manufactured with, if applicable] [insert
name of substance], a substance which harms public health and
environment by destroying ozone in the upper atmosphere.2"5
Although the environmental and attenuated public health risks associated with
ozone depleting substances would seem to fit more appropriately as an entry
in the "Environmental Hazards" section used in pesticide labeling, the
information is introduced with a signal word normally reserved by EPA for
chemicals that may pose a serious risk of acute toxicity for the immediate user.
Some commenters therefore urged deletion of the term "Warning," but the
Agency responded that it could not alter the language required by Congress." 6
In proposing the regulation, EPA expressly recognized the importance of
not interfering with other required labeling information, and the corresponding
need to provide manufacturers with flexibility in complying with the new
requirement. The Agency concluded, however, that the warning "will not
distract consumers from noticing other warnings on the [principal display
panel], such as those required by CPSC under the Federal Hazardous Substances
Act."2 7 The final regulation codified this expectation: "The warning statement
shall not interfere with, detract from, or, mar any labeling information required
on the labeling by federal or state law."2 Notwithstanding its concern about
distracting consumers from other information, EPA requested comments about
the possibility of using a symbol (shaped as a stop sign with a partial view of
the planet Earth) to draw consumer attention to the new warning, 20 9 but the
Agency did not adopt this idea in the final regulation.210
FDA and several persons submitted comments to EPA asking that certain
prescription drug products containing ozone depleting substances, such as
metered dose inhalers (MDIs) used by asthmatic patients, be exempted from
the new warning requirement. These commenters argued that the warning could
cause such patients to discontinue prescribed therapies at risk to their health.2 t
EPA responded that Congress had not provided it with the authority to exempt
205. 40 C.F.R. § 82.106(a) (1993).
206. 58 Fed. Reg. 8136, 8157 (1993).
207. 57 Fed. Reg. 19,166, 19,172 (1992).
208. 40 C.F.R. § 82.106(c) (1993).
209. 57 Fed. Reg. 19,166,19,176(1992) ("To the extent that a symbol makes the label more noticeable
and understandable, it would aid consumers in making this [purchase] decision.").
210. 58 Fed. Reg. 8136,8157 (1993).
211. Id. at 8155; see also 58 Fed. Reg. 34,812, 34,814 (1993) (reiterating FDA's concern that "patients
who are concerned about a medical product's impact on the environment and public health might
inappropriatelyrefrain from takingtheir medication"). FDA's CFC warning requirement specificallyexcludes
MDls and related products. 21 C.F.R. § 369.21 (1993) ("The warning for self-pressurized containers that
contain a fully halogenated chlorofluorocarbon is not required and should not be used for metered-dose
adrenergic bronchodilators for oral inhalation and contraceptive vaginal foams." (emphasis added)); id.
§ 801.425(c); 42 Fed. Reg. 22,019, 22,026 (1977) (explaining that essential uses were exempted from the
warning requirement to avoid unduly alarming patients).
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essential products, but that it would tailor the requirement to minimize the risk
of unduly alarming patients." 2 The final regulation provides that if the full
warning appears in the package insert directed to physicians, then the package
label or other labeling intended for patients can bear an abbreviated statement




The above discussion provides representative examples of the types of
cautionary statements mandated by the three federal agencies most directly
involved in the regulation of consumer product labeling, namely FDA, EPA,
and CPSC.21 A rudimentary taxonomy may be gleaned from these materials.
The requirements vary significantly, reflecting in large part some of the basic
differences between the product categories. For instance, FDA's reluctance to
mandate warnings for food products contrasts with its evident willingness to
require all sorts of warnings for cosmetics, perhaps reflecting a perceived
dichotomy between essential and nonessential consumer goods.
The differences in the tone and complexity of warnings for OTC products
as compared to prescription drugs and devices no doubt reflect perceived
differences in the level of sophistication of the target audiences. When FDA
prescribes professional labeling for nonprescription drugs, the warnings are
more detailed than the consumer labeling for the same products. Conversely,
patient package inserts for prescription drugs are .less detailed than the labeling
intended for physicians, though they present much more carefully differentiated
cautionary information than consumer labeling for OTC drug products. Lastly,
while package inserts for physicians must contain a "Warning" when sulfiting
agents are present, and a "Precaution" for Yellow No. 5, food products need
only include ingredient disclosures in such cases. These differences in labeling
requirements demonstrate attention by the Agency to relevant differences in
audiences and product categories.
Interagency comparisons are also instructive. All three agencies imposed
CFC labeling requirements in the late 1970s. FDA and CPSC opted for
warnings, while EPA required only an ingredient disclosure statement. The
more recent warning mandated by Congress and implemented by EPA for all
ozone depleting substances resembles the older CFC warnings imposed by FDA
212. 58 Fed. Reg. 8136, 8155-56(1993).
213. 40 C.F.R. § 82.108(c). FDA announcedaltemative labeling statements for prescription and nonpre-
scription drugs and devices that could be used to satisfy this requirement. 58 Fed. Reg. 34,812, 34,813
(1993) (placing mandatory warnings between two disclaimers).
214. The more limited roles of the FTC and USDA with respect to the labeling of tobacco and meat





and CPSC. The various instructional warnings imposed by CPSC for hazardous
household products are similar to FDA's requirements for OTC drug products,
while EPA's detailed hierarchy of cautionary information for pesticide labeling
more closely approximates the requirements for prescription pharmaceuticals.
Except for FDA with respect to prescription labeling requirements, all three
agencies have struggled with the questions of whether and how to disclose
information about chronic health risks possibly associated with a product.
The federal government is not alone in requiring that consumer products
bear cautionary information in their labeling. As discussed in the next Part, state
regulators and courts further complicate efforts to achieve coherence in this
area. A more detailed analysis of some of the general shortcomings of these
various warning requirements is reserved for Parts IV and V of the Article.
III. State Warning Requirements
A. State Statutes and Regulations
Virtually all states have their own versions of the FD&C Act, including
similarly broad prohibitions against the misbranding of food, drugs, medical
devices, and cosmetics.215 But apart from an odd assortment of mandatory warn-
ings for specific products, reflecting either peculiar local conditions or the
special concerns of state lawmakers, state requirements are quite limited. One
exception is the sweeping "right-to-know" initiative pioneered by the State of
California which is discussed in Section 2.
1. Warnings for Specific Products
States have imposed specific warning requirements on a variety of
products. For example, Louisiana has mandated that warnings appear on all raw
shellfish produced or sold in the state because of the threat of cholera:
THERE MAY BE A RISK ASSOCIATED WITH CONSUMING
RAW SHELLFISH AS IS THE CASE WITH OTHER RAW
PROTEIN PRODUCTS. IF YOU SUFFER FROM CHRONIC
ILLNESS OF THE LIVER, STOMACH OR BLOOD OR HAVE
OTHER IMMUNE DISORDERS, YOU SHOULD EAT THESE
PRODUCTS FULLY COOKED.216
215. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. chs. 499.007,499.009,500.1 1 (Harrison Supp. 1992); TEX. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 431.082, 431.112, 431.142 (West 1992).
216. 19 La. Reg. 643 (May 20, 1993).
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California has a similar regulation, 217 and FDA is now considering the
desirability of a federal warning requirement for raw shellfish. 218 In
Connecticut, apricot kernels may not be sold unless they are packaged and
labeled with a warning that such kernels contain cyanide and may be fatal if
swallowed.219 In Oregon, foods containing residues of diethylstilbestrol (DES)
must carry a warning label to indicate that this synthetic growth hormone has
been associated with vaginal cancer and male genital abnormalities.
2 1
State warnings also have been imposed for products other than food. OTC
drugs are subject to some specific state labeling requirements.221 Many states
have authorized the prescription use of unapproved drugs such as Laetrile
(amygdalin) and dimethyl sulfoxide (DMSO) so long as certain warnings are
conveyed to patients.2 22 A number of states require that retail establishments
selling alcoholic beverages post warnings concerning the risk of birth defects.223
The State of Connecticut recently mandated that toys containing small parts
include a warning statement on the label concerning the choking hazard to
children under the age of three.224
In addition to hazard statements required by state statute or regulation,
courts have in some cases imposed detailed warning requirements pursuant to
general statutory prohibitions against false and misleading advertising. For
instance, one California appellate court recently affirmed a lower court's order
217. FOOD CHEM. NEWS, Dec. 14, 1992, at 22; see also Simeon v. Doe, 618 So. 2d 848,852 (La. 1993)
(person who ate raw oysters tainted with vibrio cholera could maintain failure-to-warn claim against sellers);
Kilpatrick v. Superior Court, 277 Cal. Rptr. 230,237 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (same); Don't Eat Raw Oysters,
Experts Warn, WASH. POST, June 4, 1993, at A14 (California and Louisiana require warnings to be posted;
State of Florida is drafting similar labeling regulations).
218. FOOD CHEM. NEWS, Feb. 3, 1992, at 28. The Agency appears to be leaning toward educational
campaigns directed at vulnerable populations rather than a label warning. Id. at 30.
219. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 21a-67 (1989).
220. OR. REV. STAT. § 616.333(1989); see also FOOD CHEM. NEWS, Mar. 1, 1993,at 2 (describing New
York proposal to require warning statements in labeling of meat or dairy products derived from animals
given bovine somatotropin (BST), a hormone that promotes milk production). FDA recently approved use
of BST without any special labeling requirement. 59 Fed. Reg. 6279, 6280 (1994).
221. See Mark B. Gelbert, State Statutes Affecting the Labeling ofOTC Drugs: ConstitutionalityBased
on CommerceClause andFederalPreemption Theories,46 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 629,643-45 (1991); F-D-
C REPORTS ("The Tan Sheet"), March 8, 1993, at 7 (describing New York proposal to require that all OTC
products be labeled to warn of risks to the elderly).
222. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 12-30-113 (1989) (physician must disclose known adverse effects
ofamygdalin to patients); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 499.035 (1992) (DMSO labeling must warn in boldfacedtype:
"May be unsafe. Not approved for human use."); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24:6F- I (West Supp. 1993) (amygdalin);
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 439.013 (West 1992) (DMSO).
223. See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 4-261 (West Supp. 1993) ("Warning: Drinking alcoholic
beverages, including distilled spirits, beer, coolers and wine, during pregnancy can cause birth defects.");
GA. CODE ANN. § 3-1-5 (1990) ("Warning: Drinking alcoholic beverages during pregnancy can cause birth
defects."); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 35-4-100 (1992).
224. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 21a-337 (1993). Industry was unsuccessful in arguing that the state's
requirement was preempted by federal law. See Toy Mfrs. of America, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 986 F.2d 615
(2d Cir. 1992). A few states at one time also imposed CFC warning requirements. See, e.g., 1977 Minn.
Laws, ch. 373, § 1(2). Industry succeeded in arguing that the Minnesotalaw was preempted. See Cosmetic,
Toiletry & Fragrance Ass'n, Inc. v. Minnesota, 440 F. Supp. 1216, 1220-1225 (D. Minn. 1977), aff'd, 575
F.2d 1256 (8th Cir. 1978) (per curiam).
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requiring that a producer of unpasteurized milk place the following warning
on its products for a period of ten years:
WARNING: THIS MILK MAY CONTAIN DANGEROUS
BACTERIA. THOSE FACING THE HIGHEST RISK OF DISEASE
OR DEATH INCLUDE BABIES, PREGNANT WOMEN, THE
ELDERLY, ALCOHOLICS, THOSE WITH CANCER, AIDS OR
REDUCED IMMUNITY AND THOSE TAKING CORTISONE,
ANTIBIOTICS OR ANTACIDS. QUESTIONS REGARDING THE
USE OF RAW CERTIFIED MILK SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO
YOUR PHYSICIAN.225
Shortly after issuance of the lower court's decision in this case, the State of
California Department of Health Services promulgated a regulation mandating
a similar warning on raw milk.226
2. Right-To-Know Initiatives
The State of California has pioneered a far-reaching "right-to-know" law
affecting most consumer products. In 1986, voters approved a Public Initiative
entitled the "Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986," better
known as "Proposition 65. "227 The law was enacted to prevent contamination
of water supplies and other toxic environmental exposures.228 Proposition 65
225. Consumers Union v. Alta-Dena Certified Dairy, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 193, 197 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
In addition, the court had mandated corrective advertising. Id. Federal courts have sometimes upheld similar
obligations imposed by FTC to correct misleading advertising campaigns. See, e.g., Porter & Dietsch, Inc.
v. FTC, 605 F.2d 294, 306-07 (7th Cir. 1979) (advertising of nonprescription weight loss tablets), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 950 (1980); Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC, 562 F.2d 749, 763 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (advertising
had to include warning that mouthwash product does not yield previously advertised health benefits), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 950 (1978). Companies have on occasion brought unfair competition claims alleging that
competitors have provided inadequate warnings on their products, but courts generally have rejected such
claims. See, e.g., American Home Prods. Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 672 F. Supp. 135, 143-45 (S.D.N.Y.
1987) (rejecting claims brought under Lanham Act and New York's unfair competition and deceptive
advertising laws alleging that labeling of aspirin product had unlawfully diluted prominence of FDA's Reye
syndrome warning).
226. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 11380 (1993); see also FOOD CHEM. NEWS, Nov. 22, 1993, at 62
(describing Oregon's proposal to require similar warnings). In response to a court order, Public Citizen v.
Heckler, 653 F. Supp. 1229, 1241 (D.D.C. 1986), FDA promulgated regulations prohibiting the interstate
sale of raw milk. 21 C.F.R. § 1240.61 (1993); see also 52 Fed. Reg. 29,509, 29,513 (1987) (rejecting
cautionary labeling as an alternative).
227. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25249.5-. 3 (1992). SeegenerallyPaulette L. Stenzel, Right-To-
Know Provisions of California's Proposition 65: The Naivete of the Delaney Clause Revisited, 15 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REv. 493 (1991); Melinda Haag, Note, Proposition 65s Right-To-KnowProvision: Can It Keep
Its Promise to California Voters?, 14 ECOLOGY L.Q. 685 (1987).
228. Congress has enacted similar "right-to-know" laws involving potential exposures to toxic
substances. See 42 U.S.C. § 11044(a) (1988) ("Each emergency response plan, material safety data sheet,
.. [and] toxic chemical release form ... shall be made available to the general public"). This provision
was part of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, included in the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, title 111, 100 Stat. 1728 (1986).
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also included controversial consumer product warning requirements that had
the dual purpose of educating consumers and encouraging companies to
reformulate their products. Although there is little evidence suggesting that the
warnings have had much of a direct impact on consumer behavior, the State
has been able to force several manufacturers to reformulate their products.22 9
Proposition 65 provides that "[n]o person in the course of doing business
shall knowingly and intentionally expose any individual to a chemical known
to the state to cause cancer or reproductive toxicity without first giving clear
and reasonable warning to such individual .. .. ""' An implementing regulation
creates safe harbors if certain statements are used when appropriate, such as
"WARNING: This product contains a chemical known to the State of California
to cause cancer. 2 31 The law states that warnings "may be provided by general
methods such as labels on consumer products .... posting of notices, placing
notices in the public news media, and the like, provided that the warning
accomplished is clear and reasonable." '232
Warnings are not required for exposures to listed chemicals shown to pose
either "no significant risk" of cancer or, in the case of reproductive toxicants,
"no observable effect" at an exposure 1000 times higher than expected.23 3 "No
significant risk" is defined as less than one excess cancer in a population of
Similarly, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) enforces a hazard communication
standard for exposures in the workplace. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (1993).
229. See Marina Gatti, Proposition 65: "Shoot First, Ask Questions Later "vm-Do the Bullets Really
Work? Have We Shot the Wrong Party? Will They Call Out the Bazookas?, 47 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 739, 741
nn.14-17 (1992). In 1989, for example, the Gillette Company agreed to reformulate its correction fluid
product "Liquid Paper" after the State instituted legal action alleging a failure to warn of the presence of
trichloroethylene, a chemical listed as a reproductive toxicant. Office of the Cal. Atty. Gen., Proposition
65 Litigation, at 3 (Jan. 15, 1993) (on file with the author). In 1992, American Home Products Corporation
agreed to reformulate its OTC product "Preparation H" by removing phenyl mercuric nitrate. Id. at 14.
230. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.6(1992). The govemormust publishand periodicallyupdate
a list of chemicals known to cause cancer or reproductive toxicity, based on findings made by other
organizations. Id. § 25249.8. The list has grown to almost 300 carcinogens and more than 100 reproductive
toxicants. See Cal. Regulatory Notice Reg. 92, No. 13-Z (1992), at 376.
23 1. The other statements include the following:
WARNING: This product contains a chemical known to the State of California to cause birth
defects or other reproductive harm.
WARNING: Chemicals known to the State of California to cause cancer, or birth defects or
other reproductive harm may be present in foods or beverages sold or served here.
WARNING: Drinking Distilled Spirits, Beers, Coolers, Wine and Other Alcoholic Beverages
May Increase Cancer Risk, and, During Pregnancy, Can Cause Birth Defects.
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, § 12601 (b)(4) (1993). The labeling for fresh produce must include the following
warning: "This product may contain a chemical known to the State of California to cause cancer, or birth
defects or other reproductive harm." Id. § 12601(b)(4)(D) (emphasis added).
232. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.11 (f) (1992). Nonetheless, efforts to rely on non-label methods
of warning, such as a toll-free telephone information hotline, have been judged to be inadequate. See
Ingredient Communication Council, Inc. v. Lungren, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 216 (1992).
233. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.10(c)(1992).
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100,000 exposed over a lifetime."' FDA-approved labeling for prescription
drugs satisfies the warning requirement.2" By an interim regulation, California
also had determined that other FDA-regulated products are not subject to the
warning requirements.236 Although only an interim exemption pending the
completion of quantitative risk assessments to establish "no significant risk"
levels for individual chemicals, this regulation had been considered essential
for avoiding the absurd result that would follow if Proposition 65 were held
to require warnings on all consumer products whose safety was already
accepted by federal and state regulatory agencies. The State recently revoked
the exemption,237 however, so a number of consumer products soon may have
to include Proposition 65 warnings in their labeling.
Several other states have considered legislation modeled on Proposition
65,238 but all such proposals have been rejected to date. For instance, a similar
ballot initiative in Ohio recently was defeated by a significant margin.239 Even
if none of these other state "right to know" proposals are adopted, Proposition
65 will continue to have a pronounced effect on how manufacturers convey
warnings about chronic health risks. In fact, because of the practical difficulties
with separate systems for in-state labeling and distribution, Proposition 65
warnings appear on products sold outside of California.
B. The Duty to Warn Under State Tort Law
Compliance with the many requirements imposed by Congress, federal
regulatory agencies, and state governments does not exhaust a manufacturer's
potential duty to warn. Notwithstanding the often pervasive regulation of the
content of consumer product labeling, courts have allowed plaintiffs to recover
234. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, §§ 12703(b), 12711 (a)(l) (1993). Assuming an average life span of 70
years, this converts to an annual risk of cancer of one in seven million. This is less than the proverbial
chance of getting struck by lightning. See EDMUND A.C. CROUCH & RIcHARD WILSON, RISK/BENEFIT ANALYSIS
176 (1982) (citing annual per capita risk of being struck by lightning as one in two million).
235. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, § 12601 (b)(2)(1993). In addition,productscontainingnaturally occurring
carcinogens need not carry a warning. Id. § 12501(a). This regulation was upheld in Nicolle-Wagner v.
Deukmejian, 281 Cal. Rptr. 494, 498 (1991).
236. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, § 12713(a) (1993) ("[E]xposure to a listed chemical in a food, drug,
cosmetic or medical device which is in compliancewith state and federal administrative standards applicable
to the product in question poses no significant risk as described in this section."). No comparable exemption
was provided for reproductive toxicants, however, such as aspirin. See Cal. Regulatory Notice Reg. 92, No.
13-Z (1992), at 384. Thus, products containing aspirin may need to be accompanied by a Proposition 65
warning in addition to FDA's general pregnancy warning for OTC drug products and specific third-trimester
pregnancy warning for products containing aspirin. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
237. See F-D-C REPORTS ("The Tan Sheet"), Jan. 3, 1994,at 38; M-D-D-I REPORTS ("The Gray Sheet"),
Dec. 13, 1993, at 19.
238. See Gatti, supranote 229, at 744 n.29 (citing recent legislative proposals in Massachusetts, Illinois,
New York, Missouri, and Oregon); Jerome H. Heckman, California 'sProposition 65: A Federal Supremacy
and States'Rights Conflict in the Health and Safety Arena, 43 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 269, 277-78, 281
(1988) (citing proposals in Tennessee, Hawaii, Missouri, New York, Illinois, and Massachusetts).
239. See F-D-C REPORTS ("The Rose Sheet"), Nov. 9, 1992, at 3 (rejected by 78% of the voters).
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for injuries allegedly stemming from a manufacturer's failure to provide
adequate warnings of certain product risks. With the benefit of hindsight, juries
frequently hold a manufacturer liable for not warning against the particular
injury suffered by the plaintiff. Moreover, even when a warning has been
provided, judges and juries may decide that the cautionary information should
have been made more prominent or alarming.
In products liability litigation, failure-to-warn claims have become quite
common, supplanting the more traditional and difficult to prove claims such
as those alleging defects in manufacture or design.24 Although prescription
drugs by their very nature are most often the subject of lawsuits alleging
failures to warn, no consumer good is immune from such products liability
claims. Other products that have been faulted for not providing adequate
warnings include cosmetics, 4' food products, 242 nonprescription drugs, 243
medical devices,144 pesticides and herbicides, 245  and common tools or
appliances.2 46 The most difficult questions in all of these cases are whether there
is a duty to warn of a particular risk and, if there is such a duty, how one
decides whether any warning that was provided is adequate.
240. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in Products Liability: The
Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 265,267-69 (1990). Claims alleging that a product was
defective in its design or manufacture are less common. See, e.g., Tobin v. Astra Pharmaceutical Products,
Inc., 993 F.2d 528, 540 (6th Cir. 1993) (upholding design defect verdict against manufacturer of FDA-
approved drug because "a reasonably prudent manufacturer would not market [the drug] if the evidence
of its efficacy was inconclusive");Ezagui v. Dow Chemical Corp., 598 F.2d 727 (2d Cir. 1979) (preservative
used in quadrivalent vaccine activated dangerous pertussis component).
241. See, e.g., Gober v. Revlon, Inc., 317 F.2d 47, 51 (4th Cir. 1963) (sustaining verdict for plaintiff
who suffered allergic reaction to nail polish product); Whitehurst v. Revlon, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 918, 920-21
(E.D. Va. 1969) (adequacy of flammability warning for nail polish was properly left to jury); Moran v.
Fabergd, Inc., 332 A.2d 11,21 (Md. 1975)(reinstatingjuy verdict for plaintiffwhen manufacturer's cologne
ignited over a candle).
242. See, e.g., Fraust v. Swift & Co., 610 F. Supp. 711, 714 (W.D. Pa. 1985) (denying peanut butter
manufacturer's motion for summary judgment agaifist claim alleging failure to warn of choking hazard for
young children); Allen v. Delchamps, Inc., 624 So. 2d 1065, 1068-69 (Ala. 1993) (grocer could be liable
for selling fresh produce containing undisclosed sulfites); Barry v. Don Hall Laboratories, 642 P.2d 685,
691 (Or. Ct. App. 1982) (jury could find manufacturer liable for failing to warn that high sugar content
of vitamin C product, when combined with ascorbic acid, could lead to tooth decay).
243. See, e.g., Hahn v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 805 F.2d 1480, 1482-83 (11 th Cir. 1986) (topical analgesic);
Torsiello v. Whitehall Laboratories, 398 A.2d 132, 137-40 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979) (aspirin
products), cert. denied, 404 A.2d 1150 (N.J. 1979); Michael v. Wamer/Chilcott, 579 P.2d 183, 187 (N.M.
Ct. App. 1978) (sinus medication).
244. See, e.g., O'Gilvie v. International Playtex, Inc., 821 F.2d 1438, 1441-43 (10th Cir. 1987)
(tampons), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1032 (1988); Desmarais v. Dow Coming Corp., 712 F. Supp. 13, 14 (D.
Conn. 1989) (silicone breast implants); Spychala v. G.D. Searle & Co., 705 F. Supp. 1024, 1027 (D.N.J.
1988) (intrauterine devices); Strothkamp v. Chesebrough-Pond's Inc., 1993 Mo. App. LEXIs 417 (March
23, 1993) (manufacturer of Q-Tips could be held liable for failure to warn of risk of injuring ear drum).
245. See, e.g., Burke v. Dow Chemical Co., 797 F. Supp. 1128, 1133 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (household
insecticide); Boyl v. California Chemical Co., 221 F. Supp. 669, 675-76 (D. Or. 1963) (residential herbi-
cide); Gainey v. Perkins, 500 So. 2d 272, 273 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (rat poison).
246. See, e.g., Chappuisv. Sears Roebuck& Co., 358 So. 2d 926, 928-30 (La. 1978) (hammer); Post
v. American Cleaning Equip. Co., 437 S.W.2d 516, 520 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969) (vacuum cleaner).
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Manufacturers have a duty to alert users of a product to dangers of which
the manufacturer is or should be aware.247 Manufacturers need not warn
consumers of dangers that are generally known and recognized. 24" At the other
extreme, the duty to warn of non-obvious risks only arises after the
manufacturer learns or should have learned of the hazard.24 9 It is difficult, of
course, to identify at what point knowledge about a putative hazard gives rise
to a duty to warn. Some courts have found such a duty on the basis of
extremely weak evidence that a substance may have caused an injury,25° while
others have demanded greater substantiation of a risk allegedly posed by a
product before imposing a duty to warn of that risk.25" ' In any event,
manufacturers must warn of the hazards associated with both the intended use
and any foreseeable misuse of a product.252 It is generally no defense that a
247. See Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 479 A.2d 374,388 (N.J. 1984); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 402A cmt. j (1965).
248. See, e.g., Kuras v. International Harvester Co., 820 F.2d 15, 18(lst Cir. 1987) (manufacturer of
lawn mower had no duty to warn against placing hand into spinning blade); Garrison v. Heublein, Inc., 673
F.2d 189, 192 (7th Cir. 1982) ("[T]he dangers of the use of alcohol are common knowledge to such an
extent that the product cannot objectively be considered to be unreasonably dangerous."); Glittenberg v.
Doughboy Recreational Ind., 491 N.W.2d 208, 214 n.15 (Mich. 1992); cf. Hon v. Stroh Brewery Co., 835
F.2d 510, 515 (3d Cir. 1987) (warning may have been necessary concerning some of lesser known risks
of prolonged alcohol consumption, such as pancreatitis).
249. See, e.g., Hermes v. Pfizer, Inc., 848 F.2d 66, 68 (5th Cir. 1988); Castrignano v. E.R. Squibb
& Sons, Inc., 546 A.2d 775, 782 (R.I. 1988) (refusing to hold manufacturer of DES liable "for failure to
warn of risks inherent in a drug [because] it neither knew nor could have known by the application of
scientific knowledge available at the time of distribution that the drug could produce the undesirable effects
suffered by plaintiff'); Griggs v. Combe, Inc., 456 So. 2d 790, 792 (Ala. 1984) (OTC drug manufacturer
"had no duty to warn of a possible allergic reaction which it had no reason to suspect might occur").
250. See, e.g., Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 788 F.2d 741, 745-46 (11th Cir.) (manufacturer
of spermicide had duty to warn of possible teratogenicity notwithstandingFDA's conclusionthat these drugs
did not cause birth defects), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 950 (1986); Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Co., 736 F.2d
1529, 1535-38 (D.C. Cir.) (anecdotal evidence of pulmonary fibrosis resulting from dermal absorption of
herbicide paraquat created a duty to warn), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984); Roberts v. United States,
316 F.2d 489, 495 (3d Cir. 1963) (finding that plaintiff's injury being the first one reported where animal
and human data generally showed toxicity concerns did not necessarily preclude liability).
251. See, e.g., Doe v. Miles Laboratories, Inc., 927 F.2d 187, 194 (4th Cir. 1991) (no duty to warn
where "only one case of AIDS was reported that could possibly have been related to Factor IX treatment
... [and] only a few AIDS cases were related to the use of any blood factor concentrate");Novak v. United
States, 865 F.2d 718, 726 (6th Cir. 1989) (warnings accompanying swine flu vaccine not inadequate for
failing to alert persons of risk of autoimmune disease because there was "insufficient medical evidence"
of causation); Smith v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 770 F. Supp. 1561, 1582 (N.D. Ga. 1991) (rejecting
failure-to-warn claim because there was no "reasonably reliable" evidence that spermicide caused birth
defects); Finn v. G.D. Searle & Co., 677 P.2d 1147, 1153 (Cal. 1984) ("Knowledgeof a potential side effect
which is based on a single isolated report of a possible link between a prescription drug and an injury may
not require a warning.").
252. See, e.g., Knowlton v. Deseret Medical, Inc., 930 F.2d 116, 122-23 (1st Cir. 1991) (device
manufacturer knew catheter was being used in open-heart surgery); Sutherland v. Elpower Corp., 923 F.2d
1285, 1289 (8th Cir. 1991) (toy manufacturer could be held liable for failure to warn about "reasonably
foreseeable, albeit unintended, uses" of its product); Johnson v. Husky Industries, Inc., 536 F.2d 645, 648
(6th Cir. 1976) (manufacturer of charcoal briquets could be held liable for inadequately warning against
indoor use for heating); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 395 cmt. k (1965) ("The manufacturer may...
reasonably anticipate other uses than the one for which the chattel is primarily intended."); cf. Berg v.
Underwood's Hair Adaptation Process, Inc., 751 F.2d 136, 137 (2d Cir. 1984) (manufacturer of synthetic
fibers for wigs had no duty to warn against misuse of fibers as implants for scalp); Ferlito v. Johnson &
Johnson Products, Inc., 771 F. Supp. 196, 200 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (Plaintiffs "failed to demonstrate the
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plaintiff's injury resulted from misuse if the manufacturer was aware that such
misuse might take place and could have warned against it.
Another factor relevant to whether a duty to warn exists is the magnitude
of the risk posed by the product. Manufacturers generally do not have a duty
to warn of risks that may affect only very few individuals,253 but courts
sometimes hold otherwise in cases where the manufacturer knows that
hypersensitive individuals may suffer serious injury.2"4 In one case, the court
held that the manufacturer had a duty to warn of the less than one-in-a-million
risk of contracting polio from a vaccine because the risk of contracting polio
as a result of not using the vaccine was equally small.255
In essentially all jurisdictions, manufacturers of prescription drugs satisfy
their common law duty to warn by providing precautionary information to
physicians and others who act as "learned intermediaries." '256 This rule exists
because "the choice involved [in prescribing a particular medication] is
essentially a medical one involving an assessment of medical risks in light of
the physician's knowledge of this patient's needs and susceptibilities.""2 7 Only
in situations where such an individualized decision is unlikely to be made (for
example, when drugs are being administered to patients in a mass immunization
program) would a manufacturer have to provide a warning directly to the pa-
foreseeability of an adult male encapsulating himself from head to toe in cotton batting and then lighting
up a cigarette."), aff'd mem., 983 F.2d 1066 (6th Cir. 1992).
253. See Adelman-Tremblay v. Jewel Companies,Inc., 859 F.2d 517, 521 (7th Cir. 1988) ("[ln the
majority of jurisdictions [there is] no duty to warn of the possibility of a rare and unusual allergic
reaction."); Burlison v. Warner-Lambert Co., 842 F.2d 991 (8th Cir. 1988) (cough drop manufacturer had
no duty to warn in absence of evidence it knew or should have known of possible allergic reactions);
Mountain v. Procter & Gamble Co., 312 F. Supp. 534, 537 (D. Wis. 1970) (no duty to warn of severe
allergic reaction to shampoo experienced by a "miniscule percentage" of users); Kaempfe v. Lehn & Fink
Prods. Corp., 249 N.Y.S.2d 840,845 (N.Y. App. Div. 1964) ("We have not yet reached.., the point where
the manufacturer is under the absolute duty of giving special warning against a remote possibility of harm
due to an unusual allergic reaction"), aff'd, 284 N.Y.S.2d 708 (N.Y. 1967).
254. See Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417, 430 (2d Cir. 1969) (drug manufacturer has duty
to warn those few persons whom it knows cannot apply its product without serious injury); Wright v. Carter
Products, 244 F.2d 53, 58 (2d Cir. 1957) (manufacturer of deodorant that caused contact dermatitis in a
small number of users may have "to warn those few persons who it knows cannot apply its product without
serious injury"); McEwen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 528 P.2d 522, 530 (Or. 1974);Tomerv. American
Home Products Corp., 368 A.2d 35, 40 (Conn. 1976).
255. Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 130 n.16 (9th Cir. 1968). But see Kearl v.
Lederle Laboratories, 218 Cal. Rptr. 453,468 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) ("[W]hatever duty a manufacturer may
have to inform of risks associated with nonuse of a product, such a duty most certainly cannot be imposed
when the relationship between use and nonuse is statistically close (and quite possibly immeasurable) and
the probability of injury from either course is extremely remote."); Calabrese v. Trenton State College, 392
A.2d 600, 604 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1978), affd, 413 A.2d 315 (N.J. 1980).
256. See, e.g., Thomas v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 949 F.2d 806, 811 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 2304 (1992); Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Yarrow, 408 F.2d 978, 992 (8th Cir. 1969); Wyeth Laboratories,
Inc. v. Fortenberry, 530 So. 2d 688, 691-92 (Miss. 1988).
257. Davis, 399 F.2d at 130; see also Brooks v. Medtronic, Inc., 750 F.2d 1227, 1231-32 (4th Cir.




tient.25a A few courts have extended the mass immunization exception to other
drugs, such as contraceptives, for which a physician may not make an individu-
alized judgment in prescribing a particular medication."'
If a duty to warn does exist in a particular case, the complete failure to
provide any warning of the risk would represent an actionable breach. The
question becomes more difficult when a manufacturer has conveyed a warning
of the risk in question but the plaintiff alleges that the warning was inadequate.
When a product's labeling warns of the very injury suffered by the plaintiff in
clear and precise terms, the manufacturer usually will be entitled to summary
judgment.260 In at least one case, however, a court has held that a warning label
might be inadequate even if the risk of the very injury suffered by the plaintiff
was clearly disclosed, on the grounds that the plaintiff might have been deterred
from taking the drug had the risk of some other more serious injury been
adequately disclosed.26'
One court offered the following guidance for judging whether a warning
is adequate:
[Flirst, it must be in such form that it could reasonably be expected
to catch the attention of the reasonably prudent man in the circum-
stances of its use; secondly, the content of the warning must be of
such a nature as to be comprehensible to the average user and to
convey a fair indication of the nature and extent of the danger to the
mind of a reasonably prudent person.262
258. See Plummer v. Lederle Laboratories, 819 F.2d 349, 356 (2d Cir.) ("If the drug is given under
clinic-type conditions the manufacturer is obligated to warn consumers directly."), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
898 (1987); Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264, 1276-77 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096
(1974).
259. See, e.g., Hill v. Searle Laboratories, 884 F.2d 1064, 1071 (8th Cir. 1989) (IUDs); MacDonald
v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65, 69-70 (Mass.) (oral contraceptives), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
920 (1985). But see Haste v. American Home Products Corp., 577 F.2d 1122, 1124-25 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978); Skill v. Martinez, 91 F.R.D. 498, 507 (D.N.J. 1981), aff'd, 677 F.2d 368 (3d
Cir. 1982); Seley v. G.D. Searle & Co., 423 N.E.2d 831, 840 (Ohio 1981).
260. See, e.g., Brick v. Barnes-Hines Pharmaceutical Co., 428 F. Supp. 496,498 (D.D.C. 1977); Felix
v. Hoffiann-LaRoche, Inc., 540 So. 2d 102, 105 (Fla. 1989); Johnson v. American Cyanamid Co., 718
P.2d 1318, 1325-26 (Kan. Ct. App. 1986), aff'd, 758 P.2d 206 (Kan. 1988).
261. Sanderson v. Upjohn Co., 578 F. Supp. 338, 339-40 (D. Mass. 1984); see also MeMahon v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 774 F.2d 830, 834-35 (7th Cir. 1985).
262. Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79,85 (4th Cir. 1962) ("If warning of the danger is given
and this warning is of a character reasonably calculated to bring home to the reasonably prudent person the
nature and extent of the danger, it is sufficient to shift the risk of harm from the manufacturer to the user.");
see also Bloxom v. Bloxom, 512 So. 2d 839, 844 (La. 1987); Richards v. Upjohn Co., 625 P.2d 1192, 1196
(N.M. App. 1980). Warnings may serve either instructional or informative purposes. Finn v. G.D. Searle
& Co., 677 P.2d 1147,11 52(Cal. 1984); see also W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 96 (5th ed. 1984), at 685 (the two goals of warnings are "risk reduction and the protection of individual
autonomy in decision-making").
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Thus, courts generally require that a warning be communicated with the degree
of urgency necessary to cause the user to exercise the level of caution
commensurate with the potential danger.263 For intance, plaintiffs in drug cases
will sometimes complain that a side effect listed in the Adverse Reactions
section should instead have appeared in the Warnings or even Contraindications
section of the package insert. A warning also may be judged inadequate if its
tone, placement, or typeface makes it unlikely to attract the user's attention.2"
The use of qualifying language may dilute the impact of an otherwise
satisfactory warning,261 or such a warning may be rendered inadequate by a
manufacturer's over-promotion of the product. 66
Several courts have held that a warning "must communicate the specific
,,161danger and risk, including the likelihood and severity of injury, but a
manufacturer generally need not catalog every possible consequence of such
an injury.2 6 In one case involving labeling for oral contraceptives, however,
263. See Salmon v. Parke, Davis & Co., 520 F.2d 1359, 1363 (4th Cir. 1975); Seley v. G.D. Searle
& Co., 423 N.E.2d 831, 837 (Ohio 1981) ("A reasonable warning not only conveys a fair indication of the
nature of the dangers involved, but also warns with the degree of intensity demanded by the nature of the
risk."); Tampa Drug Co. v. Wait, 103 So. 2d 603, 609 (Fla. 1958); Richards,625 P.2d at 1196 ("[T]he drug
manufacturer must bring the warning home to the doctor."); Post v. American Cleaning Equip. Corp., 437
S.W.2d 516, 520 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969) (voltage instructions on vacuum cleaner failed to describe the
potentially serious consequences of ignoring the instructions).
264. See Spruill, 308 F.2d at 86 (warning on furniture polish "was placed so as to conceal it from all
but the most cautious users. It is located in the midst of a body of print of the same size and color, with
nothing to attract special attention to it except the words 'Safety Note."'); Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Yarrow,
408 F.2d 978, 994 (8th Cir. 1969) ("The 'Dear Doctor' letter could have been reasonably found to be
lacking in emphasis, timeliness and attention inviting qualities. . . . [lts wording, and the manner of its
circulation could be found unreasonable considering the magnitude of the risk involved."); Walker v.
Maybelline Co., 477 So. 2d 1136, 1139 (La. Ct. App. 1985) ("The [mascara] warning was buried in a list
of instructions with nothing to call it to the attention of the purchaser. Moreover, it started with the word
'Note', which would not call the reader's attention to the grave nature of the threat. Futhermore, no mention
was made of the threat of pseudomonas infection or of eye infection with possible resultant loss of
eyesight."), cert. denied, 481 So. 2d 1333 (La. 1986).
265. See, e.g., Tinnerholm v. Parke, Davis & Co., 285 F. Supp. 432, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (finding
that a warning had been "water[ed] down" by the "shrewd use of descriptive adjectives"), modified, 411
F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1969); Maize v. Atlantic Refining Co., 41 A.2d 850, 851 (Pa. 1945) (prominent use of
brand name "Safety-Kleen"diverted attention from caution against using product in poorly ventilated areas);
McFadden v. Haritatos, 448 N.Y.S.2d 79, 81 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (statement that'side effects of drug
are usually reversible "tends to qualify and dilute the whole of the [adverse reactions] section's
admonition."); Ross v. Jacobs, 684 P.2d 1211, 1215-16 (Okla. Ct. App. 1984).
266. See, e.g., Salmon v. Parke, Davis & Co., 520 F.2d 1359, 1363-64 (4th Cir. 1975); Stevens v.
Parke, Davis & Co., 507 P.2d 653, 661-62 (Cal. 1973); Incollingo v. Ewing, 282 A.2d 206,220 (Pa. 1971).
Agencies are also cognizant of this problem. See, e.g., 41 Fed. Reg. 38,312, 38,334 (1976) (FDA panel
reviewing OTC antihistamines strongly urged FTC to challenge any advertisement which "[iln any way
negates or dilutes the information on the label, especially the contraindications and/or warnings").
267. McHargue v. Stokes Div. of Pennwalt, 686 F. Supp. 1428, 1437 n.8 (D. Colo. 1988); see also
Cooleyv. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 478 N.Y.S.2d 375,379-80 (App. Div. 1984) ("Mere directions for the proper
use of a product which fail to warn of specific dangers and risks of harm if the directions are not followed
may be inadequate.").
268. See Jamieson v. Woodward & Lothrop, 247 F.2d 23, 25 & 30 (D.C. Cir.) (en bane) (exercise rope
hit plaintiff's eye causing retina to detach), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 855 (1957); Vallillo v. Muskin Corp.,
514A.2d 528, 531 n.3 (N.J. 1986) ("It is generally sufficient if the warning gives general notice of a danger
and the conduct to be avoided. For example, signs giving a warning of high voltage electricity that
pictorially indicate not to touch wires ... need not indicate the particular permanent physical harm that
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warnings emphasizing the risk of "fatal" adverse reactions but failing to use
the word "stroke" were found potentially inadequate because a jury might
conclude that the resulting permanent disability is a fate worse than death.269
Product labeling also must include clear instructions for avoiding or minimizing
the risk.27
Normally the adequacy of a warning is judged by an objective standard
which refers to a hypothetical average consumer rather than the particular
plaintiff. However, some courts use a more subjective standard and ask whether
a warning is comprehensible to persons like the plaintiff. The duty to warn then
becomes difficult to satisfy with respect, for instance, to consumers who cannot
read English. A few courts have suggested that the failure to provide warnings
in Spanish may be actionable,"' or that labeling must include pictograms for
persons who cannot read no matter what language they speak.272
Even a specific and prominent warning may be found inadequate if it has
not been communicated through the most effective channels. For instance, a
number of courts have demanded the use of methods other than labeling to
convey information to physicians about prescription drug risks, in part because
might befall a person who disregards the warning.").
269. MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65, 72 (Mass.), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
920 (1985); see also Petty v. United States, 740 F.2d 1428, 1437 (8th Cir. 1984) ("[T]he risk of death may
be conceptually remote, whereas a more specific warning detailing the known risk of serum sickness and
its symptoms would alert recipients more concretely to the risks that they actually were assuming."). But
see Mampe v. Ayerst Laboratories, 548 A.2d 798, 801 (D.C. App. 1988) ("We seriously doubt that
promotional materials which warn of death as a possible reaction to a drug could be inadequate to warn
of a consequence any less severe."); Dunkin v. Syntex Laboratories, Inc., 443 F. Supp. 121, 124 (W.D.
Tenn. 1977) (warnings that oral contraceptive created risk of thrombosis, cerebral vascular accident, and
fatal blood clotting abnormalities held to be adequate).
270. See, e.g., Tucson Industries, Inc. v. Schwartz, 487 P.2d 12, 18 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1971) (instruction
to provide "adequate ventilation" when using adhesive was ambiguous); Burch v. Amsterdam Corp., 366
A.2d 1079, 1086 (D.C. App. 1976) (a warning is inadequate unless it "provides specific directions for safe
use"). The court in Burch decided that a prominent flammability warning on an adhesive product (using
language required under the FHSA) may not have adequately alerted a person against using it near a pilot
light. Id. at 1087-88.
271. Stanley Industries, Inc. v. W.M. Barr & Co., 784 F. Supp. 1570, 1576 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (manu-
facturer of linseed oil product may have owed plaintiffs a duty to warn in Spanish or through pictorial
warning symbols where company advertised product in local Hispanic media and a large percentage of the
foreseeable users only spoke Spanish); Ramirez v. Plough, Inc., 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 423, 430 (Cal. Ct. App.
1992) (jury allowed to decide whether aspirin manufacturer should have reasonably foreseen use of the
product by non-English speaking individualsand if so whether warning should have included languageother
than English), rev d, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 97 (1993). Similarly, one court apparently was persuaded by the
argument that more explicit and prominently placed warnings may be necessary for products used by
youngsters "mindful of teenagers' inclination not to follow instructions." Nowak v. Faberg6 U.S.A., Inc.,
812 F. Supp. 492, 497 (M.D. Pa. 1992).
272. See Hubbard-Hall Chemical Co. v. Silverman, 340 F.2d 402, 405 (5th Cir. 1965) (even though
pesticide label had been approved by USDA, a jury could find the warning inadequate for users who did
not speak English "because of its lack of a skull and bones or other comparable symbols or hieroglyphics");
Campos v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 485 A.2d 305, 310 (N.J. 1984) ("In view of the unskilled or semi-
skilled nature of the work and the existence of many in the work force who do not read English, warnings
in the form of symbols might have been appropriate."). But see Thomas v. Clairol, Inc., 583 So. 2d 108,
110-11 (La. Ct. App. 1991) (rejecting claim by illiterates that written warning on hair dye product was
inadequate).
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physicians rarely see the actual product they have prescribed for any particular
patient.273 In particular, several courts have focused on the use of
pharmaceutical company sales representatives to convey precautionary informa-
tion about prescription drugs to physicians.274 When companies do use their
sales representatives to disseminate information about possible new side effects,
some courts have criticized them for not sending a "Dear Doctor" letter in-
stead.2" Conversely, when "Dear Doctor" letters are circulated, the manufac-
turer may be held liable for not using sales representatives to convey the
information.276 Product labeling alone may, therefore, sometimes fail to satisfy
the duty to warn. Just as in hindsight the content of warning statements may
always seem inadequate, a manufacturer's choice of mechanisms for presenting
these warnings may always appear to be less than perfect.
Thus, manufacturers may face liability either for not including in the label
any mention of the particular injury suffered by a plaintiff, even if the risk of
that injury is trivial, or for not conveying the warning with sufficient
prominence on the label or through other means, even if the risk does not
warrant such prominence relative to other possible consumer product hazards.
Indeed, the use of federally-mandated warnings generally provides no safe
harbor against tort claims. The next section discusses the extent to which
federal regulatory requirements may displace the duty to warn under state
common law.
273. See, e.g., Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Yarrow, 408 F.2d 978, 992 (8th Cir. 1969) ("[lI]t was not
unreasonable to find that the appellant should have employed all its usual means of communication... to
warn the prescribing physicians of these dangers."). Indeed, as two FDA officials once wrote, "corrective
advertisements, 'Dear Doctor' letters, and the FDA Drug Bulletin ... are presumably more effective in
reaching practitioners than an additional warning added to the fine print of the product labeling." Peter H.
Rheinstein & Carlene S. Baum, LabelingEffectivenessandthe Health Environment, in PRODUCT LABELING,
supranote 171, at 286. The FDA DRUG BULLETIN was renamedthe FDA MEDICAL BULLETIN in 199 1, and its
scope expanded to include information about medical devices and other products.
274. See Yarrow v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 263 F. Supp. 159, 163 (D.S.D. 1967), aff'd, 408 F.2d 978,
990(8th Cir. 1969) (pharmaceutical company held liable for failure to warn of newly discovered side effects,
notwithstanding letters it had sent to physicians, because it had not used its sales representatives to convey
the information); Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 507 P.2d 653, 663 (Cal. 1973); Mahr v. G.D. Searle &
Co., 390 N.E.2d 1214, 1232 (111. App. Ct. 1979); Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Yarrow, 408 F.2d 987,991-94 (8th
Cir. 1969); cf Gracyalny v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 723 F.2d 1311, 1321 (7th Cir. 1983) (manufacturer
of faulty circuit breakers may have been negligent in failing to follow up warning letter with personal visits
by sales representatives); Wallace v. Upjohn Co., 535 So. 2d 1110, 1117 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (sales persons
would not be personally liable for failing to warn physicians), cert. denied, 539 So. 2d 630 (La. 1989).
275. See Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82, 84 (8th Cir. 1966); Hoffman v. Sterling Drug,
Inc., 485 F.2d 132, 146-47 (3d Cir. 1973) (noting that "some doctors did not take the time to speak to detail
men, some did not always accept the product cards or brochures offered, and some did not always listen
to what the detail men said about a drug").
276. Yarrow, 408 F.2d at 994 ("The trier of fact could reasonably conclude that the urgency of the
circumstances reasonably required more than the relatively slow action and relative lack of emphasis




In light of the competing labeling demands of federal regulators, state
lawmakers, and the courts, manufacturers of consumer products have argued
that federal law should preempt state law. The success of this argument has
varied considerably, depending on the peculiar statutory provisions applicable
to a category of products rather than the relative stringency of federal labeling
requirements. The degree to which federal law displaces state statutory and
regulatory requirements and the duties to warn under common law will be
addressed in turn.
1. Preemption of State Requirements
Under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution,277 federal
law may supersede state law in a number of circumstances. First, Congress may
by statute expressly preempt state law.278 Second, in the absence of express
statutory preemption, congressional intent to preempt state law sometimes may
be inferred where a comprehensive scheme of federal regulation "left no room"
for supplementation by state law.7 9 Finally, even in the absence of implied
preemption of an entire field of regulation, state law is preempted to the extent
that it stands as an obstacle to the implementation of congressional objectives, 20
or actually conflicts with federal law.28'
The most obvious case for preemption of state labeling requirements arises
when Congress itself has specified what must be included in the labeling of
consumer products. Congresional intent to preempt state law in such cases may
be either express, as in the case of tobacco products and alcoholic beverages,
28 2
or implied, as in the case of coal tar hair dyes.
283
Preemption is less certain when Congress delegates broad authority to
administrative agencies to regulate consumer product labeling, unless an express
preemption clause appears in the statute. The FD&C Act contains no general
preemption provision.284 Indeed, 1990 amendments to the Act, contained in the
277. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
278. See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 530-32 (1977).
279. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
280. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
281. See California Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 281 (1987); Ray v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 158 (1978); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers; Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132,
142-43 (1963).
282. See 15 U.S.C. § 1334 (1988) (cigarettes); 15 U.S.C. § 4406(b) (1988) (smokeless tobacco
products); 27 U.S.C.A. § 216 (West Supp. 1993) (alcoholic beverages).
283. See Gorolin Corp. v. City of New York, Food Drug Cosm. L. Rep. (CCH) 7116 (S.D.N.Y. 1949)
(holding that the warning imposed by Congress for coal tar hair dyes preempted local labeling requirement).
284. See, e.g., Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 714-23
(1985) (FD&C Act did not preempt local ordinancesconcemingcollectionof blood); Pharmaceutical Society
of the State of New York v. Lefkowitz, 586 F.2d 953, 958 & n.6 (2d Cir. 1978) (state requirement that
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Nutrition Labeling and Education Act (NLEA), express an intent not to preempt
state warning requirements applicable to food products.285 This provision was
"included to underscore that State laws requiring warnings pertaining to the
safety of foods are not preempted." '286 On the other hand, state laws relating to
medical devices are expressly preempted to the extent that FDA has imposed
requirements relating to safety and effectiveness of particular devices.28 7
Other statutes governing the labeling of consumer products have broader
preemptive effects. For instance, the FHSA expressly preempts state labeling
requirements for hazardous substances. 288 FIFRA contains a preemption provi-
sion, 289 but it also includes a savings clause expressly permitting state regulation
of pesticide sale and use,290 leading courts to reach somewhat inconsistent
decisions as to whether state warning requirements are preempted.29t USDA
drug manufacturer be identified on the label not preempted); Kellogg Co. v. Mattox, 763 F. Supp. 1369,
1379 (N.D. Tex.) (state restrictions on health claims appearing on food labels not preempted), aff'd mem.,
940 F.2d 1530 (5th Cir. 1991).
285. Nutrition Labeling and Education Act, Pub. L. No. 101-535, § 6(c)(2), 104 Stat. 2364 (1990)
(NLEA's express preemption provision "shall not be construed to apply to any requirement respecting a
statement in the labeling of food that provides for a warning concemingthe safety of the food or component
of the food."). The NLEA did not, however, reduce the preemptive effect of food labeling requirements
under existing law, id. § 6(c)(3), and state requirements that actually conflict with FDA regulations have
been held to be preempted. See Grocery Mfrs. of America, Inc. v. Gerace, 755 F.2d 993, 1001 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 820 (1985).
286. 136 CONG. REC. H5842 (daily ed. July 30, 1990) (statement of Mr. Waxman). Congressman
Waxman, whose home state is California, added that "the most compelling argument for State regulation
is where the States have adopted laws to protect the safety of their citizens." Id. at H5840. Absent peculiar
local conditionsaffecting the hazardousnessof foods, however, see 21 U.S.C.A. § 343-1(b)(3) (West Supp.
1993), the justification for state-by-state regulation of food labeling is weak. Senator Hatch, commenting
on the need for uniform federal regulation of food labeling, countered that inconsistent state and local laws
would "frustrate food safety and nutrition education efforts by presenting consumers with varying and
inconsistent information and warnings." 136 CONG. REC. S16611 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1990) (urging his
colleagues to "remember that a warning on everything means a warning on nothing").
287. See 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (1988); 21 C.F.R. § 808.1 (1993); Massachusetts v. Hayes, 691 F.2d
57, 64 (Ist Cir. 1982) (hearing aid requirements were preempted). Manufacturers of dental amalgam,
threatened by citizen suits in California alleging 'a failure to warn of the presence of mercury, have sought
a declaratoryjudgment that Proposition 65 is preempted under this provision. M-D-D-I REPORTS ("The Gray
Sheet"), Oct. 4, 1993, at 19.
288. 15 U.S.C. § 1261 note (b)(l)(A) (1988) ("[N]o State or political subdivision of a State may
establish or continue in effect a cautionary labeling requirement applicable to such [hazardous] substance
or packagingand designed to protect against the same risk of illness or injury unless such cautionary labeling
requirement is identical to the labeling required under section 2(p) or 3(b)."); Chemical Specialties Mfrs.
Ass'n v. Clark, 482 F.2d 325, 327-28 (5th Cir. 1973) (per curiam) (local ordinance requiring detergent
labeling to list ingredients held expressly preempted). But see Toy Mfrs. of America, Inc. v. Blumenthal,
986 F.2d 615, 620-24 (2d Cir. 1992) (FHSA does not preempt Connecticut law requiring a warning of the
risk to children under the age of three of choking on small parts of toys intended for use by older children);
Chemical Specialties Mfrs. Ass'n v. Allenby, 958 F.2d 941, 949-50 (9th Cir.) (FHSA does not preempt
Proposition 65 requirements), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 80 (1992).
289. 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (1988) ("[A] State shall not impose or continue in effect any requirements
for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from those required under this subchapter.").
290. Id. § 136v(a); see also Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, Ill S. Ct. 2476, 2482-87 (1991);
Comment, Local Pesticide RegulationSince Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 20 B.C. ENVTL. AFF.
L. REV. 65 (1993).
291. Compare New York State Pesticide Coalition, Inc. v. Jorling, 874 F.2d 115, 119 (2d Cir. 1989)
(state regulation requiring notice of pesticide application by posting signs is not preempted); Allenby, 958
F.2d at 949-50 (FIFRA does not preempt Proposition 65 requirements) with Arkansas-Platte & Gulf
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labeling requirements enjoy broad federal preemption under the federal meat
and poultry inspection acts.292
Even in the absence of express statutory preemption, however, an agency
may issue regulations intended to preempt state labeling requirements.293
Therefore, even if Congress were not prepared to revisit the issue in cases
where an existing statute failed to contain a preemption clause, federal agencies
could take the lead to ensure that their labeling requirements were not
undermined by additional or different state warning requirements. FDA has
done this in the case of three general OTC drug warnings,294 as have other
agencies on certain occasions.295 Sometimes agency labeling requirements will
be held to preempt by implication inconsistent state laws, 296 and agencies also
can preempt state requirements for product risks that they have decided do not
merit cautionary labeling.297
Proposition 65 has raised a number of difficult preemption issues. The law
itself recognizes that it cannot apply to "[ain exposure for which federal law
governs warning in a manner that preempts state authority."'2 9 USDA has taken
the position that the meat and poultry inspection acts expressly preempt
Proposition 65 product warning requirements, and the Agency rejected one
manufacturer's proposed label because it regarded the California cancer warning
Partnership v. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 981 F.2d 1177, 1179 (10th Cir.) (finding express preemption
of failure-to-warn claims), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 60 (1993).
292. 21 U.S.C. § 678 (1988) (meat labeling "requirements... in addition to, or different than, those
made underthis chaptermay not be imposed by any State"); id. § 467e (same provision applicableto poultry
products); see also Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 530-32 (1977) (California net weight labeling
requirements are expressly preempted by these provisions); Armour & Co. v. Ball, 468 F.2d 76, 84-85 (6th
Cir. 1972) (Michigan ingredient requirements preempted), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 981 (1973); Meat Trade
Inst., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 326 N.Y.S.2d 683, 684 (N.Y. App. Div. 1971) (per curiam).
293. See City of New York v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57, 64 (1988); Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467
U.S. 691, 699-700 (1984); Fidelity Federal Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 154, 167
(1982); 59 Fed. Reg. 3944, 3948-49 (1994) (FDA proposal to preempt state disclosure laws). See generally
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Regulation, Deregulation, Federalism, and Administrative Law: Agency Power to
Preempt State Regulation, 46 U. PITT. L. REv. 607 (1985); Paula A. Sinozich et al., Project, The Role of
Preemption in Administrative Law, 45 ADMIN. L. REv. 107 (1993). Su~h administrative preemption would,
of course, not be possible if it conflicted with contrary Congressional intent.
294. See 51 Fed. Reg. 8180, 8181 (1986) (Reye syndrome warning); 47 Fed. Reg. 54,750, 54,756
(1982) (general pregnancy warning for OTC drug products); 47 Fed. Reg. 50,442,50,447-48 (1982) (tamper-
resistant packaging and associated labeling requirements).
295. See, e.g., 52 Fed. Reg. 34,698,34,702 (1987) (CPSC warning requirement for productscontaining
methylene chloride).
296. See Cosmetic, Toiletry & Fragrance Ass'n v. Minnesota, 440 F. Supp. 1216, 1219, 1225 (D. Minn.
1977) (granting preliminary injunction against enforcement of Minnesota's CFC labeling requirement which
was held to be preempted by FDA's regulation), aff'd, 575 F.2d 1256 (8th Cir. 1978) (per curiam).
297. See Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691,708 (1984) (state not permitted to exercise
police powers where the Agency determined that restrictions were not in the public interest); Ray v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 178 (1978) (state not permitted to act where federal officials' failure to do
so amounts to a ruling that regulation is inappropriate); Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor
Relations Bd., 330 U.S. 767, 774 (1947); cf. Toy Mfrs. of America, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 986 F.2d 615, 621 -
23 (2d Cir. 1992) (CPSC's failure to adopt warning requirements for toys containing small parts did not
reflect any intent to foreclose state action). See generally Note, "Phony" Intent?: An Examination of
Regulatory-PreemptionJurisprudence,67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 108 (1992).
298. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.10(a)(1992).
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as misleading.2 99 In addition, although BATF has not taken a position on the
matter, the California warning for alcoholic beverages generally duplicates the
requirement imposed by Congress in 1988.300 Likewise, the carcinogenic
properties of tobacco products would trigger Proposition 65's warning
requirements were it not for the express preemption clauses in the applicable
federal statutes. 31 Even so, the broad array of options available for
communicating a warning under Proposition 65 means that federal labeling
requirements will rarely preempt the California requirements entirely. 302
In short, the scope of federal preemption will depend on both the clarity
of the preemptive intent expressed by Congress or an agency and the nature
of the state's warning requirements. If state lawmakers are able to evade all but
the most far-reaching statements of preemptive intent by allowing risk
information to be provided by methods other than labeling, they may succeed
in continuing to undermine carefully balanced federal warning efforts. 30 3 The
irony, of course, is that manufacturers attempting to comply with state warning
requirements by means other than product labeling may face claims that they
failed to choose the most effective way to convey the risk information.30 4
2. Preemption of State Tort Claims
The threat of inconsistency in product labeling is greatly compounded
when courts allow juries to impose additional demands for warning statements.
Courts have largely ignored the relevance of warnings required by legislatures
and administrative agencies, refusing to accord preemptive effect to federal
requirements. Even specific warnings mandated by Congress will not
299. Letter from Margaret O'K. Glavin, Director, Standards and Labeling Division, Food Safety and
Inspection Service, USDA, to William J. Coffin, American Home Food Products, Inc. (Nov. 20, 1987) (on
file with the author). Unlike FDA's regulation of food product labeling, USDA preapproves the labeling
of specific meat products. 9 C.F.R. § 317.4(a) (1993).
300. See supra notes 49-55 and accompanying text. Both describe the risk of birth defects, and,
although it does not use the word "cancer," the federal warning mentions other "health problems."
301. See supra note 282; John R. Emshwiller, Vons Stores Remove Tobacco Products T4hat Lack Health-
Warning Labels, WALL ST. J., Oct. 5, 1988, at B6 (describing the treatment of various tobacco products in
California). Of course the federal warning statements describing the risk of lung or mouth cancer should
satisfy a manufacturer's duty under state law, but the system of rotation for the federal warnings means that
a majority of tobacco products sold in any one year will not include a cancer warning in their labeling; see
also supra note 287 (raising question of preemption in the case of dental amalgam, a product regulated by
FDA as a medical device).
302. See D-Con Co. v. Allenby, 728 F. Supp. 605, 607 (N.D. Cal. 1989); Chemical Specialties Mfrs.
Ass'n v. Allenby, 744 F. Supp. 934, 935-36 (N.D. Cal. 1990), aff'd, 958 F.2d 941, 947-48 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 80 (1992). But cf King v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 806 F. Supp. 1030, 1037
n.4 (D. Me. 1992) (preemption of failure-to-warn claims under FIFRA extended to include mechanisms in
addition to EPA-approved product labels), aff'd, 996 F.2d 1346 (1 st Cir. 1993).
303. But see Susan B. Foote, Administrative Preemption: An Experiment in Regulatory Federalism,
70 VA. L. REv. 1429, 1463 (1984) (recommending that agencies leave states free to impose more stringent
labeling or other requirements).
304. See supra note 232.
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necessarily preempt failure-to-warn claims." 5 The Supreme Court recently
addressed the question of whether the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertis-
ing Act preempted common law tort claims.0 6 Since 1965, Congress has
prescribed the warnings that must appear on cigarette labels.0 7 Section 5(b) of
the Act, as amended in 1969, provided that:
No requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be
imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or promotion
of any cigarettes the package of which are labeled in conformity with
the provisions of this chapter.30 8
The Justices divided three ways, issuing a plurality decision. A majority of the
Justices agreed that the Act, as amended in 1969, expressly preempts products
liability actions grounded on failure-to-warn (but not other) claims, even though
the statute did not specifically delineate such claims as subject to preemption.3 9
Application of the Court's decision to other labeling statutes has been somewhat
haphazard to date.310
The preemptive force of specific agency warning requirements depends
on how clearly the statute or regulation expresses the intent to displace common
law claims. As explained above, state requirements governing the safety or
effectiveness of FDA-regulated medical devices were expressly preempted by
Congress. 3 ' Several courts have held that this provision of the FD&C Act also
preempts common law tort claims to the extent that FDA governs the labeling
of a device. For instance, claims against tampon manufacturers for failure to
warn of toxic shock syndrome have been dismissed because the Agency has
305. See, e.g., D'Arienzov. Clairol, Inc., 310A.2d 106, 109 (N.J. Super. 1973) (statutory coal tar hair
dye warning would not bar failure-to-warn claim brought by an individual who suffered an allergic reaction).
306. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992) (plurality).
307. See supra notes 32-42 and accompanying text.
308. 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1988). The Court held that the 1965 version, which provided that "[nio
statement relating to smoking and health" shall be required in the labeling or advertising of cigarettes labeled
in conformity with the Act, did not preempt common law tort actions. 112 S. Ct. at 2619. This provision
should be contrasted with the preemption provisions in the Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health
Education Act of 1986, discussed in supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text. State and local statutes or
regulations requiring a statement relating to the use of smokeless tobacco products and health are preempted,
but common law liability is expressly not affected. 15 U.S.C. § 4406(b), (c) (1988).
309. See 112 S. Ct. at 2619-24 (Stevens, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., White and O'Connor, JJ.)
(concluding that breach of express warranty and certain fraudulent misrepresentation claims were not
preempted). Two other Justices found an even broader preemptive effect in the statute and would have held
all common law claims preempted under the 1969 amendment. See id. at 2632-38 (Scalia, J., joined by
Thomas, J.). The remaining three Justices would have held none of the claims preempted. See id. at 2625-31
(Blackmun, J., joined by Kennedy and Souter, JJ.). See generally Richard C. Ausness, The Impact of the
Cipollone Case on Federal Preemption Law, 15 J. PROD. & Toxics LIAB. I (1993).
310. See, e.g., King v. Collagen Corp., 983 F.2d 1130, 1133-36 (1 st Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 84
(1993); Davidson v. Velsicol Chemical Corp., 834 P.2d 931, 933 n.2 (Nev. 1992) (per curiam), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 1944 (1993); Case Note, Preemption Doctrine After Cipollone, 106 HARV. L. REv. 963 (1993).
311. See supra note 287.
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issued specific warning requirements for these products.312 Recent preemption
decisions involving prescription medical devices are even more sweeping,
holding that premarket approval by FDA defeats a variety of common law
claims including those alleging defective design, testing, manufacture, or label-
ing.3'
3
In sharp contrast, courts have universally rejected the argument that FDA
regulations generally preempt state tort law for prescription drugs. 14 Although
they are regulated somewhat more stringently than medical devices, prescription
drugs are not covered by a comparable express preemption provision. Thus,
common law failure-to-warn claims are routinely brought against pharmaceu-
tical manufacturers even though drugs are subject to the most detailed and
carefully applied labeling requirements imposed by the federal government.
The primary rationale for ignoring FDA's drug labeling decisions is that
the Agency has imposed only "minimum" standards open to supplementation
by a lay jury's verdict enforcing a manufacturer's common law duty to warn.3 5
As one former FDA Chief Counsel commented a few years ago, however,
"FDA surely does not regard its own prescription drug labeling decisions as
merely establishing a floor."3 6 Another common refrain is that state common
law merely supplements FDA regulation by creating a compensatory mechanism
312. See Moore v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 867 F.2d 243, 246-47 (5th Cir. 1989); Bejarano v. Interna-
tional Playtex, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 443,445-46 (D. Idaho 1990); Berger v. Personal Products, Inc., 797 P.2d
1148, 1150-51 n.9 (Wash. 1990) (collecting cases), cert. denied, 11I S. Ct. 1584 (1991). The regulation
is discussed in supra note 133. Preemption in these cases means that failure-to-warn claims can only be
premised on a failure to provide the warning mandated by federal regulation and not on some general state
common law standard of adequacy. See, e.g., Stewart v. International Playtex, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 907, 910
(D.S.C. 1987) ("The remedy is available to plaintiff, but compliance with federal law protects the defendant
from the vagaries of each state's judicial system."); Poloney v. Tambrands, Inc., 399 S.E.2d 208, 210 (Ga.
1991).
313. See King, 983 F.2d at 1133-36 (injectable collagen); Stamps v. Collagen Corp., 984 F.2d 1416,
1421-25 (5th Cir. 1993) (same), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 86 (1993); Slater v. Optical Radiation Corp., 961
F.2d 1330, 1333 (7th Cir.) (investigational intraocular lenses), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 327 (1992); Lars
Noah, Amplification of FederalPreemption in Medical Device Cases,49 FOOD & DRUG L.J. _ (forthcoming
1994).
314. See Hurley v. Lcderle Laboratories, 863 F.2d 1173, 1176 n.2 (5th Cir. 1988) (citing 14 federal
district court and three state court decisions involving vaccines that rejected preemption defense); Abbot
v. American Cyanamid Co., 844 F.2d 1108, 1112 n.I (4th Cir.) (citing nine federal district court decisions
involving vaccines and rejecting preemption defense), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 908 (1988).
315. Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 788 F.2d 741, 746 (11 th Cir.) ("An FDA determination
that a warning is not necessary may be sufficient for federal regulatory purposes but still not be sufficient
for state tort law purposes."), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 950 (1986); Savina v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 795 P.2d
915, 931 (Kan. 1990); Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 479 A.2d 374, 391 (N.J. 1984); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 288C (I 965) ("Compliancewith a legislative enactmentor an administrative regulation
does not prevent a finding of negligence where a reasonable man would take additional precautions.");
Henderson & Twerski, supra note 240, at 320 ("[F]or reasons that we find difficult to understand, courts
have not deferred to the determinations of product safety agencies .... The analysis usually begins and
ends with the statement that agency standards are minimum, not maximum, standards and that courts are
therefore free to disregard them.").
316. Scarlett, supra note 163, at 40. "On the contrary, the FDA regards such labeling as fully adequate




not available under federal law.317 In several cases, for instance, courts have
allowed juries to find that the specific warnings provided to patients by
manufacturers of oral contraceptives were inadequate even though the labeling
fully complied with FDA's PPI regulation.31 Ironically, even an apparent refus-
al by FDA to allow the addition of a warning may not protect a manufacturer
from tort liability for failing to include precisely that warning. 19
In one widely reported jury verdict, a drug company was held liable for
failing to warn of the risks of blindness associated with the accidental
intraocular injection of a corticosteroid. Although not approved by FDA to treat
inflammations of the eye, this drug was widely used by the ophthalmological
community for that purpose. The jury returned a verdict against the manufactur-
er for $3 million in compensatory damages and $124.5 million in punitive
damages. 320 The trial judge remitted the punitive damage award to $35 million
but otherwise left the jury's verdict undisturbed. Furthermore, he excluded as
irrelevant evidence that the company had been unable to convince FDA to
include the precise warning urged by the plaintiff.32 ' The judge rejected the
manufacturer's argument that evidence of unsuccessful attempts to persuade
FDA of the need for an additional warning should at least be permitted for
purposes of rebutting allegations of negligent failure-to-warn. 322
Even though they have rejected preemption defenses, most courts recognize
that FDA-approved labeling provides some evidence of what constitutes an
adequate warning.32 3 Some state statutes also create a rebuttable presumption
317. E.g., Mazur v. Merck & Co., 742 F. Supp. 239, 247 (E.D. Pa. 1990); Feldman v. Lederle
Laboratories, 592 A.2d 1176, 1192 (N.J. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3027 (1992).
318. Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 642 F.2d 652, 658 (1 st Cir. 198 1); MacDonald v. Ortho
Pharmaceutical Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65, 70-71 (Mass.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 920 (1985); McEwen v. Ortho
Pharmaceutical Corp., 528 P.2d 522, 534 (Or. 1974).
319. See Wooderson v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 681 P.2d 1038,1057 (Kan.) (ignoring FDA letter
to manufacturer rejecting addition of requested warning), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 965, (1984); Feldman, 479
A.2d at 378-79; Charles J. Walsh & Marc S. Klein, The Conflicting Objectives of Federal and State Tort
Law Drug Regulation, 41 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 171, 185-88 (1986); Note, A Question of Competence:
The Judicial Role in the Regulation of Pharmaceuticals, 103 HARV. L. REV. 773, 779 (1990).
320. 19 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) 1169 (1991) (describing Proctor v. Upjohn Co.). The
decision is currently on appeal.
321. id; see also May v. Parke, Davis & Co., 370 N.W.2d 371,380 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985) (excluding
evidence that FDA had subsequently rejected another manufacturer's identical proposed warning as
unsubstantiated). Upjohn prevailed in a case involving a different off-label use. Hahn v. Richter, 628 A.2d
860 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993). During trial, Upjohn had presented testimony from Herbert Ley, a former FDA
Commissioner, explaining that the Agency "would not have allowed Upjohn to contact physicians or send
a 'Dear Doctor' letter regarding the intrathecal use of Depo-Medrol because it was not an approved use for
the drug." Id. at 863.
322. 19 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) 1169 (1991). On remand, the appellate court in Feldman
held open the question of "whether the correspondence from the FDA was sufficient evidence to justify
Lederle's decision to withhold a warning until such time as the FDA was convinced otherwise." Feldman
v. Lederle Laboratories, 608 A.2d 356, 359 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.), aff'd in part, 625 A.2d 1066, 1070
(N.J. 1993).
323. Salmon v. Parke, Davis & Co., 520 F.2d 1359, 1362 (4th Cir. 1975) ("In North Carolina, as
elsewhere, compliance with federal laws and regulations concerning a drug, though pertinent, does not in
itself absolve a manufacturer of liability."); MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65, 70-
357
The Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 11:293, 1994
that a drug warning is adequate if approved by FDA, 24 and other states
recognize more general defenses for any products whose labeling is regulated
by the federal government.3 25 A few courts have even registered a willingness
to consider a limited "preemption" defense to failure-to-warn claims if FDA
was provided with all relevant information at the time it approved labeling for
the new drug,326 but this is clearly a minority position.327 On the other hand,
any failure to abide by FDA requirements such as those for the reporting of
adverse drug experiences may constitute negligence per se.32s
In support of the general refrain that federal regulations represent only
minimum safety requirements open to supplementation by juries, courts have
emphasized that additional or more forceful warnings may be added to labeling
without prior FDA approval.3 29 FDA pronouncements on the subject have
contributed to the confusion. The Agency has on a number of occasions
expressed its intent to stay above the products liability fray.33 In the preamble
to its drug labeling regulations, in fact, FDA emphasized that manufacturers
may add warnings without prior approval.' Although these options for
71 (Mass.) ("compliancewith FDA [warning] requirements, though admissible to demonstrate lack of negli-
gence, is not conclusive"), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 920 (1985).
324. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-4 (West 1993); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.76(C) (Baldwin
1994).
325. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-104 (1993); see also Goins v. Clorox Co., 926 F.2d 559, 561-62 (6th
Cir. 1991) (applying Tennessee statute where product labels complied with FIFRA and FHSA); Uptain v.
Huntington Lab, Inc., 685 P.2d 218,222 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984) (applying similar Colorado statute to label
approved by EPA), aff'd, 723 P.2d 1322 (Colo. 1986).
326. Hurley v. Lederle Laboratories, 863 F.2d 1173, 1179 (5th Cir. 1988); McDanielv. McNeil Lab.,
Inc., 241 N.W.2d 822, 828 (Neb. 1976); cf Ramirez v. Plough, Inc., 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 97, 102 (Cal. 1993)
("[T]here is some room in tort law for a defense of statutory compliance.").
327. Abbot v. American Cyanamid Co., 844 F.2d 1108, 1112 (4th Cir.) (rejecting preemption defense
even while acknowledgingthat "[t]he language of the label is subject to FDA approval, and once approved,
cannot be changed without FDA approval"), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 908 (1988); Tarallo v. Searle Pharmaceu-
tical, Inc., 704 F. Supp. 653,660 (D.S.C. 1988) (refusing to follow what it called dicta in Hurley concerning
implied specific preemption).
328. Stanton v. Astra Pharmaceutical Prod., Inc., 718 F.2d 553, 565 (3d Cir. 1983); Orthopedic
Equipment Co. v. Eutsler, 276 F.2d 455,461 (4th Cir. 1960); Lukaszewiczv. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.,
510 F. Supp. 961,964-65 (E.D. Wis. 1981); Allen v. Delchamps, Inc., 624 So. 2d 1065, 1067 (Ala. 1993);
Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 398, 409 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967).
329. E.g., Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 479 A.2d 374,390 (N.J. 1984); cf Osburn v. Anchor Lab.,
825 F.2d 908, 912 & n.4 (5th Cir. 1987) (relying on parallel provisions for warnings on animal drugs), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 1009 (1988); In re Tetracycline Cases, 747 F. Supp. 543, 549-50 (W.D. Mo. 1989)
(pointing out that warnings on antibiotics may be added to the label in advance of FDA approval and that
there are other means for disseminating warning information which would not conflict with federal
requirements).
330. See 59 Fed. Reg. 3944, 3948 (1994) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 20.63(0) ("FDA recognizes
that product liability plays an important role in consumer protection."); 44 Fed. Reg. 37,434, 37,447 (1979)
(citing McEwen without criticism); 43 Fed. Reg. 4214,4214-15 (1978) (revised PPI for oral contraceptives);
42 Fed. Reg. 37,636, 37,637 (1977) ("[Wihether particular labeling [i.e., the estrogen PPI] may alter a
manufacturer's liability in a given instance cannot be considered as a dispositive factor by the Commis-
sioner").
331. "[Tjhese labeling regulations do not prohibit a manufacturer, packer, relabeler, or distributor from
warning health care professionals whenever possibly harmful adverse effects associated with the use of the
drug are discovered." 44 Fed. Reg. 37,434, 37,447 (1979) ("The addition to labeling and advertising of
additional warnings, as well as contraindications, adverse reactions, and precautions regarding the drug, or
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conveying additional risk information are not prohibited, their availability is
significantly restricted by FDA. Moreover, the Agency's apparent lack of
opposition to second-guessing by the courts is difficult to fathom, though one
commentator has suggested that agencies like FDA may not mind having the
tort system serve as a "safety valve" for deflecting adverse publicity from them-
selves when hazards associated with an approved product later come to light.332
Although in theory drug manufacturers are free to add warnings in advance
of FDA approval,333 they may not enjoy any real flexibility to alter previously
approved labeling. As one former FDA Chief Counsel explained, "the actual
freedom of manufacturers unilaterally to change the package insert is mini-
mal." '334 Moreover, even when a manufacturer may add a warning in advance
of receiving Agency approval, the additional warning may not be used if, after
reviewing the supplement, FDA rejects the modified language. "Although the
FDA is not rigidly opposed to adding more precautionary information to
labeling, it is conscious of the problem of information overload... [and it]
would not acquiesce in defensive labeling that lacked medical support." '335 The
possibility of Agency disapproval means that manufacturers typically await at
least informal pre-approval before changing product labeling. In the interim,
however, companies may be held liable if they have not at least requested FDA
approval of an additional warning as soon as a new hazard is discovered.336
Even while conceding that prescription drug labeling is subject to strict
FDA regulation that prohibits warnings about unsubstantiated risks, some courts
have taken the position that warnings could still be conveyed by means not
the issuance of letters directed to health care professionals (e.g., 'Dear Doctor' letters containing such
information) is not prohibited by these regulations.").
332. Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the Courts,
85 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 334 (1985).
333. 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(2)(i) (1993); 44 Fed. Reg. 37,434, 37,447 (1979) (explaining that this
regulation "permits the addition to the drug's labeling or advertising of information about a hazard without
advance approval of the supplemental application by FDA"). Until 1965, FDA regulations applicable to
drugs prohibited companies from adding warnings or other information without prior approval. See 25 Fed.
Reg. 12,592, 12,595 (1960). These regulations were amended in 1965, allowing labeling changes related
to safety to be "placed into effect at the earliest possible time." 30 Fed. Reg. 993 (1965) (goal was "to
enable prompt adoption of such changes").
334. Richard M. Cooper, Drug Labeling and Products Liability: The Role of the Food and Drug
Administration, 41 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 233, 236 (1986); see also Scarlett, supra note 163, at 36, 40.
Manufacturers of approved Class II devicesonly have limited flexibility to alter warnings without clearance
from the agency. 21 C.F.R. § 814.39(d)(1993); see also Lindquist v. Tambrands, Inc., 721 F. Supp. 1058,
1060 (D. Minn. 1989). Revisions to risk information in labeling can be implemented only after FDA has
acknowledgedthat the submission is being processed as a special supplement. ODE Guidance Memorandum
P90-1 (Apr. 16, 1990) (on file with the author).
335. Scarlett, supra note 163, at 40.
336. In re Tetracycline Cases, 747 F. Supp. 543, 550 (W.D. Mo. 1989); cf Sterling Drug, Inc. v.
Yarrow, 408 F.2d 978, 991-92 (8th Cir. 1969); Miller v. Upjohn Co., 465 So. 2d 42, 45 (La. Ct. App.) (jury
"could reasonably have found that Upjohn was tardy in applying for the warning label"), cert. denied, 467
So. 2d 533 (La. 1985).
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subject to federal control.337 These courts fail to recognize, however, that other
avenues of communication cannot be used to circumvent FDA decisions about
appropriate labeling. "Dear Doctor" letters, for instance, are subject to specific
FDA regulations33 and would have to abide by the same restrictions that apply
to the content of package inserts. 339 The Agency restricts the use of "Dear
Doctor" letters because it wants to reserve them to alert physicians to critical
new information. If courts force manufacturers to inundate doctors with such
letters, these communications might then be ignored along with much of the
other mail routinely sent to physicians' offices. 340 Nonetheless, courts have
generally failed to appreciate these important limitations.341
Courts should give labeling decisions made by expert federal agencies
more respect. FDA strictly controls the labeling of prescription medications,
demanding that cautionary information appear in appropriate categories and
prohibiting the inclusion of unsubstantiated warnings. Yet judges and juries
have shown little compunction about second-guessing these and other FDA
labeling determinations. Courts are divided over whether common law claims
are preempted under other labeling statutes such as FHSA 342 and FIFRA.343
337. See, e.g., In re Tetracycline Cases, 747 F. Supp. at 549; Herr v. Carolina Log Buildings, Inc.,
771 F. Supp. 958,961 (S.D. Ind. 1989) (describing various alternatives for conveyingrisk information about
pesticides); Baker v. St. Agnes Hosp., 421 N.Y.S.2d 81, 86 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979) ("There are other, well-
known methods by which pharmaceutical manufacturers apprise the medical profession of the dangers of
a drug."); Finn v. G.D. Searle & Co., 677 P.2d 1147, 1169 n.20, (Cal. 1984) (Bird, C.J., dissenting) ("These
include advertising and promotional literature, letters to the medical profession and oral communications
by sales representatives.").
338. See 21 C.F.R. § 200.5 (1993) (Because "such mail should be distinctive in appearance so that
it will promptly be recognized and read," FDA requests that drug manufacturers adhere to certain guidelines
for the notice on the envelope and that they not "use the distinctive envelope for ordinary mail"). Thus,
if the information in the letter "concerns a significant hazard to health," the outside of the envelope should
carry the following boxed statement in large red lettering: "IMPORTANT DRUG WARNING." Id. § 200.5-
(c)(1). Other significant labeling changes should be noted with the following boxed statement in large blue
lettering: "IMPORTANT PRESCRIBING INFORMATION." Id. § 200.5(c)(2).
339. See id. §§ 201.56, 202.1(/)(2); Cooper, supra note 334, at 240 ("FDA commonly reviews 'Dear
Doctor' letters and similar communication in advance."). Nor can these limitations be escaped by instructing
sales representatives to communicate verbal warnings not yet approved by FDA, especially if they might
imply an unapproved use. See Hahn v. Richter, 628 A.2d 860, 863 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993); 21 C.F.R. § 201.-
56(c) (1993) ("No implied claims or suggestions of drug use may be made [in drug labeling] if there is
inadequate evidence of safety or a lack of substantial evidence of effectiveness."); 37 Fed. Reg. 16,503,
16,504 (1972); Lars Noah, Death of a Salesman: To What Extent Can the FDA Regulate the Promotional
Statements of PharmaceuticalSales Representatives?,47 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 309, 320-22 (1992); Philip J.
Hilts, Court Bans Impropriety in Promoting a Drug, N.Y..TIMEs, Aug. 3, 1993, at CS (describing recent
FDA consent decree prohibiting promotion of drug by company sales representatives for unapproved uses).
340. See Hoffman v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 485 F.2d 132, 146 (3d Cir. 1973) ("Nor was mailing drug
literature to physicians necessarily an effective way to reach them .... [Tihe jury could reasonably have
found that a considerableamount of such literature winds up in the wastebasket and is not adequate to advise
doctors concerning matters of utmost importance.").
341. See Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82, 84 (8th Cir. 1966) (ignoring manufacturer's
argument that the Dear Doctor "letter was not sent sooner because the connection between the drug and
the conditionwas not yet sufficiently established, and because some time was consumed in clearing the letter
with the FDA").
342. Compare Burch v. Amsterdam Corp., 366 A.2d 1079, 1086 (D.C. App. 1976) (no preemption
of claim involving adhesive product) with Lee v. Boyle-Midway Household Products, Inc., 792 F. Supp.
1001, 1008-09 (W.D. Pa. 1992) (finding failure-to-warn claim involving a drain cleaner product impliedly
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Even if they are not willing to find common law failure-to-warn claims
preempted by federal requirements, however, "courts must acknowledge their
own inability to grasp the totality of warnings problems by deferring more
readily to other decisionmakers who do possess the institutional capability to
assess warnings as a whole."3" As is discussed at length in Part V, the refusal
to do so has resulted in the counterproductive proliferation of warnings about
insignificant or unsubstantiated risks in the labeling of consumer products.
IV. Considerations in Designing Warning Labels
Unless used in a consistent and thoughtful manner, warning statements will
fail to fulfill their intended purposes. The various shortcomings of current
labeling requirements suggest a number of important lessons. As explained in
the sections that follow, it is essential that warning statements be introduced
with appropriate signal words, specify the nature of the hazard, be comprehens-
ible to consumers, describe the degree of uncertainty underlying the risk
estimate, and explain how to avoid the risk. Although these goals require
certain trade-offs and may at times conflict, especially when attempts are made
to convey ambiguous risk information in a way that is both accurate and
understandable, they represent important considerations for those who design
or evaluate warnings. In addition, by testing the effectiveness of warning efforts
rather than simply relying on intuitive and unverified judgments about their
utility, decisionmakers could acquire a better basis for designing or revising
hazard statements in product labeling.
One of the earliest risk labeling systems, a voluntary standard published
by the Manufacturing Chemists Association (MCA) in the 1940s, incorporated
many important considerations relevant in the design of precautionary labeling,
including the consistent use of different signal words, uniform formats, simple
preempted).
343. Compare Ferebeev. Chevron Chemical Co., 736F.2d 1529, 1539-42 (D.C. Cir) (no preemption),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984); andCouture v. Dow Chemical U.S.A., 804 F. Supp. 1298, 1302 (D.
Mont. 1992) (same) with Shaw v. Dow Brands, Inc., 994 F.2d 364,369-71 (7th Cir. 1993) (FIFRA preempts
common law failure-to-warn claim against the manufacturer of a bathroom cleaner); Papas v. Upjohn Co.,
985 F.2d 516, 518-20 (11 th Cir.) (per curiam) (finding express preemption of common law failure-to-warn
claims under FIFRA, after remand from the Supreme Court for further consideration in light of its decision
in Cipollone), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 300 (1993); Arkansas-Platte & Gulf Partnership v. Van Waters &
Rogers Inc., 981 F.2d 1177, 1179 (1 0th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 60 (1993); and Davidson v.
Velsicol Chemical Corp., 834 P.2d 931, 936-37 (Nev. 1992) (per curiam) (finding implied preemption of
failure-to-warn claims under FIFRA), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1944 (1993). See generallyR. David Allnut,
Comment, FIFRA Preemption of State Common Law Claims After Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 68
WASH. L. REv. 859, 869-76 (1993) (criticizing recent decisions finding express preemption of common law
claims under FIFRA).
344. Henderson & Twerski, supra note 240, at 321 (adding that agencies "possess not only expertise
but also a capacity for knowledge and memory which courts cannot match"); see also Lars Noah, The
Dysfunctions of Drug Review in the Courts, 5 REG. AFF. 387,401 (1993). See generally Michael D. Green,
When Toxic Worlds Collide: Regulatoryand Common Law Prescriptionsfor Risk Communication, 13 HARV.
ENV. L. REv. 209 (1989).
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language, presentation of precautionary instructions in tandem with identifica-
tion of the hazard, and use of warnings only when necessary. 45 Although
features of the MCA system were incorporated in the original Federal
Hazardous Substances Labeling Act of 1960,346 as well as in EPA's pesticide
labeling regulations, 47 the lessons reflected in these efforts have been lost on
some of the persons now responsible for designing or reviewing consumer
product warning labels.
A. Selecting Appropriate Signal Words
Careful choice of introductory signal words (such as "Danger," "Warning,"
"Alert," and "Caution") is important. All of the cautionary statements mandated
by Congress, with the exception of those for coal tar hair dyes and saccharin,
are designated as "Warnings," and sometimes accompanied by a reference to
the "Government" or the "Surgeon General." As discussed in Part II of this
Article, agency practice with regard to choice of signal words is varied and
sometimes inconsistent. EPA's pesticide labeling regulations create a strict
hierarchy for the use of signal words depending on the risk of acute toxicity.34
CPSC's labeling regulations governing hazardous substances parallel EPA's
pesticide requirements in some respects, but the CPSC allows the terms
"Warning" and "Caution" to be used interchangeably. 349 FDA's prescription
drug and medical device labeling regulations, which take both acute and chronic
health hazards into account, use a similar hierarchy (ranging from
"Contraindications" to "Precautions") depending on the seriousness of the
risk.35 FDA warning requirements with respect to OTC drugs, food products,
and cosmetics are less discriminating in choice of signal words, frequently
treating "Warning" and "Caution" as synonyms.35' For their part, state
lawmakers and courts appear inclined to designate all hazard information as a
"Warning."
Introducing a hazard statement as a "Warning" often is unjustified.
Research confirms that, to maximize the effectiveness of precautionary
information, signal words should be consistent with the degree of risk reflected
345. George T. Scriba, The Federal HazardousSubstancesLabelingAct, 16 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J.
615, 628-31 (196 1) (describing the MCA manual and its substantial influence on what is now the FHSA).
The MCA system is the basis for the system adopted by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI).
ANSI Standard Z 129.1 (1988), discussed in Betso, supra note 202, at 219-20.
346. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanyingtext.
347. See supra notes 185-201 and accompanying text.
348. 40 C.F.R. § 156.10(h)(l)(i)(E) (1993).
349. 16 C.F.R. §§ 1500.3(a)(14)(i)(D), 1500.130(b) (1993).
350. See supra notes 146-163, and 179, and accompanyingtext.
351. In discussing OTC drug labeling, the Agency admitted that "historically there has not been
consistent usage of the signal words 'warning' and 'caution'...." 57 Fed. Reg. 58,356, 58,367 (1992).
Tampon labels use the signal word "Alert" to introduce risk information about toxic shock syndrome (TSS).
See supra note 133.
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in the text of the statement.352 The word "Warning" sounds a note of urgency,
designed to draw consumer attention to the information conveyed and typically
also to encourage some modification of behavior. Thus, in formulating its
general pregnancy warning for OTC drugs, FDA explained that it "chose[] the
word 'Warning' as a signal word because it is more likely to attract the
attention of consumers than the word 'Caution."' 353 Ten years later, in
promulgating the final monograph for OTC antihistamine products, FDA
reiterated this conclusion:
[T]he signal word "warning" is more likely to flag potential dangers
so that consumers will read the information being conveyed. ....
Therefore, FDA has determined that the signal word "warning," rather
than the word "caution," will be used routinely in OTC drug labeling
that is intended to alert consumers to potential safety problems.354
The critical question in each case, however, is whether a particular risk deserves
such attention.
Indiscriminately labeling every hazard, no matter how small, as a
"Warning" is inappropriate, particularly when information about suspected
chronic risks is unclear. Thus, "Warnings" for prescription drugs generally are
based only on clinical data, though evidence of "serious animal toxicity" may
suffice.355 Evidence of carcinogenic potential from long-term animal studies
normally should be included in the "Precautions" section of the package
insert.356 Statements about the acute health hazards of pesticides are introduced
with signal words that vary according to the severity of the hazard, and EPA
prohibits deviation from the signal words it has prescribed.357 The tendency with
respect to both acute and chronic risk labeling for other products, however, is
to use the word "Warning" irrespective of the degree of risk or the strength of
the scientific evidence underlying the statement. Regulators should adopt clearer
guidelines for the consistent and discriminating use of hazard indicators, if not
352. See Mark A. deTurck et al., UncertaintyReduction in Product Warnings: Effects of Fear in Signal
Word and Hazard Statement, 13 J. PROD. LIAB. 329, 336 (1991) ("[A] warning message is most effective
when the signal word and hazard avoidance statement are consistent with respect to the level of fear they
communicate."). The authors also reported that consistency between color (red, orange, or yellow, in
descending order of urgency) and the hazard statement were important. See Mark A. deTurck et al.,
Uncertainty Reduction in Product Warnings: Effects of Fear and Color, 13 J. PROD. LIAB. 339, 345 (1991).
353. 47 Fed. Reg. 54,750, 54,751 (1982).
354. 57 Fed. Reg. 58,356, 58,368 (1992). By comparison, in issuing its recent nutrition labeling
regulations, FDA recognized that using the same descriptive terms for products containing different levels
of a nutrient could confuse consumers. See 58 Fed. Reg. 2079, 2118 (1993) ("[Aldjective formats lead
consumers to miss quantitative differences between products when different nutrient levels are characterized
by the same adjective.").
355. 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(e) (1993).
356. Id. § 201.57(0(5).
357. 40 C.F.R. § 156.10(h)(l)(i)(E) (1993).
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across agencies, then at least within agencies or within categories of similar
products.
B. Specifying the Hazard
As the selection of signal words should reflect the degree of risk involved,
the cautionary statement itself should accurately convey the nature of the hazard
posed by the product. There is a danger that, in an effort to attract consumer
attention to particular warnings, regulators may overstate a product's true risk.
The objective should not "be to have the strongest impact possible but to have
an impact that is most commensurate with the risk level that is posed by a
product."35 Consistent with such guidance, CPSC generally may not 2require
the use of the same hazard statement for a product that "exhibits significantly
dissimilar functional or risk characteristics when compared with the other
products" for which that hazard statement is required. 59
The Proposition 65 hazard statement ("WARNING: This product contains
a chemical known to the State of California to cause cancer.") suggests a
chronic health hazard far more serious than the one-in-100,000 lifetime cancer
risk threshold that triggers the warning requirement. By way of comparison,
the saccharin label statement mandated by Congress, is not designated as a
"Warning," cautions only that the product "may be hazardous" and explains that
the chemical "has been determined to cause cancer in laboratory animals. 360
Thus, the saccharin statement is substantially milder than the California Warning
even though the extrapolated lifetime human cancer risk from saccharin had
been set at one-in-2500,361 forty times greater than the Proposition 65 "no
significant risk" threshold. The text of the California cancer warning statement
more closely resembles the cigarette warning mandated by Congress in 1969,362
even though the carcinogenic risks for these products may differ by several
orders of magnitude. Consumers will be misled if such disparate risks are
characterized in labeling as being equally serious.
358. W. Kip Viscusi, Predicting the Effects of Food Cancer Risk Warnings on Consumers, 43 FOOD
DRUG COSM. L.J. 283, 299 (1988) (criticizing the Proposition 65 requirements in part because California
allows liquor stores to post a single sign to convey the warning while less risky food products must generally
bear prominent individual warning statements on their labels).
359. ASG Industries, Inc. v. CPSC, 593 F.2d 1323, 1330 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,444 U.S. 864 (1979).
FDA announced that it would abide by this principle when it promulgated the TSS warning requirement
for tampons. 47 Fed. Reg. 26,982, 26,984 (1982).
360. 21 U.S.C. § 343(o)(1) (1988).
361. See supra note 24.
362. See Viscusi, supra note 358, at 296-98 (describing consumer testing which demonstrated that
"consumers view the Proposition 65 warning as stronger than the saccharin warning and at least as strong
or stronger than the early cigarette warnings"); see also W. KIP VISCUSI, REFORMING PRODUCTS LIABILITY 136
(1991) ("[Clonsumers view the risk of getting cancer from eating breakfast cereal bearing a Proposition
65 warning as comparable to that of getting cancer from smoking 0.58 packs of cigarettes.").
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Understated labeling statements also must specify the hazard posed by a
product in clear terms. Warnings are vague if they report information such as
the results from animal studies without describing the results in any terms that
would allow consumers to assess the strength of the data. The saccharin
statement, although it correctly avoids over-dramatizing the risk, provides a
good illustration of the difficulties that accompany vague disclosures concerning
chronic health risks extrapolated from studies in animals.
The main problem with such a warning is that it may be so equivocal
or mysterious that it cannot even be taken into consideration by the
consumer. The warning will not even produce an informed decision,
let alone a particular decision that is socially desirable.363
The proposed warnings for products containing doxylamine and 4-MMPD share
this same failing,36 4 but at least these statements imply a human health risk of
some type of cancer. References to completely unspecified health risks in the
alcoholic beverages warning,365 and the early cigarette warnings,"' even fail
to explain whether the hazard is chronic or acute. Such ambiguous warnings
will undermine consumer confidence in the reliability of truly important label
information.1
67
The need for clarity should not cause regulators to oversimplify hazards
or obscure the degree of uncertainty underlying a risk estimate.3 6' Generally,
when physicians are the target audience, presenting meaningful risk estimates
is not a problem. In revising its regulation on general prescription drug labeling,
FDA observed that "[i]t is common for a warning to state that the product
'may' cause a hazard, where the relationship is not yet conclusively proven,
363. Michael S. Yesley, Afterword.- Policy Issues in Risk Labeling, in PRODUCT LABELING, supra note
171, at 315 ("Even if the risk and confidence in estimating the risk are low, ... these factors do not justify
presenting information that is virtually useless to the average consumer."); see also NAS, Food Safety
Policy: Scientific and Societal Concerns 7-13 - 7-14 (March 1979) ("[l]t is not easy to convey warnings
about small and ambiguous risks. People have difficulty conceptualizing small-probability hazards, and
abstract statistical information is much less compelling than concrete information." (footnote omitted)).
364. See supra notes 67 & 135 and accompanying text. In the case of the 4-MMPD warning, FDA
explained that there is "no reason to expect that consumers will interpret a warning that concerns the nature
of the risk and that is phrased in general terms ... as conveying information on the size of the risk in
absolute terms or in comparison to other risks." 44 Fed. Reg. 59,509, 59,516 (1979) ("Warning
labels-including those for cigarettes and saccharin-simply do not purport to provide, and are not
understood by the public as providing, that kind of information.").
365. See supra note 54 and accompanyingtext.
366. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
367. See Yesley, supra note 363, at 316.
368. The NAS has emphasized that "[d]ata gaps and areas of significant disagreement among experts
should be disclosed" when communicating risk information. NAS, IMPROVING RISK COMMUNICATION 170
(1989). "One pitfall is that of equating clarity with brevity. The message preparer's goal should not be to
gloss over the complexity and uncertainty of a risk but to reflect those qualities in plain language." Id. at
167.
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or to point out that the relationship between adverse animal findings and human
consequences has not yet been determined.
'369
[I]ncluding the best available information on the degree of scientific
certainty about a possible hazard, its frequency, severity, and other
related information .... [provides] clear and unambiguous informa-
tion of use to the medical profession in making benefit-risk decisions
on drug prescribing.370
Package inserts provide detailed scientific information about a drug's clinical
pharmacology, adverse reaction profile, and the results of animal toxicology
and in vitro mutagenicity assays, among other items.
As explained in Subpart D, consumers may find it very difficult to make
sense of such information. In proposing to require PPIs, FDA recognized that
many of the scientific concepts discussed in the package insert, no matter how
simply written, "are difficult to convey to persons who lack professional
training or experience in the use of prescription drug products. '371' Anticipated
problems with comprehension by lay persons did not, however, deter FDA from
proposing to require comprehensive though somewhat simplified PPIs based
on the information contained in the package insert, and the PPIs would have
included detailed information about carcinogenicity and mutagenicity.372 By
contrast, the proposed warnings for cosmetics containing 4-MMPD and OTC
drug products containing doxylamine inappropriately gloss over precisely such
information. If consumers are given the task of making their own risk-benefit
calculations for potential carcinogens, they should also be provided with as
much accurate information as possible.
369. 39 Fed. Reg. 33,229, 33,232 (1974). FDA does not allow any "statement of differences of opinion
with respect to warnings (including contraindications, precautions, adverse reactions, and other information
relating to possible product hazards) required in labeling for food, drugs, devices, or cosmetics under the
act." 21 C.F.R. § 1.21(c)(1) (1993). (Similarly, CPSC prohibits the use of disclaimers to accompany
warnings on the labels of hazardous substances. 16 C.F.R. § 1500.122 (1993).) Unless FDA itself has
prescribed cautionary statements that reflect the degree of uncertainty underlying a risk estimate,
manufacturers are prohibited from conveying such information because it may undermine the warnings
mandated by the agency. 39 Fed. Reg. at 33,232 ("[T]here is no basis to permit warnings to be discounted
by an opinion that the warning is really not necessary at all .... [A] warning must be unencumbered and
unambiguous."). FDA concludedthat "where warnings are required, disclamatory opinions necessarily detract
from the warning in such a manner as to be confusing and misleading." Id.; see also 40 Fed. Reg. 28,582,
28,583 (1975) ("[W]arnings about possible hazards associated with the use of a drug must, to be effective,
remain undiluted by expressions of opinion discounting the risk.").
370. 40 Fed. Reg. 28,582, 28,584 (1975).
371. 44 Fed. Reg. 40,016, 40,026 (1979). In fact, some patients may consult professional labeling
reprinted in the PDR and, although some of the terminology may be unfamiliar, they can glean basic risk
information from it.
372. 44 Fed. Reg. 40,016, 40,026-27, 40,029 (1979). In addition, as more prescription drugs are
switched to OTC status, labeling will become increasingly detailed. See Peter Barton Hutt, A Legal
Framework for Future Decisions on Transferring Drugs from Prescription to Nonprescription Status, 37
FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 427, 438 (1982).
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C. Explaining How to Avoid the Risk
In addition to using signal words and text that are both clear and
commensurate with the risk, regulators must advise consumers what steps they
should take to avoid an identified hazard.373 "The existence of [health] risks
may mean little if it is not made clear what practical measures an exposed
individual might use to avoid or reduce them." '374 The labeling of drug products
generally satisfies this criterion. In the case of package inserts for prescription
drugs, which are meant to be read by physicians, FDA requires that the
"Warnings" section describe serious adverse reactions, safety hazards, and the
"steps that should be taken if they occur." ' 5 Similarly, the precautionary labels
for some consumer goods, especially OTC drugs, are framed primarily as
directions for safe use.
Many other warning efforts, however, fail to describe how to avoid or
minimize the hazard identified in the labeling statement. For example, it is
unclear how the "Warning" required for cosmetic products whose safety has
not been determined,376 or chronic risk disclosures for OTC drugs,377 will
enhance purchase and use decisions. Such warnings are noncommittal because
they convey information that scientists have had difficulty interpreting, and do
so without even hinting what, if anything, consumers should do in response.37
Vague warnings may provide comparative risk information in a gross sense,
because consumers can select other products that do not include similar warning
373. See William J. McGuire, The Communication-Persuasion Model and Health-Risk Labeling, in
PRODUCT LABELING, supra note 171, at 106 ("[Clompliance with risk-avoidance messages tends to increase
with the amount of information given for how to avoid the risk rather than with amount of stress on the
seriousness of the risk."); David E. Kanouse & Barbara Hayes-Roth, Cognitive Considerationsin the Design
of Product Warnings, in PRODUCT LABELING, supra note 171, at 148-50 (emphasizing importance of both
explaining nature of risk and providing "specific, action-oriented instructions").
374. NAS, supra note 368, at 166. "Messages are more effective at producing behavior change when,
in addition to producing understanding, they are specific about any desired response and proximate in time
and place to that response." Id. at 25; see also Viscusi, supra note 187, at 148-49 (1991) ("What matters
is whether the warning conveys new information in a convincing manner. Warnings that are forms of per-
suasion or which are intended simply to serve as reminders will generally have less impact than those that
provide new knowledge."). Even when warnings restate the obvious, however, they may serve a valuable
reminder function. 43 Fed. Reg. 25,544, 25,562 (1978) ("[M]any if not most warnings serve that purpose,
and they remind people of important facts which, while obvious to many, might be overlooked by some.").
375. 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(e) (1993). The sectionconcerning"Overdosage"also requires giving concrete
advice to the physician. Id. § 201.57(i).
376. Id. § 740.10(a).
377. See supra notes 134-142 and accompanying text. Similarly, "Proposition 65 is flawed because
it informs the public only of the presence of risk at a level specified by a government agency, and' does
not provide the public with information to comprehend that risk." Stenzel, supra note 227, at 516. But see
Note, Proposition 65 s Right-To-Know Provision, supra note 227, at 704-05 (defending need to simplify
message).
378. See SuSAN G. HADDEN, READ T-E LABEL: REDUCI RISK BY PROVIDING INFORMAflON 38 (1986) ("[l]t
is unreasonable to expect individuals to process information that has confounded the experts."). "Policy-
makers like labeling precisely because it leaves these difficult choices to the individuals who will benefit
from or suffer the risk. Unfortunately, many labels do not describe the hazards at all, and, of the ones that
do describe the hazard, most give limited information about severity and none about probability." Id. at 196.
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statements. This argument assumes, however, that the substitutes have been
subjected to similar testing for chronic risks, which often is not the case.
Moreover, the argument assumes that consumers will be able to judge whether
the chronic risk avoided by choosing a substitute outweighs possible increases
in other risks or reductions in product effectiveness.37 9 For instance, a consumer
selecting an OTC cough-cold product may avoid products containing
doxylamine because of a carcinogenicity warning in favor of other products
with antihistamine ingredients, even though the substitutes may pose more
serious but less frightening acute risks.
In the case of chronic risk disclosures, consumers may tend to infer that
the disclosures suggest that the product should be avoided altogether,38 ° even
if the level of risk disclosed does not in fact justify avoidance of the product.38'
Where the risk is sufficiently great that avoidance may be merited, the warning
statement should be more explicit about the nature of the risk and the
circumstances under which the product should not be used, as is the case with
the third-trimester pregnancy warning for products containing aspirin. If a risk
is of siuch a magnitude that the product should be avoided in all cases, an
outright prohibition makes more sense than a warning. If, however, a prohibi-
tion is considered unjustified in such a case, a warning requirement often would
be equally inappropriate precisely "because the information necessary for an
intelligent consumption decision cannot be provided. '382
[FDA] does not believe that a warning or cautionary statement should
be required for every possible question that might be raised about the
379. See infra note 462 and accompanyingtext (discussing risk trade-offs between CFCs and certain
hydrocarbon propellants); cf Public Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d 1108, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("[Miakers
of drugs and cosmetics who are barred from using a carcinogenic dye carrying a one-in-20-million lifetime
risk may use instead a noncarcinogenic, but toxic, dye carrying, say, a one-in-10-million lifetime risk.").
380. FDA's labeling requirement for tampons includes a statement advising consumers that they can
avoid the risk of getting TSS by not using tampons. 21 C.F.R. § 801.430(d)(4) (1993). In response to a
comment calling this warning "unprecedented,"the Agency noted that "[tlhe significant difference between
this statement and other warnings typically found on FDA-regulated products is that the statement itself sets
forth the conclusion that is inherent in other such [FDA] warnings, viz., do not use the product if you wish
to avoid the risk associated with it." 47 Fed. Reg. 26,982, 26,986 (1982); cf Dunn v. Lederle Laboratories,
328 N.W.2d 576, 580 (Mich. App. 1982) ("Plaintiffs cite no authority for the proposition that a warning
must include instructions on how to avoid a danger .... A danger is often avoided simply by refusing to
use the dangerous product."); 16 C.F.R. § 1500.123 (1993) (whenever hazard statement itself implies precau-
tionary measures, no separate statement of precautionary measures is needed under FHSA).
381. Contrast the direction on the labels of OTC dandruff products advising consumers to avoid
prolonged use. See supra note 138. If FDA instead had selected a vague chronic risk statement to disclose
the carcinogenicity of coal tar dyes, consumers may have avoided the products altogether even though the
insignificant risk apparently did not justify such a response.
382. Cooper, supra note 171, at 301. For a defense of labeling as an appropriate regulatory strategy,





safety of a product. A plethora of warnings about insubstantial
questions would be difficult for consumers to evaluate.383
As explained in Part V(C) of this Article, public disclosure of such risks may
be better accomplished in other ways.
Nonetheless, lawmakers frequently pass the burden of making decisions
about ambiguous product risks to consumers. When FDA decided to prohibit
most uses of saccharin, Congress interceded with a labeling requirement
describing in only general terms the results of the animal bioassays. FDA's
warning for cosmetics containing 4-MMPD placed primary decisionmaking
responsibility in the hands of consumers but failed to equip them with the
information necessary to make sense of the warning. In the case of the general
pregnancy warning for OTC drugs, FDA specifically denied that the warning
was intended "to shift responsibility for determining the product's safety to
consumers."38 4 The pregnancy warning was directed to an easily identified
subpopulation already under medical supervision in most cases, and it was
based on well-documented concerns with drugs intended for systemic absorp-
tion.385 By contrast, generalized disclaimers that the safety of a product is
unproven and carcinogen warnings like those required under Proposition 65 are
directed to all purchasers of a product. Although they have the advantage of
preserving consumers' freedom of choice, such warnings give no hint of what
consumers should do in response to the information provided. As explained in
Part V(B), exaggerated or uninformative warning statements serve only to
distort consumer choices.
D. Ensuring Consumer Comprehension
In addition to characterizing hazards accurately and explaining how to
avoid risks, warning statements must be clear and should contain enough detail
to ensure comprehension of the risk information that is presented. Although,
as explained in the previous sections, warning labels should provide accurate
and detailed risk information, there is a countervailing need to guard against
overwhelming consumers with too much information. Because risk messages
"cannot include all the details known to science and still be read and understood
by nonexperts," persons who design such messages must "omit some infor-
mation and highlight other information." ' 6 In connection with its recent
nutrition labeling regulations, FDA noted that studies "have generally shown
383. 43 Fed. Reg. 1101, 1104 (1978).
384. 47 Fed. Reg. 54,750, 54,751 (1982).
385. Id. at 54,754 ("FDA concludesthat the warning statements required are those that are scientifically
documented, clinically significant, and important for the safe and effective use of the products by average
consumers.").
386. NAS, supra note 368, at 82.
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that consumers prefer the largest amount of information offered but perform
best with limited amounts of information specifically related to the task. '387
Consumer research conducted by industry and by FDA demonstrated
that simpler, less cluttered label formats help consumers to make
comparisons between products .... The agency agrees that simplicity
and lack of clutter are important criteria in selecting a format.
However, enough effective information must be presented to make
the nutrition label useful.383
In designing warning statements, therefore, a balance must be struck between
simplicity and specificity.
The FD&C Act requires that label information be presented in such "terms
as to render it likely to be read and understood by the ordinary individual under
customary conditions of purchase and use."3"9 The regulation governing OTC
drug products is even more explicit.
Labeling... shall state... warnings against unsafe use, side effects,
and adverse reactions in such terms as to render them likely to be
read and understood by the ordinary individual, including individuals
of low comprehension, under ordinary conditions of purchase or
use.
390
Agency labeling requirements sometimes fail to adhere to these guidelines. For
example, suggestions that OTC products include warnings about possible
carcinogenicity in animals will make little sense to persons of low or even
ordinary comprehension. Similarly, several of FDA's cosmetic labeling require-
ments do not provide precautionary information in a manner that. is likely to
be read and understood by the consumer, much less acted upon in an appropri-
ate fashion.39'
387. 58 Fed. Reg. 2079, 2119 (1993) (citations omitted).
388. Id. at 2122 & 2132; see also 59 Fed. Reg. 3752 (1994) (CDC proposal to simplify vaccine
information materials); Kanouse & Hayes-Roth,supranote 373, at 153 ("[C]onsumers may be more inclined
to act on a warning that they perceive as complete and accurate than on an equally comprehensible warning
that offers little justification for its conclusions.").
389. 21 U.S.C. § 352(c) (1988).
390. 21 C.F.R. § 330.10(a)(4)(v) (1993) (emphasis added). "Studies indicate that a warning message
is more likely to be remembered over the long-term if it presents specific rather than general information.
Also, research indicates that labels must be written clearly and in a manner that can be understood by target
audiences." Assistant Secretary of Health, HHS, Review of the Research Literature on the Effects of Health
Warning Labels: A Report to the United States Congress 4 (June 1987); see also 43 Fed. Reg. 25,544,
25,553 (1978) (revising proposed warnings for OTC nighttime sleep-aids "in the interests of coticiseness,
legibility, and clarity").




Target audiences will have differing levels of sophistication. Because of
the role of physicians with respect to prescription drugs and devices, precaution-
ary information accompanying these products may be quite detailed and
complex. Most other warning labels are directed to lay consumers. When hazard
information is provided directly to these users, the risk message must be
simplified somewhat and expressed in concrete terms if it is to be
comprehended by the majority of readers.392 Even if a reasonably sophisticated
individual could grasp the message behind, for instance, a carcinogen warning,
consumers of average or below average comprehension surely could not
appreciate its meaning or purpose.
It is estimated that nearly ten percent of the United States' population is
functionally illiterate.393 A smaller but still significant percentage of the
population is only able to speak a language other than English.394 Such statistics
have prompted some courts to demand that manufacturers use dual language
labeling or pictograms to alert consumers who may have difficulty reading
English. 395 FDA permits multilingual labeling of most products, and in some
cases it has permitted or required the use of symbols.3 96 EPA is somewhat less
flexible with regard to multilingual labeling,3 97 but both it and CPSC require
the use of the skull-and-crossbones symbol on poisonous products. 9 Canada
has developed an elaborate pictogram system to convey certain types of risk
information such as degrees of flammability.3 99 Serious difficulties would be
encountered, however, if one attempted to supplement or replace more
complicated textual warnings with pictographs or other symbols.
4 0
392. Some commentators have suggested the use of a common risk metric to facilitate consumer
decisions about potentially hazardous products. See, e.g., McGuire, supra note 373, at 106. Efforts to
compare dissimilar risks with some baseline (e.g., flying from Boston to New York) should be avoided,
however, "as they have often either confused message recipients or irritated them because they were seen
as unfair or manipulative." NAS, supra note 368, at 173; see also id. at 97 ("The easiest way to avoid
comparing apples and oranges is to compare the risk associated with the same hazard at different times or
risks associated with different options for achieving the same purpose.").
393. See William Celis II, Study Says Half of Adults in US. Can't Read or Handle Arithmetic, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 9, 1993, at AI, A22 (adding that an even greater percentage are barely functional); Lee A.
Daniels, Illiteracy Seen as Threat to US. Economic Edge, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 1988, at B8.
394. See DepartmentofCommerce, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES xii (I112thed. 1992)
(preliminary data from 1990 census reveal that over five percent of the population over five years of age
speaks a foreign language and cannot speak (or, presumably, read) English very well).
395. See supra notes 271-272.
396. See supra note 122. Persons advocating bilingual labeling sometimes point to dual language
labeling in Canada.See Consumer Packagingand Labelling Regulations,C.R.C., c.417, §§ 6(2), 6(8) (1990).
FDA has specifically rejected the analogy because Canadian regulations do not mandate the inclusion of
as much information as does FDA. See 50 Fed. Reg. 1833, 1836-37 (1985) (discussing requirement of
pictograms and symbols but not multilingual labels in labeling of infant formulas).
397. See supra note 196.
398. See supra note 191. Because hazards to young children generally cannot be addressed adequately
through cautionary labeling, Congress has opted for design standards in such cases. See supra note 14.
399. See supra note 188.
400. See Ramirez v. Plough, Inc., 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 97, 101 n.3 (1993) ("[Allthough symbols and
pictograms can be used effectively to warn that a substance is flammable or toxic.... it is doubtful that
they are at present able to convey the more complex warning information typically required for
371
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In addition to limiting the possible effectiveness of warning label require-
ments, 4 1 high levels of functional illiteracy may have important distributional
consequences. Some commentators have suggested that information provision
is a regressive policy because it provides costly information of interest only to
educated consumers,40 2 who, if they respond to this information by avoiding
riskier products in favor of substitutes, may affect prices in such a way that
poorer individuals will consume or otherwise be exposed to a disproportionate
share of the riskier products.40 3 Of course, warning requirements may lead to
product reformulations that benefit everyone,40 4 and more direct forms of safety
regulation such as design standards may have similar distributional effects by
increasing prices.4 5 In any case, the fear of distributional consequences should
not deter regulators from demanding warnings (or design standards) when
appropriate, but such concerns should underscore the need to ensure that risk
information be comprehensible and meaningful to as many consumers as
possible.
E. Evaluating Effectiveness
Several commentators have stressed the need to undertake consumer studies
in advance of mandating a warning statement on a particular product.40 6 Only
rarely, however, have agencies undertaken such studies.4 7 Although courts have
nonprescription drugs."); Broussard v. Continental Oil Co., 433 So. 2d 354, 357-58 (La. App.) (rejecting
symbols proposed by plaintiff's expert because they were "unclearand subject to different interpretations"),
cert. denied, 440 So. 2d 726 (La. 1983); HADDEN, supra note 378, at 235 (noting that "it is difficult to
develop pictograms that are easily associated with hazards," and that "the number of hazards is so great
that it is impossible to devise pictograms to indicate them all"); Mark R. Lehto & James M.. Miller, The
Effectiveness of Warning Labels, II J. PROD. LIAB. 225, 238-45 (1988).
401. See Cooper, supra note 105, at 617.
402. See HADDEN, supra note 378, at 226; Michael B. Mazis, An Overview of Product Labeling, and
Health Risks, in PRODUCT LABELING, supra note 171, at 8. Sales of diet soft drinks did not increase as rapidly
in educated as in undereducated neighborhoods after the saccharin warning label appeared, see Raymond
C. Stokes, ConsumerResearchon Food-LabelInformation, in PRODUCT LABELING, supra note 171, at 84, but
this may reflect an overreaction by well-educated persons rather than an underreaction by those who are
less well educated.
403. See HADDEN,supranote 3 78, at 144; Note, Health RegulationofNaturallylHazardousFoods, supra
note 106, at 1045 n.139.
404. See Howard Beales, Benefits and Costs of Label Information Programs, in PRODuCr LABELING, supra
note 171, at 248 ("All consumers who use these products benefit from the information even though only
a small number actually read the labels ... [because of] product changes as a result of the competitive
process.").
405. See HADDEN, supra note 378, at 226.
406. See, e.g., Viscusi, supra note 362, at 144-45; Yesley, supra note 363, at 313 (criticizing the lack
of any "empirical justification" for many warning requirements).
407. See, e.g., 47 Fed. Reg. 54,750, 54,754 (1982) (rejecting suggestion that consumer studies be
undertaken before imposing third-trimester pregnancy warning for OTC aspirin products). Courts have
demandedthat CPSC requirements for warning labels be proven effective but have stopped short of requiring
consumer behavior studies. See ConsumerFed'n of America v. CPSC, 883 F.2d 1073, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(rejecting argument that such studies were a statutory prerequisite for methylene chloride warning
requirement); Aqua Slide 'N' Dive Corp. v. CPSC, 569 F.2d 831, 841-42 (5th Cir. 1978) ("The evidence
that the signs would reduce the risk rests more on inference than it does on proof."). When it recently
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identified some general factors in defining the duty to provide adequate
warnings, judges generally have not demanded that consumer studies be
introduced to evaluate this question. Instead, jurors are left to make judgments
about the adequacy of challenged warnings, 0 8 sometimes but not invariably
with the assistance of testimony from risk communication experts for one or
both parties at trial.4 °9
Significant difficulties would attend efforts to study the effectiveness of
warning programs, whether these studies are undertaken prospectively or
retrospectively. The Administrative Conference of the United States has noted
that the "[flailure to clarify whether the primary purpose [of agency risk
communication programs] is simply to inform and educate persons at risk, or
to produce actual behavioral changes, has hindered evaluation and reform ef-
forts."4 ' The NAS added that:
Although risk messages are sometimes judged against a criterion of
behavior change, this is not an appropriate test of whether an
individual has made an informed choice. It is possible for an
individual, fully informed of the risks, to choose to engage in hazard-
ous behaviors .... 41
In the case of warnings concerning the risk of acute illness or injury, changes
in the rate of that illness or injury may be correlated with the warning effort.
For example, the incidence of toxic shock syndrome (TSS) has declined sharply
in the last decade,41 2 the decline in TSS appears to have more to do with
changes in tampon design than with the warning efforts.413 Moreover, the
informational effects of FDA-mandated labeling cannot be readily disentangled
from the effects of extensive media coverage of the problem. Cases of Reye
syndrome also have decreased since FDA required a warning for OTC products
revised the format of the nutrition label on food products, however, FDA relied heavily on consumer
research. See 58 Fed. Reg. 2079, 2115 (1993) ("Behavior-based performance measures... are generally
accepted as the more reliable and valid way to evaluate the consequences of information displays on
consumer perception and understanding.").
408. See Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 552 F. Supp. 1293, 1304 (D.D.C.) ("The Court can think
of no question more appropriately left to a common sense lay judgment than that of whether a written
warning gets its message across to an average person."), aff'd, 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1062 (1984); Streich v. Hilton-Davis, Div. of Sterling Drug, 692 P.2d 440, 443 (Mont. 1984)
("Any layman could understand the insufficiency of the warning. Expert testimony was not necessary.");
cf. Wyeth Lab., Inc. v. Fortenberry, 530 So. 2d 688, 692 (Miss. 1988) ("The adequacy of a warning
addressed to the medical community may fall into the category of issues requiring expert testimony.").
409. See, e.g., Baroldy v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 760 P.2d 574, 588-89 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988);
John G. Kreifeldt, A Deductive Method for Treating Expert Opinions: An Application to Warnings and
Instructions, 14 J. PROD. LIAB. 225 (1992).
410. 55 Fed. Reg. 13,538, 13,539 (1990) (draft recommendation on "Risk Communication as a
Regulatory Alternative for Protecting Health, Safety and the Environment").
411. NAS, supra note 368, at 80.
412. See 39 MoRB. & MORT. WEEKLY REP. 421 (1990).
413. Id. at 422.
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containing aspirin, but here again it is difficult to attribute the decline to
labeling alone rather than the Agency's simultaneous public education
campaigns.
411
It is even more difficult to judge the effectiveness of warning labels
concerning chronic risks. Studies often look to changes in consumption patterns
in such cases. For instance, "studies of the impact of the saccharin warning
,label concluded that the warning label did have a moderate, but statistically
significant, impact upon sales of diet soft drinks in grocery stores."4 5 These
consumption changes may, however, reflect an overreaction by consumers to
the level of risk suggested by the disclosure statement. In the case of cigarettes,
extensive publicity about the hazards of smoking has had a noticeable effect
on consumption, but again it is impossible to segregate the independent impact
of warning labels.416 The apparent impact of mandatory warnings concerning
alcoholic beverages on patterns of usage has been disappointing to date. 4 17
F. Summary
There are a number of important considerations that should be taken into
account when designing or reviewing cautionary labeling statements to ensure
that risk information is conveyed in an appropriate fashion. Risk statements
-must use proper signal words, specify the nature of the hazard, explain how
to avoid the hazard, and be comprehensible to consumers. Existing labeling
efforts often are deficient in at least one respect (in some cases unavoidably
so), and sometimes deficient in several. Lack of appropriate selectivity is one
recurring error that is discussed at greater length in the next Part.
V. The Hazards of Overwarning
Even if it were possible to include cautionary information about every
potential hazard in product labeling, it would be undesirable to do so for a
number of reasons. The proliferation of warnings may dilute the impact of truly
important cautionary information. By the same token, it may cause consumers
414. 53 Fed. Reg. 21,633, 21,634 (1988); 40 MoRB. & MORT. WEEKLY REP. 88, 89 (1991).
415. Assistant Secretary of Health, HHS, supra note 390, at 4-5 ("One study concludedithat the warning
label resulted in a 6 percent reduction in diet soft drink sales below expected sales levels.").
416. See R. Dennis Murphy, ConsumerResponsesto CigaretteHealth Warnings, in PRODUCT LABELiNG,
supra note 171, at 13, 17 (describing FTC study); cf Bethany K. Dumas, Adequacy of Cigarette Package
Warnings, 59 TENN. L. REV. 261,297-301 (1992) (identifying numerous alleged shortcomings of cigarette
warnings).
417. See Michael E. Hilton, An Overview of Recent Findings on Alcoholic Beverage Warning Labels,
12 J. PUB. POL & MKTG. I, 3-4 (1993). Studies of information disclosure in other contexts confirm the
problems that may be encountered when providing complicated information to consumers. See, e.g., Jeffrey
Davis, Protecting Consumers from Overdisclosure and Gobbledygook: An Empirical Look at the




to overreact to information about relatively inconsequential risks. Notwith-
standing these concerns, courts and regulators have demanded that an ever-
growing number of warning statements appear on product labels.
A. Causes of Excessive Warnings
Decisionmakers often fail to take into account the need for selectivity in
the design of warning statements. Courts in particular seem oblivious to the
overall effect of their many decisions regarding the need to warn of individual
and often trivial risks. "[T]he legal system's apparent preference for comprehen-
sive warnings is less the result of a considered evaluation of the warnings
problem than the net effect of hundreds of narrowly focused products liability
cases."41 Typically, courts view the marginal costs of providing additional
warnings as insignificant." 9 Such a narrow focus on the low apparent cost of
relabeling can lead to serious mischief when deciding what warnings should
have been given. The premise that hazard statements on product labels are
essentially costless erroneously suggests that all potential risks, no matter how
remote, should be disclosed.
The low perceived cost of labeling revisions relates both to adding new
warnings and to enhancing the prominence of existing warnings. 420 Thus, even
when a manufacturer has the foresight to mention the particular injury suffered
by a plaintiff, it may be held liable for not making the reference to that risk
* sufficiently eye-catching, no matter how trivial the risk is in comparison to the
other hazards discussed in the labeling. At present, courts impose no penalties
for overwarning, only, for failing to provide what they deem to be adequate
warnings. As a consequence, manufacturers have an incentive to provide
extremely detailed and comprehensive warnings rather than meaningful
cautionary statements about only truly important risks.42 ' There is also an incen-
418. Victor E. Schwartz & Russell W. Driver, Warnings in the Workplace: The Need for a Synthesis
of Law and Communication Theory, 52 U. CIN. L. REv. 38, 60-61 n. 108 (1983) ("When a person is injured
by a very remote risk, the remoteness of the risk tends to be obscured by the reality of plaintiffs injury.
Courts generally do not ask how many other risks the manufacturer might also be required to warn about.").
419. As one court explained, the cost of giving an adequate warning, "amounting only to the expense
of adding some more printing to a label,... would be of minimal consequence .. " Moran v. Fabergd,
Inc., 332 A.2d II, 15 (Md. 1975); see also Ross Lab. v. Thies, 725 P.2d 1076, 1079 (Alaska 1986); Cooley
v. Carter-Wallace Inc., 478 N.Y.S.2d 375, 376-77 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) ("Since the cost of providing
warnings is often minimal, the balance usually weighs in favor of an obligation to warn."); Dambacher v.
Mallis, 485 A.2d 408, 423 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984), appeal dismissed, 500 A.2d 428 (Pa. 1985).
420. See Viscusi, supra note 187, at 151 ("There are always additional manipulations of the warnings
that are possible to make the risk information seemingly more prominent.").
421. See Schwartz & Driver, supra note 418, at 60; Scarlett, supra note 163, at 34. As an extreme
example, the instructions for one company's Batman costume apparently include the following cautionary
statement: "Capedoes not enable user to fly." Dave Barry, You CanSay ThatAgain, WASH. POST MAG., Sept.
19, 1993, at 52.
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tive to highlight all cautionary information as significant.4' These legal incentives
are tempered, of course, by countervailing marketing pressures and practical
constraints such as the size of product labels.
A few courts have acknowledged the need for selectivity when conveying
risk information in product labeling. For instance, the United States Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit once observed that "[f]ailure-to-warn cases have
'the curious property that, when the episode is examined in hindsight, it appears
as though addition of warnings keyed to the particular accident would be
virtually cost free." '423 As the court, however, elaborated:
Plaintiff's analysis completely disregards the problem of information
costs. . . . He discounts altogether the warnings in the pamphlet,
without even considering what the canister warning would have
looked like if [the manufacturer] had supplemented it not only with
the special items he is personally interested in-in hindsight-but also
with all other equally valuable items (i.e., "equally" in terms of the
scope and probability of the danger likely to be averted and the incre-
mental impact of the information on user conduct).424
A product may pose two or three significant hazards along with a dozen
identifiable but relatively trivial risks. An effective warning label might be able
to address the significant hazards, but a duty to warn of every foreseeable risk
would result in a substantially longer label or less detailed discussion of the
important risks to avoid.
A pair of 1983 decisions involving failure-to-warn claims against a power
tool manufacturer recognized the difficulties that would arise if the more
prominent warnings urged by the plaintiffs were required for all equally serious
422. See Cooper, supra note 334, at 237 ("The incentive is to issue warnings that the manufacturer
thinks have the best chance of satisfying a jury .... "); Henderson & Twerski, supra note 240, at 318-19;
see also Viscusi, supra note 187, at 158 ("[l]f one were to adopt a warnings strategy with the objective of
minimizing one's risk of liability, the solution would be to box and put in large bold lettering all warnings
pertaining to products .... ).
423. Cotton v. Buckeye Gas Prod. Co., 840 F.2d 935, 937-38 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
424. Id. at 938; see also Ramirez v. Plough, Inc., 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 97, 105-06 (Cal. 1993) (Multilingual
labeling of OTC drug products "might prove ineffective or even counterproductive if the warning inserts
became so large and cumbersome that a user could not easily find the warning in his or her own language.");
Ingram v. Hook's Drugs, Inc., 476 N.E.2d 881, 887 n.4 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (rejecting suggestion that
patient should have been given precautionary information contained in package insert for Valium, which
included over 20 cautionary instructions and 32 listed side effects, because "[sluch a voluminous warning
would only confuse the normal consumer and be of dubious value"); Vallillo v. Muskin Corp., 514 A.2d
528, 531 n.3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986) ("Warning labels cannot be effective if they take on the
characteristicsofdrug package inserts."), cert. denied, 546 A.2d 540 (N.J. 1988); W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER
& KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 96 (5th ed. 1984), at 686 ("Those who argue for warning as the solution
to latent design defects labor under a naive belief that one can warn against all significant risks.").
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risks posed by the products." 5 In both cases, the tool itself carried an instruction
directing the user to read the accompanying owner's manual for safety
information, and the risk encountered by each plaintiff was clearly warned
against in the manual. Both plaintiffs claimed, however, that the tools
themselves should have carried a label warning against the particular hazard
that caused their injuries, a proposition rejected by both courts.
In this case, the injury was caused by explosion, but it could just as
easily have been caused by failure to observe any of the other
nineteen safety precautions. To require that one explicit warning be
placed on the saw would be to require all twenty.426
The courts thus avoided the common pitfall of evaluating the plaintiff's failure-
to-warn claim in isolation and without regard to all of the equally pertinent
risks that also might have to be warned against on the label. The inquiry in
these two cases was simplified somewhat because the owner's manuals
contained a large but finite set of hazard statements. Courts encounter greater
difficulty when no warning against plaintiff s injury is given anywhere or when
it is unclear how many other risks of a comparable magnitude exist and might
necessitate a similar warning statement.
42 7
Although judicial recognition of the problem of information costs may be
increasing, the majority of failure-to-warn cases continue to focus narrowly on
the failure to warn adequately of the particular injury suffered by the plaintiff,
425. See Scott v. Black & Decker, Inc., 717 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1983); Broussard v. Continental Oil
Co., 433 So. 2d 354 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 440 So. 2d 726 (La. 1983); see also Thomas v. Hoffman-
LaRoche, Inc., 949 F.2d 806, 815-16 (5th Cir.) (rejecting plaintiff's claim that the contraindications for
Accutane should have been broader than those required by FDA), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2304 (1992);
Odom v. G.D. Searle & Co., 979 F.2d 100 1, 1003-04 (4th Cir. 1992) (rejecting plaintiffs proposed contra-
indication for an IUD, noting that any additional suggested warning "must bear some reasonable relation
to the 1.84% risk" of pelvic inflammatory disease and resulting ectopic pregnancy).
426. Scott, 717 F.2d at 254. In the other case, the owner's manual included eighteen warnings, and
the plaintiff conceded that as many as ten of these should have appeared directly on the label, while the
manufacturer took the position that there was no basis for excluding the other eight. The court held that
none need appear on the label:
As a practical matter, the effect of putting at least ten warnings on the drill would decrease
the effectiveness of all the warnings. A consumer would have a tendency to read none of the
warnings if the surface of the drill became cluttered with the warnings. Unless we should ele-
vate the one hazard of sparking to premier importance above all others, we fear that an effort
to tell all about each hazard is not practical either from the point of view of availability of
space or of effectiveness. We decline to say that one risk is more worthy than another.
Broussard,433 So. 2d at 358.
427. In one case, for instance, where the trial court had granted the manufacturer a judgment notwith-
standing the verdict partly because the plaintiff's failure-to-warn claim ignored the trade-offs that a more
specific warning would have required, the appellate court reversed, explaining that "the jury is perfectly
capable of assessing whether the proposed warning would be unreasonable because of possible cost or confu-
sion." Marehant v. Dayton Tire & Rubber Co., 836 F.2d 695, 701 (1st Cir. 1988).
The Yale Journal on Regulation
no matter how trivial the risk of that injury is as compared to other risks posed
by the product. This is not to say that in all instances a court should decline
to find a warning inadequate because of such information costs. In some cases,
a narrow holding that a certain type of serious risk was not made sufficiently
clear in the existing labeling may be defensible.428 For the most part, however,
the common law duty to warn has been applied by the courts without sufficient
care.
Lawmakers sometimes suffer from the same myopia, resorting to product
labeling as a default option for controlling risks because of its perceived ease
and flexibility.4 29 "The low direct cost of label information has seemingly
beguiled many would-be regulators into requesting even more information on
labels."43 Agencies sometimes impose labeling requirements without giving any
real consideration to the impact on the label as a whole, tacking on additional
warning statements as new hazards are identified. FDA's cosmetic labeling
regulations provide a good illustration of this problem.43 By contrast, when
428. See, e.g., Ayers v. Johnson & Johnson, 818 P.2d 1337, 1342 (Wash. 1991) (rejecting argument
that imposition of liability for failure to warn of risks of aspiration of baby oil by infant would force
manufacturers to "deluge" consumers with "indiscriminate warnings" of remote risks associated with
aspiration of other common products). The Court added,
Our holding is limited to the proposition that baby oil, because it is intended for use on and
around babies, may be the proximate cause of injuries due to aspiration if sold without an
adequate warning of the danger of such injuries. We reject the notion that any product with
physical properties similar to, or as dangerous as, those of baby oil may for that reason alone
create manufacturer liability for failure to warn. Because our holding is limited in this way,
we reject the argument that upholding the jury's verdict . . . will dramatically encourage
overwarning.
Id. at 1343. Of course a cautious manufacturer, fearing what a somewhat less reasonablecourt might decide
in a future case, may feel compelled to add warnings about aspiration by babies of common food products
such as milk or apple sauce. (CPSC already requires warnings for products containing mineral oils because
of the risk of aspiration. 16 C.F.R. § 1500.14(b)(3)(ii) (1993).)
429. See HADDEN, supra note 378, at 258-59 ("Most new risk control laws incorporated a labeling
requirement because labeling seems to be a relatively benign form of regulation: low in cost and preserving
flexibility of individual action."). One of the sponsors of the alcohol labeling legislation asserted that
"warning labels are the quickest, cheapest, and probably the most effective means for imparting the necessary
knowledge." Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Consumer of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1988) (statement of Rep. John Conyers, Jr.); see also Jeff
MacNelly,Shoe (Tribune Media Services, Inc., Oct. 28, 1988) (proposing as "the all-purpose warning label"
the following: "The Surgeon General has determined we are all doomed.").
430. Beales, supra note 404, at 249. Ironically, consumer groups seem equally short-sighted in their
assessment of the potential costs associated with warning labels. See, e.g., William B. Schultz, Labels, Bans,
and Consumer Preferences, in PRODUCT LABELING, supra note 171, at 221 ("Labeling is a simple and
inexpensive means of conveyinginformation to consumers about the products they buy."). The author, then
a director of the Public Citizen Litigation Group, asserted that "consumers should be given all the informa-
tion which is available about the risks associated with the product," because, "even if we cannot prove in
advance that labeling will affect consumer conduct, there is considerable value in giving information to
consumers so that they bear some responsibility for their choice."Id at 224 (emphasis added); see also FOOD
CHEM. NEWS, Feb. 15, 1993, at 76 (describing lawsuit brought by a public interest organization challenging
USDA's failure to require warning labels describing risks of bacterial contamination in meat and poultry
products).
431. See supra notes 60-67 and accompanying text.
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they engage in rulemaking efforts that simultaneously affect many aspects of
a product label, agencies are somewhat more attentive to the marginal costs of
including additional information.432
State lawmakers sometimes view labeling requirements as an indirect way
to regulate products that are otherwise subject primarily to federal control.
Warning requirements may be thought of as placing less of an undue burden
on interstate commerce than would more direct design requirements or outright
prohibitions. The warning provisions of Proposition 65, for example, seek to
encourage product reformulation, 33 leading one defender of the law to assert:
Th[e] feared proliferation of warnings will not necessarily occur,
because those who produce toxic substances or use them in the
workplace may substitute other substances for the listed chemicals that
trigger Proposition 65's warning requirement. If unlisted chemicals
displace listed ones, there will be no overwarning problem because
those substitute chemicals will require no warnings."'
Reformulation may not, however, prove to be feasible for many products.
Thus, courts and lawmakers share the blame for encouraging or demanding
excessive consumer product warnings. In particular, fears of tort liability have
created distorted incentives to add warnings to product labeling. The ultimate
irony of reliance on warnings to convey information about insignificant risks
is that overwaming eventually may incur penalties from the very same courts
that have created the pressures to overwarn in the first place. It seems to be
only a matter of time before a plaintiff succeeds in bringing an inadequate
warning claim premised on the argument that, although a completely accurate
statement of the risk had been provided, the pertinent warning lacked sufficient
prominence because it was lost among the clutter of too many other cautionary
432. For instance, FDA took into account the trade-offs to be made when it substantially revised
nutrition labeling requirements for food products. See 58 Fed. Reg. 2079, 2107 (1993) ("Not only would
space constraints not allow for [the inclusion of all information related to healthy dietary practices], but
the large amount of information would interfere with consumers' abilities to use the information of the
greatest public health significance."). Similarly, FDA reduced the number of warnings proposed for use on
OTC topical first aid antiseptic products from seven to four after "recogniz[ing] that it is not necessary or
even possible to identify every improper use of a drug that could occur and to list such information on the
label." 56 Fed. Reg. 33,644, 33,654 (1991); see also 44 Fed. Reg. 37,434, 37,448 (1979) ("agree[ing] that
information should not be unnecessarily duplicated in [prescription] drug labeling").
433. See supra note 229.
434. Note, Proposition 65 's Right-To-Know Provision, supra note 227, at 704 (footnote omitted).
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statements on the label.435 Although such an outcome is not to be encouraged,
it would bring the failure-to-warn case law full circle.
Excessive warnings also may face threats of regulatory enforcement
actions. As mentioned earlier, EPA prohibits the use of overly alarming signal
words in the labeling of pesticide products436 and FDA strictly controls the
cautionary labeling allowed for OTC medications.4 37 FDA prescription drug
regulations are a significant restraint to those who would attempt to insulate
themselves from products liability exposure by mentioning or highlighting
unsubstantiated or insignificant risks. 3 The Agency generally frowns upon and
will not approve defensive labeling. For instance, FDA has rejected manufact-
urers' proposals to contraindicate or otherwise warn against use of their drugs
during pregnancy, proposals evidently prompted by the valid fear that birth
defects (which are certain to occur in some percentage of women) might
wrongly be associated with the use of those drugs during pregnancy and
therefore expose the manufacturer to potentially meritless but costly products
liability claims.4 39 A manufacturer could not, in pursuit of satisfying its common
law duty to warn, ignore FDA's decision without risking administrative
enforcement actions. In most cases, however, agencies do not restrict so clearly
the ability to include additional or more prominent hazard statements in product
435. Cf. Karns v. Emerson Elec. Co., 817 F.2d 1452, 1457 (10th Cir. 1987) (holding that jury could
reasonably find warnings accompanying mechanized yard tool inadequate, in part because sheer number
of different safety rules and precautions appearing in owner's manual (24 in all) may have undermined
clarity of instructions against using tool when other persons were in vicinity); Hahn v. Sterling Drug, Inc.,
805 F.2d 1480, 1482 (11 th Cir. 1986) (FDA-mandated warning to keep product out of children's reach may
have been inadequate for OTC analgesic in light of fact that "the same warning appears on numerous
products that are not harmful"); Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79, 86 (4th Cir. 1962) (warning
of danger associated with ingestion of furniture polish should not have been given lesser prominence on
label than danger ofcombustion); Leday v. Clairol, Inc., 571 So. 2d 866, 870 (La. Ct. App. 1990) (finding
that cautionary information on label of hair dye product satisfied duty to warn in part because it "was not
obscured by numerous other warnings and instructions"); Walker v. Maybelline Co., 477 So. 2d 1136, 1139
(La. Ct. App. 1985) ("The warning was buried in a list of instructions.... ), cert. denied, 481 So. 2d 1333
(La. 1986). Apparently no court has yet held a defendant liable for overwarning. See STEVEN GARBER, PRODUCT
LIABILITY AND THE ECONOMICS OF PHARMACEUTICALS AND MEDICAL DEVICES 134 (1993).
436. 40 C.F.R. § 156.10(h)(l)(i)(E) (1993).
437. See 21 C.F.R. § 330. 1 (c)(2)(vi) (1993) (warnings for OTC drugs may not deviate from language
required by applicable monographs); 56 Fed. Reg. 63,554, 63,566 (1991) (allowing voluntary inclusion on
label of cautionary information not required by monograph, but not in section designated for warnings).
438. As explained above, FDA requires substantiation and categorizationof risks in prescription drug
labeling. See supra notes 146-168 and accompanyingtext.
439. When it approved a new prescription drug for the treatment of insomnia, FDA rejected the
manufacturer's request, which was apparently based on fears of tort liability, that its use be contraindicated
during pregnancy. See F-D-C REPORTS ("The Pink Sheet"), Dec. 21, 1992, at 3. Similarly, in discussions
concerning the labeling of transdermal nicotine patches, manufacturers sought to include a stringent
pregnancy warning concerningthe teratogenicity of nicotine, but FDA opted for a milder warning evidently
because it did not want to discourage women who would otherwise have smoked during their pregnancy
from attempting a cessation program using a patch. See F-D-C REPORTS ("The Pink Sheet"), July 20, 1992,
at 9. The Agency also has directed manufacturers to remove contraindications from existing labeling after
concludingthat there was insufficient data to justify a particular contraindication.See F-D-C REPORTS ("The
Pink Sheet"), May 24, 1993, at T&G-I.
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labeling. As a result, only marketing pressures and practical constraints will
counterbalance the liability system's incentive to overwarn.
B. Consequences of Overwarning
Indiscriminate and cumulative warnings about trivial risks are counterpro-
ductive. Consumers either will begin to ignore product labels altogether, thereby
missing other important information, or they will become alarmed by data that
were judged insufficient to warrant any more direct attempts to curtail use."'
These twin evils of dilution and overreaction counsel against the use of product
labeling to convey trivial risk information to consumers.
1. Dilution of Existing Warnings
There is a danger that the addition of warning statements to labeling may
distract consumers' attention from existing warningg about more serious risks
as well as other important information. FDA has acknowledged the problems
of information overload and dilution of warnings in a number of different
contexts. For these reasons, the Agency recently rejected suggestions that food
labels include explicit allergy warnings.44' For similar reasons, FDA dropped
its proposal to require a warning about the color additive Yellow No. 5 in the
labeling of OTC drugs in favor of a simple ingredient disclosure statement.442
In promulgating its general labeling conditions for OTC drugs, FDA recognized
that "if labeling contains too many required statements ... the impact of all
warning statements will be reduced. '4 3 As explained above, however, the
Agency does not always abide by these commendable principles.444
440. See Paul Slovic et al., Informing People about Risk, in PRODUCT LABELING, supra note 17 1, at 177-
78 ("[W]e must question the value of labels warning about substances whose toxicity is fai from certain
(e.g., saccharin). If not ignored, such labels are likely to confuse people or raise their anxiety level, without
providing much information relevant to decision making."); Henderson & Twerski, supra note 240, at 296.
441. See 56 Fed. Reg. 28,592, 28,615 (1991) (expressing concern that such a requirement "would
overexpose consumers to warnings," and that then "consumers may ignore, and become inattentive to, all
such statements"). In the final regulations, the Agency affirmed its tentative conclusion, citing comments
"that an overabundance of warning statements may desensitize the general public to safety concerns and
subsequently cause warning statements to lose some of their value as a means of informing the consumer
about potential health hazards." 58 Fed. Reg. 2850, 2872 (1993).
442. 44 Fed. Reg. 37,212, 37,218 (1979).
443. 40 Fed. Reg. 11,717 (1975) ("In addition there is a space limitation on the number of statements
that can appear on the labeling."); see also 53 Fed. Reg. 30,522, 30,530 (1988) ("The agency agrees that
too many warning statements reduce the impact of important statements."); cf. 58 Fed. Reg. 46,551, 46,554
(1993) (in promulgating labeling requirement for cars equipped with air bags, the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration decided against "adding additional statements to the label because it believes that
such additions would contribute to an 'information overload,' thereby diluting the impact of the most
important information").
444. In considering the rule requiring pregnancy warnings for most OTC drug products, FDA reiterated
its "consistent and frequently stated policy" that "warnings must be used judiciously so that they do not
lose their effectiveness."47 Fed. Reg. 54,750,54,753 (1982). The Agency nonethelessimposed that warning
requirement because it believed that "appropriate general warnings, such as this pregnancy-nursingwarning,
381
The Yale Journal on Regulation
Congress itself recognized that the overuse of warnings could distract
consumer attention from label information about serious risks. When it enacted
the Federal Hazardous Substances Labeling Act in 1960,"" Congress provided
the following reasons for limiting the Act's warning requirements only to
"substantial" hazards:
If labeling were required to caution against the risk of even the most
trifling indisposition, there would hardly be any substance going into
the household which would not have to bear cautionary labeling, so
that consumers would tend more and more to disregard label
warnings, thus inviting indifference to cautionary statements on
packages of substances presenting a real hazard of substantial injury
or illness.
446
Subsequently enacted congressional warning requirements for tobacco products
and alcoholic beverages generally adhere to this policy of alerting consumers
only to substantial risks, but statutory labeling requirements for saccharin and
ozone depleting substances are somewhat more suspect in this regard.
Some courts also have recognized that overwaming may reduce the
effectiveness of warnings about serious risks.447 For instance, the .United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit noted that, "[i]f pharmaceutical
companies were required to warn of every suspected risk that could possibly
attend the use of a drug, the consuming public would be ,so barraged with
warnings that it would undermine the effectiveness of these warnings...
Physicians would not be immune to the consequences of overwarning of
prescription drug risks.449 In the event that labeling included warnings of all
are an important means of educating the public about drug use." Id. at 54,754. FDA asserted that growing
familiarity with the general warning, rather than causing consumers to tune out, would allow consumers
to "more readily understand the significance of specific warnings that describe demonstrated risks of
particular drugs to pregnant and nursing women." Id. This argument assumes, of course, that use of the
boilerplate warning will not diminish the likelihood that consumers will read and attend to more specific
directions and warnings. The Agency then tacked on another pregnancy warning, this one focusing on risks
encountered in the third trimester, for OTC products containing aspirin. 21 C.F.R. § 201.63(e) (1993). FDA
rejected comments urging that the warnings be consolidated to minimize the problems of dilution. 55 Fed.
Reg. 27,776, 27,777-78 (1990).
445. See supra note 11.
446. H.R. REP. No. 1861, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960), reprinted in 1960 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2833, 2837.
447. See Cotton v. Buckeye Gas Products Co., 840 F.2d 935, 938 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("The inclusion
of each extra item dilutes the punch of every other item. Given short attention spans, items crowd each other
out; they get lost in the fine print."); Mountain v. Procter &.Gamble Co., 312 F. Supp. 534, 537 (E.D. Wis.
1970) (noting that to require warning of rare allergic reactions would "make such warnings less effective
in all cases"); Dunn v. Lederle Lab., 328 N.W.2d 576, 580 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982).
448. Doe v. Miles Lab., Inc., 927 F.2d 187, 194 (4th Cir. 1991); see also Edmondson v. International
Playtex, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 1571, 1574-75 (N.D. Ga. 1987).
449. The California Supreme Court has observed that, "if every report of a possible risk, no matter
how speculative,conjectural, or tentative, imposed an affirmative duty to give some warning, a manufacturer
would be required to inundate physicians indiscriminately with notice of any and every hint of danger,




possible side effects, the cacophony of risk information could undermine a
doctor's ability to appreciate warnings about meaningful hazards.45 Such an
outcome, while it may serve to insulate companies from the risk of lawsuits,
ultimately would be counterproductive to patient health.
Several commentators also have voiced concerns about information
overload, noting that the proliferation of hazard statements could drown out
other more important information on product labels and foster public cynicism
about warning statements generally. 41 If consumers are exposed to numerous
vivid accounts of minor health threats, their attention will be diverted, their
priorities will be confused, and their responsiveness to important messages will
be decreased. Whatever their degree of sophistication, consumers can attend
only to a limited number of information signals in a given period of time. Thus,
an initial draft of the Restatement (Third) of the Law of Torts includes the
following important comment:
Courts should be cautious to avoid imposing a duty to provide overly
numerous or too detailed warnings. Such warnings are likely to be
ignored and thus ineffective.... Useful instructions and warnings call
the user's attention to dangers that can be avoided by careful product
use, but they can be debased if attention must also be directed to
trivial or far-fetched risks. Should courts require inappropriately
elaborate warnings, consumers would be disadvantaged.45
1147, 1153 (Cal. 1984) ("Knowledge of a potential side effect which is based on a single isolated report
of a possible link between a prescription drug and an injury may not require a warning."); see also Thomas
v. Hoffman-LaRoche, 949 F.2d 806, 816 n.40 (5th Cir.) (noting that imposition of liability for failure to
warn about reported but unconfirmed adverse experiences with prescription medications could "force drug
manufacturers to list, and perhaps contraindicate, every possible risk in order to avoid the possibility of
liability"), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2304 (1992).
450. See Thomas, 949 F.2d at 816 n.40 ("If manufacturers so respond to the possibility of liability,
physicians will begin to ignore or discount the warnings provided by the drug manufacturers. Permitting
a jury to find liability on such a basis would undermine the important role of warnings as a device to
communicate vital information to physicians.").
451. See, e.g., Beales, supra note 404, at 250 ("[A]dditional label information may reduce the
probability that consumers read, note, and act upon other information on the label."); Schwartz & Driver,
supra note 418, at 59-60 ("A product user who recognizes that one of the hazards addressed in a warning
is trivial is likely to discount the importance of the other hazards addressed in the warning.... If every
possible danger in life were accompanied by a warning, product users quickly would become inured to all
warnings, and eventually would ignore them." (footnote omitted)). But see Mary L. Lyndon, Information
Economics and Chemical Toxicity: DesigningLaws to Produce and Use Data, 87 MICH. L. REv. 1795,1831
(1989) (discounting these concerns by asserting that "people already handle substantial amounts of complex
information").
452. RESTATEMEwCl'HIRI)) OF TORTS: PRODUCrS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. f (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1994), at 24-25;
see also Beales, supra note 404, at 251 ("Ubiquitous disclosure that a product may be hazardous, although
probably true, is likely to rob that statement of its information value."); Henderson & Twerski, supra note
240, at 296 ("Courts should recognize that warning about relatively remote risks generates substantial social
costs which in most cases outweigh any corresponding benefits in reducing accident costs."); Schwartz &
Driver, supra note 418, at 54 n.71 ("The net effect of such a warning may be the prevention of fewer
accidents than a warning that addressed only the three most important hazards.").
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If warnings about relatively trivial risks are given equal prominence with
warnings about more significant problems, people will be unable to distinguish
what is important from what is unimportant.45 3 If warnings of all sort
proliferate, the general public may become bored or cynical and cease to pay
attention altogether.454
Apart from the possibility that consumers simply will stop paying attention,
warnings about every possible risk associated with a product could confuse the
public. For instance, certain consumers may believe that a product whose label
discloses several small risks is more hazardous than a product whose label
warns of a single serious risk.455 Conversely, one study found the perverse
effect that consumers viewed products with warning labels as more desirable
than those without them, perhaps because products accompanied by warnings
were perceived as containing more powerful ingredients.456 One quite serious
possibility is that overwarning will distract consumers from attending to the
directions for proper use, thereby increasing the chance of injuries resulting
from product misuse.457 Such inappropriate responses to risk labeling may
outweigh the anticipated benefits of warning efforts, particularly when the
primary purpose of such efforts is nothing more than fulfilling an amorphous
"right to know."
The problem of information overload is compounded when consumers are
given raw data without straightforward guidance about how to respond. During
proceedings on Proposition 65, FDA Commissioner Frank Young explained the
Agency's opposition to indiscriminate warnings about potential carcinogens.
We are greatly concerned that a requirement for placing warning
labels on all such products will lead to consumer confusion and
actually diminish the effect of the labeling that is now required....
453. See Lehto & Miller, supra note 400, at 233 ("[Plresenting a long list of messages with a warning
label could be quite counterproductive. This problem would be most serious when messages vary extensively
in importance, since processing the less relevant messages may consume the limited mental resources and
time that should be allotted to the important messages."); Henderson & Twerski, supra note 240, at 308
("Sequencing [of warnings in labeling] inevitably denotes relative importance and will have an impact on
the weight a consumer attaches to the risk.").
454. See Viscusi, supra note 187, at 162 ("If everything in society is stamped 'Hazardous,' then in
effect no warnings will be given. The overall task ... is to be selective and to earmark those products that
merit warnings .. "); Yesley, supra note 363, at 316 ("Increased familiarity with warnings as a result of
their growing number may breed disregard, if not contempt. Individual warnings, no matter how well
designed, will lose their saliency in a forest of other warnings.").
455. See Kanouse & Hayes-Roth, supra note 373, at 156; Slovic et al., supra note 440, at 177.
456. Michael Ursic, Research Note, The Impact of Safety Warnings on Perception and Memory, 26
HUMAN FACTORS 677, 680-81 (1984).
457. See Viscusi, supra note 187, at 147 (noting that, because "the major risks of pesticide products
are from misuse ... rather than inadequate precautions during proper use, excessive risk information may
actually increase the overall risk posed by the product."); see also Liesener v. Weslo, Inc., 775 F. Supp.
857, 861 (D. Md. 1991) (recognizing "the need to keep warnings simple and succinct enough to be readable
and effective; the more detailed, the less chance there is that they will be read at all, thereby perversely




Messages warning of product ingredients that actually pose no risk
will prompt consumers not to read labeling at all. Indeed, for products
that now contain necessary warning labels, those warnings might be
overlooked entirely, to the detriment of those citizens for which they
were intended.458
Unfortunately, the task of selecting and appropriately highlighting only the most
serious hazards for inclusion in labeling cannot be accomplished so long as
federal agencies must vie with state lawmakers and the courts for control over
risk communication decisions.
2. Overreaction to Additional Warnings
Even if consumers do pay attention to warnings, they may well overreact
to the information, particularly when the warning statement is intended to
convey a subtle message about low probability risks.459 Such an overreaction
is especially likely in the case of warnings about statistically remote risks of
dreaded diseases such as cancer. Thus, when it imposed the CFC warning
requirement for consumer products, FDA rejected a comment urging that the
warning make specific reference to skin cancer effects.
The public is, understandably, exceptionally alarmed by risks of
cancer. A reference to a cancer risk on the label should be
accompanied by a careful explanation which may require a lengthy
text. Furthermore, a reference specifically to cancer, even though
stated to be an environmental effect, could without further explanation
lead some consumers to believe the risk is greater for the individual
user of the product.460
458. Frank E. Young, M.D., Statement before the Science Advisory Board of the California Health
and Welfare Agency (Dec. I1, 1987), at 16 (on file with the author). But see Note, Proposition 65 s Right-
To-Know Provision, supra note 227, at 704-05 ("In any event, some degree of overwarning may be an
acceptable side effect .... If having 'too many' warnings is the only way to avoid requiring citizens to
discover for themselves the hazards of a particular chemical, this may be a worthwhile tradeoff.").
459. See Viscusi, supra note 358, at 287-88 ("Perhaps the major danger from any risk-communication
effort is that instead of informing people these programs will serve to unduly alarm them and cause an
overreaction to the risk information."); Richard J. Zeckhauser & W. Kip Viscusi, Risk Within Reason, 248
SCIENCE 559 (1990).
460. 42 Fed. Reg. 22,019, 22,026 (1977); see also John Higginson, Everything Is a Carcinogen?, 7
REG. TOXiCOL & PHARMACOL 89, 93 (1987) ("[S]uch misconceptions are dangerous since the public may tend
to regard all potential carcinogenic stimuli as equally important irrespective of dose and mechanism and
equate the trivial with the significant.").
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The CFC warning therefore only cautions that a product "[c]ontains a
chlorofluorocarbon that may harm the public health and environment by
reducing ozone in the upper atmosphere.
461
In fact, there is no distinctive individual risk from use of products
containing CFCs, but there may be direct health risks associated with alternative
propellants. Although FDA was careful not to mention cancer in the warning
statement, it failed to consider the potential adverse health effects that could
arise if consumers reacted to the somewhat less threatening warning by
switching to products containing non-CFC propellants. The primary purpose
of the CFC warning was to encourage use of alternative propellants, though
several comments pointed out these alternatives caused adverse effects such as
eye irritation and raised flammability concerns. FDA, however, responded that
"[t]he present action relates only to the adverse effects of [CFCs] upon
stratospheric ozone, and the potential physiological hazards from other products
are not within the scope of this regulation." '462 FDA did take into consideration
the availability of safe alternative delivery systems for purposes of deciding
whether a particular use would be exempted as "essential," '463 and CPSC
addressed a similar objection to its identical CFC warning by pointing out that
the labeling requirement would not prevent consumers from purchasing products
containing CFCs if they were thought to be safer than alternatives. 4" Even so,
the possibility that warnings about CFC propellants could lead to the use of
alternatives posing a greater personal risk for users (albeit less of an
environmental concern) did not lead either Agency to reconsider the desirability
of the proposed warnings.
Requiring warning statements about unsubstantiated or insignificant risks
in the labeling of useful products can distort consumer choices. "Warnings may
not take into account the benefits that are gained from using a prod-
uct ... includ[ing] both the positive advantages afforded by the product and
also the avoidance of costs that would result from not using the product." '465 For
461. E.g., 21 C.F.R. § 801.425(a)(1993) (medical devices).
462. 42 Fed. Reg. 22,019, 22,027 (1977). Yet FDA has recognized that hydrocarbon propellants are
subject to abuse, 21 C.F.R. § 740.11 (b)(1) (1993), and that the sniffing of fumes by youngsters has become
a serious problem. See Laura Sessions Stepp, Sniffing Fumes: A Growing and Deadly Trend Among
Teenagers, WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 1994, at Al. These CFC alternatives are also flammable. Nowak v. Fabergd
U.S.A., Inc., 812 F. Supp. 492, 495 (M.D. Pa. 1992). Use of alternative propellants recently resulted in
widely publicizedrecalls becauseof health problems. See41 MORB. & MORT. WEEKLY REP. 965,966(1993);
Two Are Hospitalized, 41 Become 111 After Using a New Spray Product, WASH. POST, Dec. 28, 1992, at A7
(leather protectant spray using petroleum distillates instead of CFCs). (Indeed, CPSC mandates special
labeling for products containing petroleum distillates because it regards them as especially hazardous. 16
C.F.R. § 1500.14(b)(3)(i) (1993).)
463. 42 Fed. Reg. 22,019, 22,027-28 (1977).
464. 42 Fed. Reg. 42,780, 42,782 (1977).
465. Yesley, supra note 363, at 316; see also Schwartz & Driver, supra note 418, at 39 n.4 ("Warnings
which raise fears in the minds of potential consumers out of proportion to the actual risks involved... may
cause consumers to forego use of a socially beneficial product."). By contrast, before a product label may




instance, many food products contain potentially carcinogenic nitrites, but at
present these preservatives provide one of the best means available for
protecting against lethal food poisoning.466 In addition, the public should be
more concerned with maintaining a healthy diet than with warnings about
possible low-level carcinogens in food products.467 Absent consistent and differ-
entiated cautionary statements allowing comparisons among the risks posed by
different products, narrowly focused warning requirements may distort these
trade-offs.
CPSC may impose labeling requirements only if there is substantial
evidence that a warning is "reasonably necessary" to prevent or reduce
unreasonable risks of injury.468 In applying this standard, reviewing courts have
balanced the identifiable advantages of a warning requirement against possible
disadvantages such as consumer overreaction. In setting aside a CPSC
regulation that required warning signs on new pool slides, one court found that
the explicit mention of the risk of paralysis "might unnecessarily frighten away
those who would be willing to buy them if they knew how remote the risk
actually was." '469 The concern with frightening consumers was not related to any
potential health benefits foregone by not using pool slides, or risks associated
with alternatives, but rather to the potential economic harms visited upon
manufacturers of products that are made to appear overly hazardous. If CPSC
must take such considerations into account before imposing a warning label
requirement, other agencies should at least give some thought to the possible
health hazards that may arise from discouraging the use of relatively safe
products.
FDA did exempt essential uses from the CFC warning requirement and,
in commenting on EPA's ozone depleting substances regulations, cautioned
against requiring warnings on essential products for fear that patients would
be unduly alarmed and discontinue important therapies.47 Likewise, in the case
See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 10 1.1 4(e)(3) (1993) (prohibiting health claims in the labeling of food products that
contain "disqualifying levels" of undesirable nutrients).
466. See Cooper, supra note 171, at 302.
467. See David McCallum, Risk Factorsfor CardiovascularDisease: Cholesterol, Salt, andHigh Blood
Pressure, in RISK COMMUNICATION 67, 69 (J. Clarence Davies et al. eds., 1987) (Risk communication
"campaignsmust recognizeoverall nutrition and the interactionofdietary factors. (For example, not drinking
milk to avoid fat rather than drinking low-fat milk can lead to calcium deficiencies.)"). See generallyNRC,
DIET AND HEALTH: IMPLICATIONS FOR REDUCING CHRONIC DISEASE RISK (1989).
468. 15 U.S.C. § 2056(a) (1988); see also 58 Fed. Reg. 8013, 8015 (1993) (withdrawing proposal to
require that toys with small parts warn of the hazard of choking because CPSC could not find that expected
benefits of such requirement "would bear a reasonable relationship to its costs").
469. Aqua Slide 'N' Dive Corp. v. CPSC, 569 F.2d 831, 844 (5th Cir. 1978); cf Southland Mower
Co. v. CPSC, 619 F.2d 499, 522 (5th Cir. 1980) (finding that lawn mower label was "not shocking or
gruesomely explicit and would not pose an unwarranted deterrent to potential purchasers"). .
470. See supra notes 80 & 211 and accompanying text. For similar reasons, one court rejected a
plaintiff's argument that the warning "ought to be so strong, regardless of medical experience, as to frighten
people from receiving the beneficial aspects of the [vaccination] program." Boruski v. United States, 803
F.2d 1421, 1427 (7th Cir. 1986).
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of OTC drugs, FDA has demonstrated a similar concern about not unduly
alarming consumers who would otherwise greatly benefit from use of such
products.47" ' For example, in proposing labeling for sunscreen products, the
Agency rejected a suggestion that consumers be alerted to the risk that the
continuous use of sunscreens may suppress cutaneous vitamin D3 synthesis
because it found that most persons obtain adequate amounts of vitamin D in
their diet, and "because such a warning might discourage the use of sunscreens,
especially in children." '472 Regulators and courts therefore should take into ac-
count the consequences that may arise if a warning effort, intentionally or not,
persuades some consumers to refrain from using a product and either to forego
the benefits of use or to switch to alternatives that may be more hazardous.
The use of warnings may have other unintended effects on consumer
behavior. Some have argued in favor of requiring specific warnings of the
addictive properties of products such as alcohol, cigarettes, and certain drugs.473
FDA does require that potentially addictive medications bear the statement
"Warning-May be habit forming." '474 Some have suggested, however, that such
warnings could be counterproductive.
The warning would frighten away many people who are unlikely to
become addicted ... [while] people with a propensity to engage in
nonconforming or thrill-seeking behavior would be more likely to use
the product in consequence of the warning; they will take a warning
as a dare or regard products with warnings as more alluring to them
just in virtue of their having been identified as risky .... [T]o label
a product "addictive" may convey the impression that consumption
will be intensely pleasurable, at least for a time.4"
471. See, e.g., 55 Fed. Reg. 27,776, 27,782 (1990) ("[T]he agency is concerned that a reference to
bleeding as included in the proposed [third-trimester pregnancy] warning may discourage compliance with
medically supervised uses of aspirin, e.g., the treatment of chronic arthritis, and therefore is not including
a specific reference to bleeding in the new warning for these OTC drug products."); 44 Fed. Reg. 59,509,
59,514 (1979) (suggesting that Congress' failure to extend saccharin warning to other products such as
toothpastes may reflect recognition of health benefits that result from encouraging use by improving
palatability).
472. 58 Fed. Reg. 28,194,28,243 (1993) (but inviting further comments on whether the elderly, who
are more prone to vitamin D deficiency, should be alerted to this possibility). By contrast, the Agency
rejected the argument that an "Avoid contact with eyes" warning should be deleted because it might
discourage consumers from applying sunscreens to their faces where it is most needed. Id. at 28,241.
473. See, e.g., Donald W. Gamer, Cigarette Dependencyand Civil Liability: A Modest Proposal, 53
S. CAL. L. REV. 1423 (1980). A few courts have found manufacturers liable for failing to warn of a product's
addictive qualities. See Marsee v. United States Tobacco Co., 639 F. Supp. 466, 471 (W.D. Oki. 1986)
(smokeless tobacco), aff'd, 866 F.2d 319 (1 0th Cir. 1989); Crockerv. Winthrop Lab., 514 S.W.2d 429,432-
33 (Tex. 1974) (prescription analgesic represented as non-addicting).
474. 21 U.S.C. § 352(d) (1988); 21 C.F.R. § 329.10(c) (1993).
475. Alan Schwartz, Views of Addiction and the Duty to Warn, 75 VA. L. REV. 509, 556-57 (1989)




Similarly, label warnings of risks other than addiction may encourage rather
than deter hazardous behavior.476 In proposing a warning requirement for prod-
ucts in self-pressurized containers, FDA recognized that an intentional misuse
warning "could lead those persons who might wish to inhale intoxicating
substances directly to products that could be abused." '477 FDA dismissed this
concern, however, by noting that "[n]o warning can protect from harm those
who intentionally indulge in practices that they know to be harmful.,
478
Other secondary effects of warnings include the possibility of "indirect
psychological costs of risk labeling, such as suggesting to people symptoms that
they would not otherwise have, or imposing additional health-threatening stress,
loss of self-esteem, etc., for people who keep smoking even though the label
tells them it is foolish., 479 In proposing its monograph for OTC stimulant drug
products, FDA recognized the "possibility that some consumers might develop
psychosomatic side effects" after reading about risks, but it rejected this concern
without any detailed explanation. 4" The same argument was made with regard
to PPIs for prescription drugs, but FDA discounted this possibility and
explained that the positive effects of supplying information about potential
adverse reactions would offset any possible negative effects:
Accurate expectations may help reduce uncertainty and anxiety about
possible effects of treatment. The patient may also be better able to
interpret and identify more accurately the cause of drug-induced
reactions, and treatment decisions will accordingly be based on more
precise information.48
Although admittedly speculative, the possibility of unintended secondary effects
such as encouraging risky behavior or suggesting side effects should caution
476. See McGuire, supra note 373, at 109-10 ("For example, among young people (and especially
young males), warning labels about the risk involved in pharmaceuticals, cigarettes, alcohol, driving styles,
certain sporting equipment and practices, etc., may actually have a net positive incentive power, drawing
the person to the practice (especially in public situations) rather than being a deterrent.").
477. 38 Fed. Reg. 6191 (1973).
478. Id. In the preamble to its final rule, FDA mentioned that one comment was received from "a
former addict [who] stated his belief that while most persons would ignore the warning, some would not,
and to that extent the warning would be worthwhile." 40 Fed. Reg. 8912, 8915 (1975).
479. Beales, supra note 404, at 243, 258-59 (statement of William McGuire)
480. 43 Fed. Reg. 25,544, 25,562 (1978). But cf. 21 C.F.R. § 7.50 (1993) ("[FDA] will intentionally
delay public notification of recalls of certain drugs and devices where the agency determines that public
notification may cause unnecessary and harmful anxiety in patients and that initial consultation between
patients and their physicians is essential."). Suggestion-induced illnesses are a documented phenomenon.
See, e.g., Larry S. Goldman, Book Review, 327 NEW ENO. J. MED. 1764 (1992) (reviewing ROBERT KELLNER,
PSYCHOSOMATIC SYNDROMES AND SOMATIC SYMPTOMS (1991)); 39 MoRB. & MORT. WEEKLY REP. 301 (1990)
(CDC analysis of reports of food poisoning in children attending day-care center, concluding that it
represented a "mass sociogenic illness").
481. 42 Fed. Reg. 37,636, 37,639 (1977) (estrogen PPI); see also 44 Fed. Reg. 40,016,40,023 (1979)
("The agency does not believe that patient labeling will significantly increase the incidence of suggestion-
induced side effects.").
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against too ready a reliance on warnings that fulfill nothing more than the "right
to know."
The risk of overreaction is not limited to lay consumers. Physicians are
vulnerable as well. Overwarning of prescription drug side effects may adversely
affect prescribing decisions.
[FDA] has an interest in "rational prescribing," i.e., ensuring that the
risks and benefits of a particular drug be fairly presented so that a
physician can compare them with other available therapies. That goal
is not advanced if a drug is made to appear riskier than other drugs
and other therapies due to the over-dramatization of risk information.
To allow a warning based on inconclusive evidence or scientific
hunches results in doctors not prescribing effective drugs to a patient
because of the erroneous belief that a side-effect might occur.48
As explained in the previous section, giving undue prominence to trivial or
unsubstantiated risks will draw attention away from more serious risks. FDA
therefore requires the substantiation and appropriate categorization of risks in
prescription drug labeling.4"3
FDA's efforts to convey accurate and balanced risk information are under-
mined when courts entertain failure-to-warn claims in these cases. Even if
physicians are not misled by warnings about trivial risks, they may nonetheless
avoid using perfectly safe and effective therapeutic agents for fear of
malpractice liability if they disregard a warning.484 Indeed, if phrased as a
contraindication, precautionary information would effectively amount to a
direction to the physician never to use the drug in those circumstances. Patients
will be the ultimate losers of excessive and misguided warning efforts
undertaken by manufacturers in response to adverse judgments in products
liability cases. There is a danger, then, that physicians may alter their prescrib-
ing decisions in response to warnings about trivial drug risks, either by taking
all warnings less seriously or taking trivial warnings too seriously. As explained
482. Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 592 A.2d 1176, 1200 (N.J. 1991) (Garibaldi, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3027 (1992); see also Cooper, supra note 334, at 238 ("This point has additional
force where there is no similar collection of risk information about alternative therapies, such as surgical
procedures."); Scarlett, supra note 163, at 36 ("[O]verstated warnings could tip the judgment of the medical
profession in an undesirable direction.").
483. See supra notes 146-168 and accompanyingtext.
484. See Mulder v. Parke Davis & Co., 181 N.W.2d 882, 887 (Minn. 1970) (deviation from
manufacturer's recommendation provides prima facie evidence of negligence); Julien v. Barker, 272 P.2d
718, 724 (Idaho 1954) (package inserts provide "prima facie proof of a proper method of use"); James R.
Bird, Note, Package Inserts for Prescription Drugs as Evidence in Medical Malpractice Suits, 44 U. CHI.
L. REv. 398 (1977); cf. Ramon v. Farr, 770 P.2d 131, 134-35 (Utah 1989) (declining to followMulderbut
conceding that the package insert provides some evidence of the standard of care); 40 Fed. Reg. 28,582,




above, consumer choices about using other products may be distorted for
similar reasons.
C. Alternatives to Warning Labels
Thus, there are several cogent reasons for using label warnings on
consumer products sparingly and relying instead on other means to convey
hazard information. The dual concerns with dilution and overreaction are
especially relevant where a warning is intended only to disclose information
rather than to ensure safe use of a product. In particular, if public disclosure
of inconclusive animal data is the goal, risk labeling is not the appropriate
mechanism. Such warnings are likely to be ignored, distract users from other
more important information on the label, cause unnecessary alarm, or mislead
consumers into believing that a product poses a risk distinct from that posed
by other products containing similar ingredients. If the goal is simply to
advance a public dialogue, there are better means available.
In the case of extremely low-level risks, for example, it may not be
possible to. include hazard information on a product label that accurately
conveys the true extent of the risk to consumers. Because persons tend to
greatly overestimate the likelihood of low probability events,. 5 the placement
of any cautionary information whatsoever in product labeling is likely to
overstate the true risk. The best response to such problems may be to forego
the use of warnings altogether,486 as FDA has done in the case of food products.
If warnings are required, consumers should be given information that allows
a comparison of risks posed by different products serving the same purpose as
well as information concerning benefits that may be foregone in choosing not
to use a particular product.487 As a practical matter, the difficulty of providing
complete and balanced information in product labeling suggests that warnings
about insignificant risks should not be included in labeling.
The many shortcomings of warning labels do not mean that risk
communication efforts should be abandoned altogether for low-level product
risks such as potential allergens or chronic health hazards. Instead, other
methods for conveying relevant information should be explored. Such methods
range from less alarming label statements, such as ingredient disclosures, to
485. See supra note 459.
486. See Cooper, supra note 171, at 301-02 ("If the risk is not serious enough to warrant a ban, it
probably also does not warrant a warning on a large number of products.").
487. See NAS, supra note 368, at 33 (Consumers "choose between options, each of which presents
some risks. Each also presents benefits .... Both kinds of knowledgeare needed for an informed choice.");
Aaron D. Twerski et at., The Use and Abuse of Warnings in Products Liability-Design Defect Litigation
Comes ofAge, 61 CORN. L. REV. 495, 503 (1976) ("If, as a result of an adequate warning, consumers will
be faced with alternatives that are even more dangerous than the questioned product without a warning, then
perhaps that warning should not be imposed or if imposed should be couched in less frightening language.");
Kanouse & Hayes-Roth, supra note 373, at 157.
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public education campaigns. Certain of these alternatives would be more
effective and more closely commensurate with the level of attention warranted
by the evidence with respect to low-level product risks. The means chosen for
public disclosure should convey what is known about the health effects of
products in an accurate, comprehensive, and balanced fashion. If a risk is
serious enough to merit identification by a warning label, however, more direct
forms of regulation may be superior.
1. Less Alarming Disclosures in Labeling
Labeling statements short of warnings can be used to provide cautionary
information in some instances. For example, mandatory disclosures of the
presence of a certain ingredient can provide allergic persons with the informa-
tion that they need to avoid certain products without unnecessarily alarming
the great majority of consumers. As FDA explained:
[I]f notification of the presence of FD&C Yellow No. 5 can be
satisfactorily achieved by means other than a warning statement on
the labels of drug products, such other means should be used because
of space limitations and the importance of reserving the use of
warning statements to situations involving a greater potential for
adverse reaction or potential safety hazard.488
The Agency therefore generally has rejected suggestions that product labels
include warnings about possible allergens.489 Ingredient declarations in these
cases can satisfy the disclosure function without overwhelming consumers with
risk information. In addition, mandatory disclosures that specify the amount of
an ingredient present in a serving or dose of a product may suffice where
excessive consumption of a common substance (for example, sodium) is widely
understood as contributing to a certain health problem (for example, hyperten-
sion).49 In such cases, quantitative ingredient information allows consumers
to compare products and monitor their total intake if necessary.
Ingredient disclosures cannot, however, provide meaningful information
to persons who do not know whether they are allergic to the substance, and
quantitative declarations will not succeed unless consumers understand that the
ingredient poses some risk. Thus, FDA opted for a CFC warning instead of the
ingredient disclosure requirement adopted by EPA because "consumers may
488. 44 Fed. Reg. 37,212, 37,218 (1979).
489. See supra note 100.
490. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 343(q)(l)(D) (West Supp. 1993); 21 C.F.R. § 101.9(c)(8)(i) (1993). FDA's
sodium labeling proposal for OTC drug products would include an ingredient disclosure but would also
require a warning at higher levels. See supra note 142.
•'Vol. 11:293, 1994
Warning Labels
not understand the significance of a presence of chlorofluorocarbon in a
product, and the hazard posed, from a statement that simply states that the
product contains chlorofluorocarbon."49 Indeed, "[s]ome consumers may
assume the statement is made to indicate an especially valuable ingredient, and
they may interpret the statement as a reason for purchasing the product.""4 2
Unless consumers first are educated about the risks associated with an ingredi-
ent, simple disclosure statements will be ineffective and possibly even
counterproductive.
There may, however, be still other ways to provide risk information in
product labeling without using warning statements. Unlike cautionary statements
about acute hazards that seek to encourage particular types of behavior in the
use of the product, disclosures of risk information that do nothing more than
fulfill a right to know and possibly affect the purchase decision need not appear
as warnings. It may make more sense to develop a uniform coding system that
could be applied to labels of diverse products for purposes of disclosing basic
risk information. Somewhat like the five alphabetical pregnancy categories used
by FDA as a shorthand to describe the teratogenicity of prescription drugs,493
a chronic risk code could be developed for consumer products.494 Risk averse
persons who are sufficiently interested in pursuing further information would
be able to do so. In addition, unlike Proposition 65, which indiscriminately
labels substances as known carcinogens whether the lifetime risk of cancer is
one-in-ten or one-in-100,000, a uniform coding system could differentiate (even
if only imprecisely) between the varying degrees of risk posed by different
products.
Some commentators have suggested using numerical scales to convey risk
information.495 One such proposal would use a compressed logarithmic scale
491. 42 Fed. Reg. 22,019, 22,020 (1977).
492. Id. FDA recently suggested requiring that the labeling oftoothpaste products include information
about their fluoride levels. 57 Fed. Reg. 55,199 (1992). By allowing consumers to select toothpastes with
lower levels of fluoride, FDA hoped to minimize the risk of fluorosis (discoloration of teeth). Initial
comments from the industry argued that consumers might overreact and decrease use of fluoride toothpastes,
thereby increasingthe risk of dental caries. Id. at 55,200. Subsequent comments, based on consumer surveys,
argued just the opposite, namely that individuals believe fluoride is good and would select toothpastes
containingthe highest levels of this ingredient. F-D-C REPORTS ("The Rose Sheet"), April 5, 1993, at 3. It
was precisely for such reasons that FDA prohibited any reference to fluoride in the labeling of prenatal
vitamin products, 21 C.F.R. § 250.10(b) (1993), or a description of the level of fluoride present in bottled
water. 58 Fed. Reg. 2302, 2314 (1993).
493. See 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(O(6)(i) (1993), discussed supra notes 165-168 and accompanyingtext.
In addition, the labeling of controlled substances must bear a symbol displaying the schedule applicable
to the narcotic drug (a roman numeral adjacent to or within the letter "C"). See 21 U.S.C. § 825(a) (1988);
21 C.F.R. § 1302.03 (1993).
494. The State of California apparently is considering proposals to use a single chronic hazard symbol
for products subject to the Proposition 65 warning requirement. See F-D-C REPORTS ("The Rose Sheet"),
Feb. 15, 1993, at 14; FOOD CHEM. NEWS, Feb. 1, 1993, at 77. Some of the limitations in using symbols are
discussed in supra note 400.
495. See, e.g., HADDEN, supra note 378, at 245-48 (describing scaling system for rating the relative
hazards posed by a product); Ernest Newbrun, Criteria of Cariogenicityfor Labeling Foods, 105 J. AM.
DENTAL ASS'N 627 (1982) (suggesting that, instead of possible warning statement, food labels use numerical
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to denote the annual risk of mortality posed by a product or activity, with larger
numbers reflecting greater safety margins.4 96 Under this system, a product
posing a one-in-ten annual risk of death would be designated as 1.0, while a
product posing a one-in-one million annual risk of death would be designated
as 6.0. If one applied existing risk estimates, approximate risk scaling for some
of the products discussed in the previous parts of this Article might be as
follows: cigarettes (2.8), oral contraceptives (4.4), tampons (5.0), and saccharin-
containing soft drinks (5.2). A product just over the Proposition 65 threshold
would be assigned a 6.8 on this scale.
The shortcomings of the underlying risk assessments (or the complete lack
of reliable estimates for many products) would make accurate and uniform risk
scaling impossible. The proponents of this approach also concede that
consumers' lack of familiarity would represent a serious initial hurdle for their
proposal, but they argue that public comprehension Will develop over time, just
as happened with use of the Richter Scale for measuring earthquake intensity.497
The authors may, however, be overestimating the extent to which lay persons
recognize that the Richter Scale is logarithmic rather than linear, and efforts
to use a common risk metric may be misleading when very different products
or activities are compared.49 Nonetheless, safety scaling has undeniable benefits
for presenting information about low-level or chronic risks. Without causing
unnecessary alarm, it would allow interested consumers to evaluate hazards
associated with competing products. Acute hazards, particularly those that can
be avoided by following precautionary instructions, would still need to be
spelled out in full, but such information would no longer have to compete with
chronic risk information for users' attention.
2. Public Education Campaigns
Risk labeling sometimes is characterized as serving primarily educational
ends, but other media could be used to convey hazard information more
effectively.499 The labeling alternatives discussed above would, in most cases,
require accompanying efforts to educate consumers about how to interpret the
information, whether that means explaining the relevance of ingredient
disclosures or translating chronic risk codes or scales. Indeed, it may be wiser
scale to rank foods based on risk they pose of tooth decay).
496. JOHN URQUHART & KLAUS HEILMANN, RISK WATCH: THE ODDS OF LIFE 47-48 (1984).
497. Id. at 193.
498. See 44 Fed. Reg. 59,509, 59,512 (1979) ("The fact that some users of hair dyes engage in
dangeroussports does not entail that they are prepared to disregard even small risks from hair dyes."); NAS,
supra note 368, at 52 ("When lay and expert values differ, reducing different kinds of hazard to a common
metric (such as number of fatalities per year) and presenting comparisons only on that metric have great
potential to produce misunderstanding and conflict and to engender mistrust of expertise.").




to focus primarily on the need for public education campaigns about product
risks and to rely on labeling as an adjunct to such efforts.
Congress has included public education requirements in legislation
governing the labeling of products such as cigarettes and smokeless tobacco
products."' Agencies have undertaken multi-media educational efforts in some
cases, particularly when serious new hazards with widely-used products
subsequently come to light'O° Unfortunately, broader public education efforts
frequently are adopted only as an afterthought to more traditional warning label
requirements.
In 1978, BATF had proposed to require warning labels on alcoholic
beverages concerning the risks of fetal alcohol syndrome.0 2 The proposal was
abandoned one year later, however, in favor of a public awareness campaign. 3
The Agency explained that it wanted to pursue other forms of education before
deciding to mandate a warning label.50 4 In addition to believing that the issue
was too complex to be readily explained in labeling, the Bureau expressed
concerns about overstating the risk and unnecessarily frightening women who
may have had an occasional alcoholic beverage during their pregnancies. 5
BATF therefore announced a plan which included publishing and distributing
its report, disseminating brochures to the public and medical profession,
encouraging the development of educational programs in schools, preparing
public service television and radio announcements, and issuing press releases.0 6
BATF promised, however, that it would once again consider the warning label
proposal if these efforts proved unsuccessful or if more precise medical
500. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
501. See, e.g., 50 Fed. Reg. 51,400,51,401 (1985) (FDA public educationcampaignto alert consumers
about risk of Reye syndrome when using aspirin); 47 Fed. Reg. 26,982, 26,982 (1982) (describing joint
efforts of FDA, CDC, and other organizations to publicize risk of toxic shock syndrome associated with
tampons, but adding that label warnings were needed to remind women of risk). In the early 1970s, USDA
rejected petitions demanding that warning labels concerning the risk of salmonella appear on meat and
poultry products, opting instead for consumer education programs. Cf American Pub. Health Ass'n v. Butz,
511 F.2d 331, 332-35 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (holding that this choice represented proper exercise of discretion
by agency). More recently, USDA decided that its longstanding educational efforts had to be supplemented
by safe handling instructions in product labeling. See 58 Fed. Reg. 58,922, 58,928 (1993), discussed supra
note 86.
502. 43 Fed. Reg. 2186 (1978).
503. 44 Fed. Reg. 8288 (1979).
504. Id.
505. Id. at 8292.
506. Id. at 8293; see also NAS, supra note 368, at 159 ("[T]he communicating organization should
synthesize the scientific information base into a formal 'white paper' that can be generally released. This
document should summarize relevant quantitative and qualitative scientific information, the attendant
uncertainty about the risk and about risk reduction alternatives, and the assumptions employed."); Clark
E. Khoury; Note, Warning Labels May Be Hazardous to Your Health: Common-Law and Statutory
Responses to Alcoholic Beverage Manufacturers'Duty to Warn, 75 CoRN. L. REv. 158, 182-83 (1989)
(criticizing warning label mandated by Congress and instead recommending reliance on an "institutionally-
based" educational approach); McGuire, supra note 373, at 107-08 (noting suggestive evidence indicates
that public service advertisements "may be more cost-effective than product labels for lessening health
risks").
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evidence became available." 7 Congress intervened a decade later by mandating
that certain health warnings appear on the labels of alcoholic beverages.
Public education efforts would allow for a more detailed and balanced
account of equivocal animal findings than could possibly be conveyed on
product labels, and the information then could be disseminated further by the
lay media. For example, FDA has informed the public about adverse scientific
findings through advisory committee proceedings, talk papers, press releases,
and articles."° Similarly, as a number of courts have recognized, physicians can
be educated about prescription drug hazards through any number of vehicles
other than product labeling." 9 Several consumer guides to prescription drugs
are readily available,"' and similar reference materials could be developed for
other products.5t Although such compilations would reach only a fraction of
the population exposed to product labeling, interested persons would be able
to share in this information, instead of being confronted with meaningless or
vague warning statements on product labels.
Although public education campaigns can potentially reach a greater
number of persons, and can more accurately describe the nature and true extent
of a risk than is possible through labeling, they also have serious limitations
and should not substitute for direct forms of regulation where those are
appropriate.12 Amorphous calls for educational efforts to convey risk informa-
507. 44 Fed. Reg. 8288, 8293 (1979).
508. FDA recently decided that chronic risk information about doxylamine could be discussed in an
FDA CONSUMER article rather than in product labeling. 59 Fed. Reg. 4216,4217(1994); see also NAS, supra
note 368, at 159-60 ("Federal agencies could release [a "white paper" synthesizing relevant scientific
information] as-or in conjunction with-the preamble to a formal notice of proposed rulemaking, as has
been done for major regulations by the [FDA] and the EPA."); 59 Fed. Reg. 1638, 1640 (1994) ("In addition
[to labeling], FDA uses consumer education vehicles such as the FDA Consumer magazine to inform the
public about issues concerningmisuse of ornamental ceramicware to avoid lead exposure from this source.");
44 Fed. Reg. 59,509, 59,514 (1979) (in issuing its final rule on 4-MMPD, FDA decided that rulemaking
proceedings rather than product labeling would provide appropriate forum for debate about true nature of
risk).
509. See supra notes 273-276 and accompanying text. Furthermore, although FDA does not permit
statements of differing opinions in labeling, debates and disagreements about the risks posed by a substance
could be discussed more fully in scientific journals and other appropriate public fora. See 40 Fed. Reg.
28,582, 28,583 (1975); 39 Fed. Reg. 33,229, 33,231 (1974).
510. 47 Fed. Reg. 39,147, 39,149 (1982) ("The agency is aware of approximately 25 commercially
available books that provide readily understandable information about numerous prescription drugs....
Virtually all of these publications are available in paperback at a reasonable price. Moreover, such books
have the recognizable benefit of providing drug information in a single retainable volume, which the patient
can conveniently refer to with each refill of a prescription.").
511. See, e.g., Stenzel, supra note 227, at 523-25 (suggesting that product information fliers akin to
material safety data sheets used in occupational settings be made available to consumers at retail outlets
such as grocery stores). At least one such compilation, published by the Consumer Federation of America,
exists at present. See STEPHEN BROBECK & ANNE C. AVERYT, THE PRODUCT SAFETY BOOK (1983).
512. Unlike educational efforts, warning label requirements are essentially self-perpetuating programs
that impose few direct costs on the agency. Sustained public education campaigns undertaken by federal
regulators therefore are likely to remain uncommon unless mandated by Congress. See Robert S. Adler &
R. David Pittle, Cajolery or Command. Are Education Campaigns an Adequate Substitute for Regulation?,
I YALE J. ON REG. 159, 190-91 (1984); Sunstein, supra note 382, at 654 ("[O1ur first line of defense should
be educative, rather than regulatory. Thus far, we have tended to pursue the opposite strategy-regulate
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tion may share some of the same problems as warning labels. Furthermore,
disclosure of risk information through publications may trigger overly alarmist
media coverage. Unlike warning labels that may not be noticed, the media can
cause hysterical public reactions to inconsequential product risks.5"3
3. More Direct Forms of Regulation
Instead of relying on labeling as the primary responseto product hazards,
courts and regulators should resort to a warning strategy only after having
considered design alternatives or other regulatory options.5"4 Regulators
sometimes opt for labeling rather than prohibitions to preserve consumers'
freedom of choice. Critics have charged that risk communication is a "'shield
for inaction,' 515 and it is often true that labeling requirements reflect passive
responses used to deflect calls for more stringent regulation. Recognizing the
temptation faced by regulators when they must grapple with new information
about product hazards, the Administrative Conference of the United States
cautioned agencies that the "dissemination of risk information [should] not [be]
promoted merely as a lower-cost substitute in situations where prescriptive
standards might in fact be more appropriate.
''16
If the goal of risk labeling is to encourage consumers to stop purchasing
a product, as opposed to encouraging them to make informed choices, the
preferred solution would be to ban the product altogether rather than to
formulate an overly alarming warning statement.5"7 For example, FDA decided
to prohibit the use of chloroform as an ingredient in drug and cosmetic products
because of new evidence that this widely used substance is an animal carcino-
first, educate only in exceptional cases.").
513. See Sanford L. Weiner, Tampons and Toxic Shock Syndrome: Consumer Protection or Public
Confusion?, in CONSUMING FEARS, supra note 27, at 158 (arguing that the media oversold relative risk of
TSS); Auvil v. CBS "60 Minutes," 800 F. Supp. 928, 930-31 (E.D. Wash. 1992) (describing the "dramatic
and swift" public reaction to news story concerning alleged carcinogenicity of Alar, a growth regulator
widely used in apple industry); Howard Kurtz, Storieson Cancer 'sCausesAre Saidto Be Misfocused, WASH.
POST, July 27, 1993, at A6 (survey of news media coverage of carcinogens over last 20 years concluded
that relatively minor health risks are exaggerated).
514. See Leslie W. Ball, Hazard Control by Warnings, I I J. PROD. LIAB. 285 (1988).
515. NAS, supra note 368, at 96 (quoting Ellen Silbergeld, senior scientist with Environmental Defense
Fund).
516. 55 Fed. Reg. 13,538, 13,539 (1990). But see Sunstein, supra note 382, at 658-60 (favoring
informational remedies over direct regulations on grounds of protecting consumer liberty, increasing market
efficiencies, and improving democratic processes).
517. See Viscusi, supra note 358, at 290. "Labeling efforts [like Proposition 65] are a disservice to
the right-to-know movement.. . . [l]f all risks that consumers are exposed to are stamped as being conse-
quential with no distinctions being made about the severity of the risk, then there will be little or no
informational content to the warning program and it will have no beneficial effect on consumer choice."
Id. at 296; see a/so STEPHEN G. BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CtRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION 56
(1993).
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gen."'8 The Agency rejected comments recommending disclosure of the risk in
product labeling so that consumers could retain "the freedom to decide whether
to use the product." '519
Far too frequently, however, decisionmakers seize on risk labeling as the
preferred strategy for addressing consumer product hazards. Indeed, warning
requirements occasionally represent a surreptitious form of regulation, for
instance, to encourage design modifications or product reformulations without
directly mandating the desired changes. 2 The CFC warnings required by FDA
and CPSC, along with the more recent congressionally-mandated warning for
all ozone depleting substances, were intended to increase consumer demand for
alternatives during the transition to eventual prohibitions on the use of these
substances. If the goal is to influence behavior and deter use of a product
without entirely constraining freedom of choice, alternatives to labeling might
include special taxes levied on products containing hazardous substances,
restrictions on advertising, appropriate age limitations, and prescription
requirements of different stringency.52
518. 21 C.F.R. § 700.18 (1993); 41 Fed. Reg. 26,842 (1976); see also 21 C.F.R. § 700.14 (1993)
(banning vinyl chloride because of acute and chronic risks); id. § 700.11 (banning bithionol in cosmetics
because of photosensitivity reactions); id. § 700.13 (banning most uses of mercury compoundsin cosmetics);
id. § 700.19, 54 Fed. Reg. 27,328, 27,334 (1989) (banning methylene chloride as cosmetic ingredient
because estimated lifetime consumer cancer risk exceeded one in ten thousand). Notwithstanding their
potential toxicity, mercury compounds may be used as preservatives in cosmetics for use around the eye
because of their unsurpassed effectiveness in preventingpseudomonascontamination and ocular infection.
21 C.F.R. § 700.13(d) (1993). Although concentration limits are set, the regulation includes no labeling
requirements for such products.
519. 41 Fed. Reg. at 26,844; see also 52 Fed. Reg. 29,509,29,513(1987) (rejecting cautionary labeling
as an alternative to a prohibition on interstate sale of raw milk). In a recent proposal addressing hazards
from the ingestion of OTC products containing high levels of alcohol, FDA selected maximum concentration
limits (depending on age of target user population) rather than a warning statement. 58 Fed. Reg. 54,466,
54,471,(1993) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 328) (proposed Oct. 12, 1993).
520. Althoughcharacterizedas a "right to know"initiative, the product labeling requirement of Proposi-
tion 65 instead appears to have this as its primary goal. See Gatti, supra note 229, at 760 & n. 136. Similarly,
FDA's safety disclaimer for untested cosmetic products, 21 C.F.R. § 740.10(a) (1993) ("Warning-The
safety of this product has not been determined."), may have been imposed primarily to encourage
manufacturers of these products to undertake necessary testing. Indeed, there appear to be no products
currently on the market that include this disclaimer in labeling. Anthony D. Hitchins, Cosmetic Preservation
andSafety: FDA Status, 57 J. AsW'N FOOD & DRUG OFFICiALS 42, 43 (July 1993).
521. See Note, Health Regulation of Naturally Hazardous Foods, supra note 106, at 1046-47
(suggesting prescription or rationing system as an alternativeto FDA's ban on swordfish contaminated with
mercury); F-D-C REPORTS ("The Pink Sheet"), Feb. 15, 1993,at T&G-2 (describing these options as possible
ways of addressing suspected risk of hemorrhagic stroke from weight control products containing
phenylpropanolamine);cf. 53 Fed. Reg. 21,633, 21,635 (1988) (in extending Reye syndrome warning
requirement, FDA rejected suggestions urging "more drastic measures [such as] banning use of aspirin in
products for individuals under 21 years of age or limiting such products to prescription use"). One could
require that OTC drug products posing certain risks only be dispensed by pharmacists (the so-called "third
class" of drugs). See 39 Fed. Reg. 19,880, 19,880-81 (1974) (FDA rejectionof this idea); Gregory M. Fisher,
Third Class of Drugs-A Current View, 46 FOOD DRUG COsM. L.J. 583, 597-99,606-07 (1991) (describing
possibility that safety rationales couldj ustify creation ofan intermediateclass of drugs). Even the availability
of prescription drugs could be restricted further if certain serious risks are involved that cannot be avoided





In short, there are a number of regulatory alternatives available for
addressing product hazards. Warning statements should be reserved for those
risks that can best be minimized by conveying information in this fashion,
whether through instructions for safe use or as a means of risk disclosure to
a subpopulation of potential users. For instance, where useful products pose
acute risks that are easily avoided by following simple precautionary instruc-
tions, labeling is obviously justified. Similarly, if a product poses a serious risk
but only to a limited class of consumers (for example, pregnant women), then
an appropriate warning statement would be preferable to a prohibition. In other
cases, however, superior regulatory alternatives exist if disclosure (for its own
sake) or deterrence are the primary goals.
Conclusion
The use of warning statements in the labeling of consumer products
appears, at first blush, to be a relatively simple and straightforward response
to product hazards. Indeed, this evident simplicity has made labeling
requirements a preferred option for Congress, federal agencies, state lawmakers,
and the courts. When viewed in isolation, many of the warning requirements
imposed by each class of decisionmakers seem more or less defensible.
Considered in their entirety, however, many of these risk communication efforts
appear to be seriously misguided.
It is imperative, therefore, that the primary responsibility for labeling
decisions be vested in a single group of decisionmakers. Federal administrative
agencies are best suited for this task, and their decisions on the necessity of
warnings on labels should preempt state requirements arising under statutory
or common law. Congress could express such a judgment through new
legislation directed to consumer product labeling generally, or each agency
could take the initiative and declare that its warning requirements preempt state
law. States would retain the power to impose warning requirements for products
not subject to federal regulation, and courts could entertain products liability
claims in cases where manufacturers fail to comply with federal or state
requirements.
For their part, federal regulators will have to reexamine their own labeling
requirements, placing a greater emphasis on selectivity and consistency. To
date, agency efforts have been uneven. Better coordination might be achieved
through the creation of an interagency task force or working group directed to
address these problems. Among the most coherent and comprehensive product
warning strategies are FDA's regulation of prescription drug labeling, EPA's
control over pesticide labeling, and, to a lesser extent, CPSC requirements for
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hazardous substances. Package inserts and pesticide labels convey concrete and
balanced information about substantiated risks in a format that organizes this
information by level of severity. Ironically, courts have accorded little or no
respect to agency judgments about appropriate labeling for these categories of
products. As noted above, an essential element of any coherent risk
communication system would be the preemption of state requirements.
The real question, however, is whether decisions about the risk labeling
of other consumer products can be informed by the approaches used with
prescription drugs and pesticides. The same agency that has done such a
thoughtful job with package inserts has done a relatively poor job in designing
risk labeling for cosmetic products. Although difficulties would arise if
consumer labeling were modeled on an approach designed for physicians,
agencies and courts could develop improved strategies for communicating risk
information to product users. Warning statements should be reserved for those
risks that can best be minimized by conveying information through labeling,
namely by providing instructions for safe use (to avoid acute hazards) or by
serving as a means for disclosing important risk information to a clearly
identified segment of potential users. Otherwise, the crazy quilt of warning
statements on product labels will continue to grow, at least until courts either
penalize manufacturers for diluting serious warnings with trivia or refrain from
second guessing federal regulators who have undertaken the difficult task of
designing meaningful product labels.
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